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This work aims to make the case for reform to the law on euthanasia being necessary. There are certain constructs within the criminal law, passive euthanasia and the doctrine of double effect, that allow the courts to re-define physicians’ actus reus (in the case of passive euthanasia) or mens rea (in the case of double effect), and make it possible for them to do acts that would otherwise be seen as murder without the threat of legal sanctions. 

While it is not disputed that the majority of physicians who perform passive euthanasia or rely on the doctrine of double effect do so in good faith and therefore deserve legal protection, it will be argued these constructs they rely are logically not fit for purpose and that the courts allow, through their use, the very acts they purport to condemn.
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It is a universally accepted truth that there are, in the law of England and Wales, certain philosophical distinctions that define the boundaries between lawful and unlawful behaviour. Nowhere is this more evident than in the law on homicide, where culpability is measured against the concepts of action and intention. Action and intention are not only used as adjectives to describe the act of doing murder, they are the actus reus, or action part, and mens rea, or mental part, of the offence of murder at law. Thus if one acts with the intention of killing another without a lawful defence, one will be convicted of murder irrespective, or so it is often professed, of one’s motive or reasons for acting.

That said, there are circumstances where the courts feel that, morally, the perpetrator of what would otherwise be a crime deserves clemency. In these situations the same constructs that define a crime can be used to show how the acts of the perpetrator do not fit the actus reus or mens rea of the offence in question, and therefore exculpate the otherwise guilty party. Take the law surrounding the concept of euthanasia for example. Euthanasia is defined as murder in the same way any other kind of intentional killing is when it is procured through the actions of a physician who intends his patient’s death. However, when that same doctor omits to treat a patient, and that patient dies, the doctor is not guilty of murder because he did not act. This practice is known as passive euthanasia or euthanasia by omission and, while it is not overtly legal, it is not penalised in the same way active euthanasia is.

Action is not the sole determinant of guilt however, and its presence does not damn an actor who causes a death by active means. If it can be shown that that death was foreseen but not intended, and that the person who caused it is a physician, the doctrine of double effect (DDE) allows culpability to be legitimately dodged. 

Passive euthanasia and the DDE have existed in English and Welsh law for over three quarters of a century, and they have been debated and used with increasing frequency in recent years as the euthanasia debate truly entered the public sphere. It is this work’s aim to add to that debate by exploring the above-noted distinctions, distinctions which delineate between lawful inaction and culpable action, and unlawful intended death as opposed to lawful foreseen but unintended death, in order to make the case that the law on euthanasia needs to be reformed. It seeks, in exploring why this is the case, to answer the following question: ‘Why does the law on euthanasia need to be reformed, and how should that reform be effected?’ Clearly this question has two distinct facets to it, and these are echoed by the paired aims of this thesis. The first aim is to put together a logical, legal explanation as to why the law needs reforming, and the second is to respond to this need by producing a draft Bill which suggests a possible avenue for effecting that reform. 

The first aim is pursued in chapters 1 through 6. Chapters 1 and 2 will set out a premise known as the Moral Step Back (MSB), which works by disputing the viability of passive euthanasia and the DDE as mechanisms through which the courts show leniency to doctors who act in ways which cause the death of their patients. While this leniency is ethically well placed, the methods that allow it to be expressed are, it is alleged here, not fit for purpose.

Despite this professed illogicality, chapter 3 will show how the courts at present rely on these faulty doctrines, and will postulate possible reasons for this while highlighting the inconsistencies their use perpetuates. Chapter 4 then moves the discussion on to the effect this perpetuation has on the competing values of life and autonomy, and chapters 5 and 6 tackle the legal and moral reasons for and against reform respectively.

The second aim is the subject of chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 details the numerous possibilities for the format of the proposed reform, and concludes that creating a piece of legislation would be the most appropriate avenue to take. This conclusion is reached after a thorough exploration of other possible methods of reforming the law​[1]​ showed that the shortcomings of non-legislative methods, particularly the fact that each of them would require additional guidelines in order to ensure that their scope and effect could be properly defined and controlled, outweighed their positive aspects.​[2]​

Chapter 8 builds on this finding and evaluates the Assistance In Dying Bill (2011) with reference to the legislation on euthanasia in Australia,​[3]​ Belgium,​[4]​ the Netherlands,​[5]​ Switzerland,​[6]​ Oregon,​[7]​ and England and Wales.​[8]​ The Bill is based both on conclusions reached in chapter 7 and the MSB theory explored in chapters 1 and 2. It aims to address the MSB's contention that the use of passive euthanasia and the DDE allow, covertly and therefore without explicit regulation, the acts they purport to condemn by providing guidelines which, if complied with, will protect the physician who uses the Bill from prosecution.​[9]​ 

Simple adherence to the MSB's precepts however would not, given the fact that the Bill would need to be presented to and passed by Parliament to make the reforms it suggests part of English law, make having the Bill accepted by the legislature an easy task. Certain of the MSB's conclusions - for example that the withdrawal of treatment in certain circumstances is tantamount to performing active euthanasia - would be both almost impossible to frame appropriately as clauses in the Bill, and would furthermore do nothing to provide the regulation that this thesis concludes is necessary. As such, while it was written to reflect the MSB's conclusions, it is recognised that, were the Bill to mirror all of them to the letter, it would be almost impossible to have it accepted by Parliament as a workable instrument of law reform. The Bill's content is therefore balanced between faithful adherence to the MSB's principles and pragmatic temperance.

Given that the Bill is physician-centric, proceeding to draft it without consulting those it primarily concerns would be imprudent. As such, the empirical element of this work centres on interviewing physicians about their views on the efficacy of reforming the law. 

This methodology was chosen because of the advantages it has compared to other types of qualitative methodologies. In a private setting it is much easier to stimulate debate and discuss the particulars of the hypothetical statute without the participant feeling pressured by the presence of others into taking a more conservative view than they may usually have. The interviewees were assured that, even if they are completely against reform being effected to this area of law, their contributions were equally as valid and as helpful as those of a person who feels that change would be desirable. While it may be the case that informing the participants of this could have hinted towards this work's positive stance or reform and therefore potentially put off people with strongly opposing views, it was felt that the risk of this occurring was sufficiently low to warrant its inclusion. Furthermore it was feared that, if the assurance was omitted, prospective participants who did not favour reform may not have felt it appropriate to get involved in a study which concerns exploring the possibility of reforming the law on euthanasia. The topic itself predisposes one to assume that the person or organisation conducting the study is looking into the possibility of proposing legal change. Without the assurance, participants who did not think reform was necessary could have assumed that only the opinions of people who felt reform was needed were welcome.

The process of organising the interviews began with identifying the prospective participants. An internet directory of consultants in England and Wales was utilised to search for and select the participants. Because they needed to work in specialities that would entail them encountering end-of-life issues, oncologists, geriatricians and palliative care specialists were selected. These selections, but for the caveat on speciality, were random. It was decided that a minimum of 50 physicians from three randomly selected hospitals in England and Wales would be contacted to combat the problem of non-response. Based on the fact that it would be incredibly difficult to conduct enough interviews to obtain statistically significant results, it was concluded that the findings would not be extrapolated to the general population.

In order to carry out the interviews this methodology had to be submitted to Aberystwyth University’s Ethics Committee, the NHS Multi Centre Research Ethics Committee (MREC) in Cardiff and the Research and Development departments of each of the hospitals chosen for the study. Once the methodology was accepted by each of these bodies, a process that took well over a year to fully complete, each participant was provided with the full details of the study and an informed consent agreement which they were prompted to sign and return if they wished to take part. This agreement, coupled with the information pack, provided the participants with all of the information they needed to properly consent to taking part in the study, and also assured them that their rights to anonymity and confidentiality were of paramount importance, and would be respected at all times during and after the study. To this end, only participants who were happy to be named in the text of this work are named. Those who were not were assigned a moniker, which is used in the event that their opinions are referred to. 

The interviews took place between October 2008 and February 2010. The timeframe over which they were conducted was so wide because, in dealing with the expectedly high rate of non-response, the number of participants grew and encompassed hospitals outside of the original purview. Because of this, R&D approval was required from each new site before the physicians targeted by the study could be approached, which took a considerable amount of time to obtain. 

The interviews were semi-structured, lasted for an average of 40 minutes and were recorded on a Dictaphone for later transcription. To minimise the effects of researcher bias, interviewer participation in the interviews was restricted to asking questions and following up interesting leads only. Five main topics were explored in each interview:

1.	The act/omission distinction.
2.	The distinction between intention and foresight in the context of the doctrine of double effect.
3.	Whether the physician was for or against assisted dying as a concept.
4.	 His/her reasons for feeling as s/he did about assisted dying and,
5.	Whether s/he believed reforming the law on euthanasia in some way is an appropriate course of action. 
































The euthanasia debate and the discord that has come to be its hallmark are by no means new. The first glimmers of it can be traced back before Thomas More’s Utopia was written to the discourses of Plato, Seneca, Cicero and Socrates. Later came the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas and later still, moving into the modern discourse, the writings of Kant, Gormally, Kuhse, Finnis, Fisher, Otlowski, Keown and innumerate others. 

The ethical dimensions of euthanasia, assisted suicide (AS), physician assisted suicide (PAS) and end of life decision-making in general have been mapped and mapped again in recent years.​[10]​  As such, any attempt made in this chapter to reconcile the incongruous discourse and differing opinions would only serve to reaffirm the fact that that friction exists. For all the dissent however there are a number of interrelated issues upon which key features of the debate rest. The first of these is definitional by nature and concerns the distinctions made between euthanasia, AS and PAS at law. The former of the three is discussed at length in section 1.1 (below), and of the latter pair only AS is defined statutorily – specifically in section 2(1) of the Suicide Act (1961) as amended by section 59 of the Coroners and Justice Act (2009). PAS is treated in much the same way as AS is, the only differences being the identity of the person assisting, the possibility of professional sanctions being imposed in tandem with those prescribed by section 2(1) and the fact that the assistor being a physician is a factor in favour of prosecution under the Director of Public Prosecution's Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (2010).​[11]​

Another of the precepts underpinning the debate concerns distinctions, specifically those between acts and omissions in the context of active and passive euthanasia and intention and foresight in relation to the doctrine of double effect (DDE). Both of these theories have been exhaustively canvassed and opinions run the gamut between scholars like Keown​[12]​ who supports both, and those like Harris​[13]​ who maintains stalwart reservations about the efficacy of either.

This thesis aims to tackle each of these topics in turn. It begins by discussing the numerous definitions of ‘euthanasia’, as opposed to AS or PAS which have comparatively settled definitions.​[14]​ From this discussion it goes on to piece together the ‘moral step back’ (MSB) theory – one which aims to prove that neither the distinction between acts and omissions (in cases concerning active and passive euthanasia), nor that between intention and foresight (in the context of double effect) are viable. 

The theory’s starting point is recognition of the moral blamelessness of the physicians involved in cases where euthanasia (the active or passive form) or double effect occurs.​[15]​ It concedes from its genesis therefore that in retaining these ‘non-viable’ distinctions the law as it stands reflects a welcome and prevailing moral standpoint. It also acknowledges the likelihood that the distinctions remain to allow physicians to distance themselves from the consequences of their ‘actions’ or ‘omissions’, and again maintains that this exercise, whilst based on flawed logic and in a sense an act of providing ‘Soma’​[16]​ for the conscience or ‘self delusion’,​[17]​ is not a morally reprehensible thing.​[18]​ It appears to allow physicians to do what they feel to be correct in very difficult circumstances ‘...without feeling pangs of conscience...’​[19]​ It would be reprehensible therefore if a theory cast blame upon such an action, and the MSB does not do so.

The theory alleges, and earns its name from the allegation that, by maintaining the abovementioned distinctions, the law allows practitioners to ‘step back’ from the death of a patient and distance themselves morally from it, regardless of the fact that their actions are allegedly equivalent to the prohibited practices of active euthanasia and causing death with the intention to cause it. Furthermore, it is alleged that the courts, by allowing a competent patient to request the withdrawal of treatment, but not ‘active’ assistance in ending his life, perpetuate jurisprudential arbitrariness in cases concerning the end of life. This arbitrariness impliedly evidences a disinclination to recognise a person’s autonomy where he requests active assistance in dying, one which is inexplicable if the MSB is taken to be accurate because of the lacking distinction between active and passive ‘acts’.

This chapter will be focused solely on exploring the acts/omissions facet of the MSB, while chapter 2 tackles the intention/foresight distinction and double effect. Discussion in this chapter will be split into three parts: the first dealing with the definition of euthanasia, as noted above; the second, after a brief look at the MSB, endeavouring to define the concepts key to the acts/omissions theory; and the third focused on exploring the theoretical underpinnings of the MSB and on how it is evidenced jurisprudentially.

The MSB’s protestations at the illogicalities upon which the law on passive euthanasia and double effect – and by extension the physician’s exercise of distancing – remain. The MSB seeks to argue that when the distinctions at the heart of both forms of ‘defence’​[20]​ are diminished, the courts have no recourse but to impose a murder conviction on the morally blameless physician.  This argument is presented in order to make the case for legislative reform being the most appropriate mechanism for providing the needed protection. To do so the MSB claims the following:

1)	In relation to the act/omission distinction it aims to prove that both acting to cause death and omitting to treat which results in death are equivalent both morally and practically in their ends and means. As such it reasons that either both should be legal or both should be illegal. 

2)	A similar vein is followed in discussing intention and foresight in relation to the doctrine of double effect. The argument here is that while the distinction between them at law is correct, it cannot be maintained in a situation where a person acts to achieve the foreseen but unwanted end.

These issues will be discussed at length in chapter 2. Presently this chapter turns to the definition of euthanasia for, as Wreen once wrote: ‘It cannot hurt, I figure, and frequently can help, to know precisely what you are talking about.’​[21]​

1.1 Euthanasia: the often defined, yet never defined concept

‘Devised for service in a rhetoric of persuasion, the term euthanasia, and its synonyms, has no accepted and philosophically warranted core of meaning.’​[22]​

Etymologically speaking ‘euthanasia’, from the Greek ‘eu’ meaning ‘good’ and ‘thanatos’ referring to death and, in Freudian terms the ‘death instinct’,​[23]​ means the want for a good or easeful death.​[24]​ Using this as a starting point it can presumed that euthanasia – since its central precept is the achievement of a ‘good’ death – concerns itself with the avoidance of a ‘bad’ one. This then raises questions concerning how, if euthanasia is by definition the want for a ‘good’ death, the practice itself can be seen as ‘bad’. 

Davies​[25]​ draws attention to the Nazi ‘euthanasia’ regimes of the 1930’s, where ‘undesirables’ were killed in the quest for Aryan purity. Clearly, in this context, the phrase confers an evil purpose, though an extended discussion on this issue would be out of place in this section. The focus here is on the meaning of the word, not its connotations.

Current thought gives a certain impression of what ‘euthanasia’ entails. Wreen provides a working definition, split up into six stages. Under these ‘Person A’ commits euthanasia only if:

1.	A kills B or lets him die.
2.	A intended to kill B.
3.	The intention specified in (2) was at least a partial cause of the action specified in (1).
4.	The causal journey from the intention specified in (2) to the action specified in (1) is more or less in accordance with A’s plan of action.
5.	A’s killing of B was a voluntary action.
6.	The motive for the action specified in (1), and the motive standing behind the intention specified in (2), is the good of the person killed.​[26]​

Huxtable builds on these ideas, stating that ‘euthanasia’ involves: ‘…the intentional ending of the life (whether the recipient wants this or not) of someone, which is motivated by the belief that this will be in some way beneficial for them…’​[27]​ He goes on to state that: ‘The motive rests on the idea of mercy…the agent practising euthanasia aims to (and does) put an end to the poor quality of life that the patient is enduring or is likely to endure…’​[28]​ as a result of ‘…a medical condition of some kind, usually a severe one that is of a terminal or chronic nature.’​[29]​

Though not without the need for clarification, Wreen and Huxtable manage to encompass the main body of what ‘euthanasia’ is taken to entail within their definitions. There must be an action that causes death (looking past the vexing act/omission distinction for a moment); the intention of ‘A’ must have been to cause ‘B’s ‘good’ death and causation is required to link ‘A’s action to ‘B’s death. ‘A’s motive must be pure and her actions must have been voluntary. ‘B’ will generally be terminally ill and, if he is not suffering as a result of it already, foresees that he will suffer as a result of that illness to an extent he does not wish to.

However it is more complicated than this because many writers​[30]​ recognise specific categories or types of euthanasia within the broad framework set out by Wreen and Huxtable. Those that are universally accepted within the literature​[31]​ are defined by Herring, who brings the issues of competency and consent to light:

‘Voluntary euthanasia: behaviour which caused the patient’s death at the patient’s request. Non-voluntary euthanasia: behaviour which causes euthanasia without the consent or objection of the patient (i.e. where the patient is unable to consent or object). Involuntary euthanasia: Where the competent patient has not expressly consented to die, but nevertheless they are killed.’​[32]​

To add to the semantic jumble, there is the distinction between ‘active’ euthanasia and ‘passive’ euthanasia. It will later be argued that this distinction is a misnomer when based on the act/omission distinction, but for now it is prudent to recognise it for clarity’s sake. Campbell, Gillett and Jones explain the concepts: ‘Active euthanasia occurs when the doctor kills the patient…There is also passive euthanasia or letting die, which involves bringing about the death of another by inaction.’​[33]​ The core notions entailed in discussing ‘euthanasia’ are thus identified. Needless to say, its connotations and the debates it incites ‘reflect particular moral viewpoint(s)’​[34]​ and therefore make a universally agreed definition lamentably difficult to pin down.  However, there is a general consensus within the academic community on the concepts Herring and Campbell et al describe.
 
These agreed-upon ideas are displayed in Wreen’s first and second criteria, which expose the doctrinal underpinnings of the law of euthanasia. Distinctions at law are made between killing and letting die, the former illegal, the latter permissible (Wreen’s 1st criterion), and intended and foreseen consequences; again, the former when the DDE is utilised illegal, the latter permissible (Wreen’s 2nd criterion). While it is conceded here that both distinctions are morally important and weighty, the MSB alleges that they are based on fictions employed by the courts to circumvent the absolute prohibition on intentional killing. Without the concepts of ‘letting die’ and ‘foreseen but not intended consequences’ or double effect, there would be no recourse for the courts, when faced with a case like R v. Adams​[35]​ or R v. Cox,​[36]​ but to convict the practitioner involved with murder. The coming sections detail the theoretical basis for this contention and begin by outlining and discussing the MSB.

1.2	The Moral Step Back

As section 1 points out, the MSB claims to show that the traditional distinctions between acts and omissions in the context of euthanasia, and between intention and foresight in the DDE are based on flawed logic. This argument is made with a view to alleging that reference to them in cases where a doctor has ‘allowed’ death or ‘foreseen’ but not intended it, puts the courts in a position where they must rely on illogical distinctions to save an otherwise blameless doctor from the murder conviction his conduct incites. 

Furthermore it claims that active and passive euthanasia are equivalent in both their ends and means,​[37]​ and that, as a result of this parity, both forms should be dealt with in the same way by the courts. Clarity dictates that both practices be considered either lawful or unlawful because they are the same thing – an action which causes the death of a patient. The doctrinal underpinnings of this contention come from the work of Rachels and Harris.

Rachels’ Equivalence thesis will be discussed in detail in section 1.4.1, however, briefly, it claims that a Kantian view of active and passive euthanasia uncovers a similarity between them which is overlooked at law in favour of maintaining the distinction between the practices. Both active and passive euthanasia, says Rachels, achieve the same ends. In both cases the patient dies and in both cases his or her family grieves. As such both outcomes are morally equivalent because, for all intents and purposes, they are the same. The MSB builds on Rachels’ thesis but maintains its Kantian flavour. It claims that not only are the ‘ends’ of active and passive euthanasia equivalent, but the means used to meet those ends are also equivalent both morally and in how they are effected. Consequently, and with reference to Rachels, it should be the case that both forms of death causing, ‘active’ or ‘passive’, are treated equally.

Harris’ philosophy on acts and omissions and what he calls ‘the argument from self-deception’ have also influenced the theory behind the MSB. Quoting from his book The Value of Life provides an instructive introduction as to the content of this point of view:
‘Indeed self deception is sometimes advanced as itself constituting the moral difference between active and passive euthanasia. The argument here is that it is only because the medical staff...are able to protect themselves from full awareness of what they are doing that they are able to bring themselves to do what they judge to be morally required in the circumstances. Here the idea that they are only ‘letting nature take its course’ allows them to distance themselves from the death of the child and fit their part in events more comfortably into their conception of the medical role.’ ​[38]​ (emphasis added)

The key aspect of Harris’ thesis on self-deception is his mention of ‘distancing’. The act/omission distinction and that between intention and foresight, claims the MSB, allow physicians to distance themselves from the death, saving them from both legal and moral censure and providing Soma for their consciences.​[39]​ Harris’ thesis also forms the basis of the second of the MSB’s claims: that the distinction between intention and foresight as maintained by the DDE is as flawed as that between acts and omissions and is still kept for the same reason.​[40]​ It affords the doctor a chance to ‘step back’ from the consequences of his actions instead of saddling him with the blame for causing the death.

Miller, Troug and Brock in their paper 'Moral Fictions and Medical Ethics'​[41]​ explore a concept similar to the MSB. The authors are concerned with what they term 'moral fictions' and the impact these fictions have on medical practice. The define them as follows:
'Moral ﬁctions are false statements endorsed to uphold cherished or entrenched moral positions in the face of conduct that is in tension with these established moral positions.'​[42]​

On the face of it this concept of moral fictions is startlingly similar to the MSB. Indeed the MSB derides the distinctions between acts and omissions and intention and foresight in DDE cases as fictitious, and explains their presence and maintenance with reference to their ability of facilitate a MORAL step back from the deleterious consequences of certain actions. However, there are stark differences between the theses if these face value similarities are looked past. The MSB for example is predicated on exploring and dismissing the distinctions it questions; distinctions which make certain of Miller et al's moral fictions possible. By contrast,  Miller et al focus on identifying these overarching moral fictions and explaining why they exist. They rightly proclaim that:

'...moral ﬁctions relating to end-of-life decisions...make morally challenging medical practices, such as withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and providing pain-relieving medication at the risk of hastening death, consistent with the norm that doctors must not kill, or assist in killing, patients.'​[43]​

A further and more pertinent distinction between the two theses is evidenced in this quotation. Miller et al are concerned with avoiding a disconnect between medical norms and the law that regulates the proper practice of medicine. They concede, despite stating, 'in theory, the moral work done by...moral fictions in the ethics of end-of-life decisions is expendable'​[44]​ that, 'with respect to the law, it is relatively easy to see [that] these moral ﬁctions...need to be endorsed in order to make medical practice consistent with the law.' The MSB on the other hand is predicated on the effect that the distinctions it contests have on the conscience of the physicians that use them, and on arguing that the law maintains the distinctions to facilitate the 'moral step back' they allow the physicians to take.

To begin exploring these distinctions this chapter now turns to two of the foundational principles upon which the MSB is based: the concepts of ‘action’ and ‘omission’. ‘Acts’ or ‘actions’ are an essential part of the criminal law in England and Wales. Without an actus reus or guilty act there is no crime to speak of.​[45]​ Indeed it is on this basis, as section 1.2 has shown, that the boundaries between illegal ‘active’ and permissible ‘passive euthanasia’ are delineated. In order for the MSB to accurately minimise this distinction, it is necessary here to make the bases upon which it is made – action as opposed to inaction or omission – as clear as possible. 

1.3 Action and the meaning behind what it is to act

Many general theories of action exist which provide differing explanations for and definitions of the concept, each with differing criteria upon which these understandings are based. Humean philosophy focuses on the interplay between desires and beliefs;​[46]​ Kantian theories propound procedures for checking that a plan of action is supported by sufficient and consistent reasons,​[47]​ and Aristotelian discourses seek to explore the ultra refined sensibilities of the practically intelligent reasoner.​[48]​ Despite these conceptual differences, they share common ground in the belief that practical reasoning describes reasoning directed towards the doing of intentional action.​[49]​ Without it, action ceases to be action at all, instead becoming ‘mere movement’.​[50]​ In recognition of this dichotomy, this section will explore practical reasoning with a view to finding an answer to one of the main questions tackled by the abovementioned philosophical stances: What does it take to be an action at all? 

In contemporary moral philosophy there are four main views taken on the topic of practical reasoning: the calculative view of Vogler​[51]​ and Thompson;​[52]​ the practice view​[53]​ of Rawls​[54]​ and Schapiro;​[55]​ the authorship view argued over by Korsgaard​[56]​ and Velleman​[57]​and the evaluatory view explored by Buss.​[58]​ The calculative and practice theses are based on non-psychologistic reasoning – reasoning which does not take the psychology of the actors in question into account – where the authorship and evaluatory views are, like the MSB, based upon it almost exclusively. Because of this division, the non-psychologistic theories will not be examined in great depth in the coming paragraphs, though references will be made where necessary.
Authorship theory, like the MSB, posits that action’s distinguishing feature is its capacity for being ‘authored’ – that it originates from a person. The two most developed theses in this area are those of Korsgaard and Velleman. To Korsgaard, what gives an action an author is that it is attributable to the person as a whole (not just to one of his drives or strong desires). In order to be so attributed a constitution is required. Constitutions are a form of psychic organisation and regulation, and they specify the procedures by which actions are to be produced. Actions are therefore owned, and so are full-fledged actions only when they are produced under a constitution.​[59]​ This connection between agent and action must be tangible enough ‘...that we can hold agents responsible for what they do.’​[60]​
The need for a moral connection between actor and action, and for this connection to be related to the actor’s autonomous choices, is also recognised by the MSB. One should not be held morally or legally responsible for a reprehensible action if it was not one’s choice to perform it. Indeed the defence of duress reflects this principle and impliedly recognises Korsgaard’s assertions regarding the universality​[61]​ of practical reasons. 
Under the authorship thesis, the alternative to a universal form of practical reasoning is particularistic reasoning. This however does not allow for freedom of choice, and identification with a principle of choice is necessary if there is to be substance to the distinction between actions (which are authored) and mere activity. In making this distinction and dismissing ‘particularistic’ reasoning, Korsgaard distinguishes between intentional action (that which she takes to be authored) and unintentional or ‘bare’ movement.  This gives her theory a Kantian flavour, as a part of Kant’s philosophy expressly imposes a universalisability requirement on practical reasons.​[62]​ The MSB also equates autonomy through the principle of choice with the ability to perform intentional actions and, as Korsgaard does, distinguishes action from mere activity or movement in this manner. 
Like the MSB and Korsgaard, Velleman takes action, as contrasted with mere activity, to be owned.​[63]​ He posits that ownership requires a definite structure within an agent, and understands the forms of practical reasoning to be determined by that structure. The sense of ownership in Velleman’s thesis has to do with whether the agent can honestly dissociate himself from his action or motivation,​[64]​ and was inherited from Frankfurt,​[65]​ Watson​[66]​ and Benson.​[67]​ Frankfurt hypothesizes that a desire is fully-fledged ‘yours’ when you have a suitable second-order desire,​[68]​ and Watson feels that this proposal merely pushes the question back to whether the second-order desire was fully-fledged yours. Benson in turn rejoined Watson, querying what makes a set of values one’s own.​[69]​ 
The problem faced by Frankfurt and Watson seems to take the shape of an infinite regress,​[70]​ and Velleman counters this by locating a psychological element the agent cannot dissociate himself from (thus halting the regress). Because to act is to act with reasons, an agent cannot dissociate himself from a desire to act for reasons without ceasing to be an agent altogether. When such a desire to produce an action – by weighing with others of its kind in favour of producing the action – causes the action to come about, Velleman concludes that the agent produces the action. Three assumptions can therefore be deduced from Velleman’s theory:
1.	Actions are owned,
2.	An action is owned when it cannot be disowned and,
3.	The only anchor for an action that an agent cannot disown in turn, without ceasing to be an agent, is the desire to act for reasons.
An action is what is produced by the operation of this desire, and so this desire amounts to the constitutive aim of action. It will therefore serve to determine which reasons for action are practical ones. A similar approach is taken by evaluatory theorists like Buss.
Like Velleman’s and Korsgaard’s, Buss’s work distinguishes between mere movements of the body and fully-fledged intentional action by requiring, for the latter, that agents endorse their actions at the time they are initiated. This endorsement or acknowledgement of one’s reason for acting must be such that it gives sufficient reason for performing the action. Anything less than this, argues Buss, amounts to acting as a spectator towards one’s own acts – to waiting to see if an identified desire will be actuated without acting to pursue it at all. 
There is a tangible overlap between Buss’s thesis and Velleman’s. Both are concerned that an agent acts for reasons, a requirement that manifests as a desire in Velleman’s work and as an evaluation in Buss’s. This concern however is differently motivated. Velleman is working to stop a regress in the structural analysis of agency where Buss is trying to express the philosophical thought that action is active rather than passive.
Thus far it is clear that, irrespective of their differences in approach, Korsgaard, Velleman, Frankfurt and Buss all identify practical reasoning with some ‘thing’ within the reasoner. For Korsgaard this element is ‘intention’; for Velleman it is the desire to act for reasons; Frankfurt takes it to be a second-order desire and to Buss it is a process of evaluation. The MSB, in turn, takes action’s defining quality to be that it originates from the mind of the actor. It is therefore seen to be caused by some kind of psychological state or process which is precipitated (or is actuated in the world the actor exists within) by action. The precise nature of this state will be discussed in section 1.3.1. For now it is prudent only to call it ‘X’. In Newtonian terms there is no effect, no action, without a cause and that cause is ‘X’. The effect comes about because a person, whatever his practical reasons for doing so, sets his mind to bringing it about and acts in a manner, precipitated by ‘X’, to do so. Section 1.3.1 will be focused on defining the character of ‘X’ and using that to settle on a tentative definition of action itself.
1.3.1 Defining ‘Action’
Thomas Aquinas wrote of the first principles of action:

‘Virtue dictates a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing’s perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act...’​[71]​

Aquinas appears to define ‘act’ with reference to the ‘end’ of the exercise of ‘power’. The means by which the end (‘act’) is achieved is ‘power’ and ‘power’ to Aquinas denotes will and virtue. Aristotle​[72]​ understood action in a similar manner. He reasoned that human beings have a function specific to them and that this function must be an activity of the psyche (the soul) in accordance with reason (logos). Aristotle identified the pursuit of happiness and wellbeing as the aim of all deliberate human action, and felt that this was the optimum activity of the soul. Although, outside of Utilitarian circles, the claim that all deliberate action is done in the pursuit of one’s wellbeing and happiness is plainly an overstatement, Aristotle identifies a key feature of the philosophical understanding of action in his references to the ‘soul’. To him the soul seems to be the beginnings or point of genesis of deliberate human action.  Modern thinkers in the field refrain from using this word, but the concept it captures – the idea of some intangible beginnings from which action comes – is prevalent in modern discussions.​[73]​

Hornsby​[74]​ for example argues that actions are events begun beneath the surface of the skin. The argument for this highlights an ambiguity in the slogan ‘all actions are bodily movements’, for if movement is required for action the phrase is inaccurate. The ambiguity stems from the fact that ‘move’ is one of the class of verbs that can occur either transitively​[75]​ or intransitively.​[76]​ Nominal expressions containing such verbs are therefore ambiguous because word order and sentence structure can change the perceived cause of the action under scrutiny. Take for example the phrase: ‘the movement of the flag’. The ‘movement’ can refer to either the action of someone’s moving the flag or to the resultant movement of the flag. Transitive verbs therefore, claims Hornsby, are the only form which make the assertion ‘all actions are bodily movements’ true. 

It appears, on Hornsby’s logic, that there are species of action that are not evidenced by bodily movement. The possibility that cognitive processes are actions has been taken up by proponents of volitional theory, of whom Frankfurt is one. Frankfurt’s thesis delineates between ‘high order volitions’ and ‘action-determining volitions’. Volitions, to Frankfurt, are desires, and come in two further forms to those already mentioned: first-order and second–order. First-order volitions are desires about anything else, such as to own a new car, or meet the pope or drink alcohol. Second-order volitions by contrast are the desire that a particular first-order desire be our will; that is, that it be the one that moves us to act.​[77]​

Davis disagrees with Frankfurt’s conclusions on volitions being the motivating desires behind action and surmises that actions are a species of ‘doing’:

‘Moving my arm is something I do; my doings are to be contrasted with my states, things that I am. I may be frightened or excited...watchful...tired...None of these are things that I do, and so none is my action...Actions...(are) doings which we must say the person does...’​[78]​
 
On this logic it is the volition​[79]​ or ‘will’​[80]​ behind a movement, the movement of one’s arm for example, which turns what would otherwise be an unconscious or ‘bare’ motion into an action. Will is separate from desire in that the former implies an action has been, is being, or will be pursued where the latter may exist separate from any move to pursue the desired goal. In Davis’ words, ‘...a doing (the arm moving under its own weight for example)...is an action if and only if an event of the corresponding type (the arm being moved) occurs as a result of the volition.’​[81]​ Utterly unconscious ‘doings’ like hiccupping and bleeding are not therefore ‘actions’ because they do not occur as the result of a volition. 

Another definition of action is provided by Anscombe, and defended by Davidson. The ‘Anscombe-Davidson’ thesis is based on circumstances where a person might be said to perform numerous acts at the same time. Goldman provides an instructive example of such a scenario:

‘Suppose John does each of the following things (all at the same time): (1) he moves his hand, (2) he frightens away a fly, (3) he moves his queen to king-knight-seven, (4) he checkmates his opponent, (5) he gives his opponent a heart attack, and (6) he wins his first chess game ever.’​[82]​

According to Anscombe and Davidson John only performs one act (one ‘doing’ in Davis’ terms) in the above example. John’s moving his hand, in their view, is identical with his moving his queen to king-knight-seven; John’s moving his hand is identical with his checkmating his opponent and so on. Understood in this manner there is but a single act done, which can be defined in numerous ways. Anscombe explains:

‘...a single action can have many different descriptions, e.g. “sawing a plank,” “sawing oak,” “sawing one of Smith’s planks,” “making a squeaky noise with the saw,” “making a great deal of sawdust,” and so on...Are we to say that the man who (intentionally) moves his arm, operates the pump, replenishes the water supply, poisons the inhabitants, is performing four actions? Or only one? ... In short, the only distinct action of his that is in question is this one, A. For moving his arm up and down with his fingers round the pump handle is, in these circumstances, operating the pump; and, in these circumstances, it is replenishing the house water supply; and, in these circumstances, it is poisoning the household. So there is one action with four descriptions...’​[83]​

Davidson concurs and adds:

‘I flip the switch, turn on the light, and illuminate the room. Unbeknownst to me I also alert a prowler to the fact that I am home. Here I do not do four things, but only one, of which four descriptions have been given.’​[84]​

And in another article Davidson writes:

‘But what is the relation between my pointing the gun and pulling the trigger, and my shooting the victim? The natural and, I think, correct answer is that the relation is that of identity.’​[85]​

Goldman, referring to the latter quote names this idea of singular acts and the relationship between them and identity as the ‘identity thesis’.​[86]​ What can be drawn from Goldman’s work is another conception of the idea of ‘action’. Stating his theory in a sentence he writes: ‘To perform an act is to exemplify a property. A particular act, then, consists in the exemplifying of an act-property by an agent at a particular time.’​[87]​ 

To properly understand this idea, a brief digression into terminology is necessary. According to Goldman one must distinguish between ‘act-types’ and ‘act-tokens’. ‘An act-type is simply an act-property...such as mowing one’s lawn, running, writing a letter...’​[88]​ and so on. These things are properties​[89]​ because they can be true of, or exemplified by a particular object at a particular time. By comparison an ‘act-token’ is ‘...the exemplifying of a property by an agent at a time.’​[90]​ Therefore John’s moving his hand at 2pm is described by Davidson as an ‘act-token’ of the property ‘moving one’s hand’. Each ‘act-token’ is attributable only to a single property. As such John’s moving his hand at 2pm is an ‘act-token’ of the property ‘moving one’s hand’, but not of ‘moving the queen to king-knight-seven’. In this way Goldman’s thesis differs from those of Davidson and Anscombe. The former contends that each of John’s acts are separate where the latter pair maintain the opposite – that, as was noted above, John’s moving his hand is identical with his moving his queen to king-knight-seven.

Davis’ idea of the ‘volition’ behind actions is a wise place to begin defining action because it is focused on the state which precedes an action being done and can be used to distinguish between simple ‘movement’ or unconscious action and volition based action. Though volitional theory as a whole has been criticised,​[91]​ the basic concept of some ‘thing’​[92]​ which drives action remains a plausible one and has been corroborated by numerous scholars. Goldman, for example, discusses what he terms ‘feature X’ in the context of his thesis and although he does not specifically refer to this ‘feature’ as a ‘volition’, his understanding of its part in propelling action correlates with Davis’ closely. Discussing ‘feature X’ Goldman notes:

‘...(we are) aware, intuitively, of a characteristic manner in which desires and beliefs flow into intentional acts. Certainly we can ‘feel’ a difference between a voluntary and an involuntary one, and this feeling...is symptomatic of certain causal processes...’​[93]​





There are contrasting opinions regarding the exact form and function​[98]​ of ‘volitions’ and how best they should be categorised. Certain scholars, Moore being one of them, Goldman and Austin​[99]​ two others, feel that the concept of a ‘volition’ is best described as a kind of want, desire​[100]​ or wish. Others, Donagan​[101]​ for example, feel that neither desires, beliefs, wants or wishes are ‘volitions’ and speak in terms of ‘choosing’ when referring to the mental states that uniquely initiate action. Further, Harman,​[102]​ Grice,​[103]​ Melden​[104]​ and O’Shaughnessy​[105]​ substitute ‘choosing’ for talk of ‘willings’ which they take to be separate from intention and attribute as being the cause of action.

There are vagaries of definition and shortcomings in each viewpoint. If ‘volitions’ are taken to be beliefs then they, as beliefs are, must be understood to be cognitive states. This conclusion is questionable, as one can believe that one will act in a certain way, or that acting in a certain way is desirable, or that a certain act-type exists without having decided to act at all. Thus, it is argued here, a ‘volition’ – the initiator of willed action – is not rightly expressed by the term belief.

 If, instead, ‘volitions’ are taken to be desires or wants, they are a species of what Davidson calls ‘pro attitudes’​[106]​ – an expression encompassing all motivational states in practical reasoning – and if volitions are a kind of desire they would share this motivational characteristic. Moore disputes this understanding of the term, noting that ‘volitions’ play an executory role in relation to wants and desires. This role entails ‘...executing our motivating wants and their accompanying beliefs into the actions that serve them...’​[107]​ On this understanding ‘volition’ is taken to describe the motivation behind attaining a desired thing rather than describing the desire itself. One can want for something, to change the channel of a television for example, and require an object to pursue that want, the remote control, whilst at the same time deciding not to reach for it because one is too lazy. There is no ‘volition’ evidenced in this want to change the channel because it, the want itself, does not prompt action. It is wise then, given this distinction, that definitions of ‘volition’ are not collapsed into ‘...the background motivational desires which they execute’​[108]​ and the MSB concurs with this assertion. ‘Volition’ is not understood here to denote ‘want’ or ‘desire’, but, as Moore argues, to refer to that part of cognition which works as an executor for one’s wants and desires; the ‘X’ between a want and the action taken to bring about that want.

There must be more to the definition of volition however than noting that it is neither a want nor a desire but some ‘X’ which works as a facilitator for actuating those things. Bentham and Mill take ‘volitions’ to be intentions to do certain acts, moving one’s fingers for example, and this has been seconded by contemporary volitionists such as Lehrer,​[109]​ Sellers,​[110]​ Brand​[111]​ and Walton.​[112]​ The concept of ‘intention’ – philosophically, not legally speaking – comes closest to embodying the MSB’s understanding of ‘volition’ and is split into two forms; ‘bare’, ‘pure’, ‘future’ or ‘present’ intention on the one hand and ‘complex intentions’, ‘further intentions’ or ‘intentions-with-which’ on the other. For convenience these respective forms will be henceforth referred to as ‘bare’ and ‘complex’ intention respectively.

Bare intention is understood to be an intention to do a future act. The intention to go down town for example or to pick up the television remote would be ‘bare’. Complex intention by contrast expands the definition of bare intention to include the reason behind one’s action. Thus the ‘complex intention’ behind moving a hand to grasp the television remote could be to change the channel. This in turn must be carefully contrasted with one’s motive in changing the channel, for motive and reason are taken to be separate by the MSB. Lord Bridge likewise distinguishes between motive (or desire) and intention:  

‘A man who, at London airport, boards a plane which he knows to be bound for Manchester, clearly intends to travel to Manchester, even though Manchester is the last place he wants to be and his motive for boarding the plane is simply to escape pursuit. The possibility that the plane may have engine trouble and be diverted to Luton does not affect the matter. By boarding the Manchester plane, the man conclusively demonstrates his intention to go there, because it is a moral certainty that that is where he will arrive.’​[113]​

Lord Bridge’s man, as the example rightly points out, exhibits, by boarding the plane, the intention to travel to Manchester. It is also rightly explained that the man’s motive for boarding is to escape pursuit – reason and motive in this case are taken as one. Lord Bridge’s thinking can be seen clearly through applying Anscombe’s ‘why’ questions​[114]​ to the scenario:

Q: “Why are you boarding the plane?”
A: “Because I intend to go to Manchester.”
Q: “Why?”
A: “To escape from the people pursuing me.”

The first paired question and answer supply the man’s intention, and the second pair logically follows on and presents the reason why he is taking the action he is taking. Applying the reasoning employed by this chapter – bare and complex intention – and using Anscombe’s questions again, the scenario can be split differently:

Q: “Why are you boarding the plane?”
A: “Because I intend to go to Manchester.”

This first paired question and answer concern the man’s ‘bare’ intention – that behind his initial movement (boarding the plane) – and the ‘complex’ intention behind that ‘bare’ intention. His reason for boarding the plane is to go to Manchester, as (in the above example) the reason one picks up the television remote is to put into action the want to change the channel. As such, ‘complex’ intention expresses one’s reason for acting.  The motive behind this ‘complex’ intention, be it going to Manchester or changing the channel, is expressed by the next application of Anscombe’s ‘why’:

Q: “Why?”
A: “To escape the people pursuing me.”

At first glance both sets of questions, those exploring Lord Bridge’s reasoning and those based on the MSB’s reasoning, are identical. However, depending on which hypothesis one is exploring, the inferences drawn from them differ. To Lord Bridge the man’s motive in boarding the plane was to escape pursuit, and this is also his reason for boarding. Contrarily the MSB takes the man’s reason for boarding the plane as being to go to Manchester, and his motive for so acting to be to escape pursuit. This alternate interpretation can also be applied to the television example. One’s bare intention is to reach for the remote control; one’s complex intention (reason) is to change the channel, and one’s motive for changing the channel is because the current one is boring. 

Understanding ‘volition’ in terms of intention negates one of the most stinging criticisms of the theory as a whole made, amongst others, by Taylor​[115]​ and Ryle.​[116]​
 The critique states that ‘volition’ as a concept has no intrinsic characteristics other than being ‘the unique cause of action’ or ‘the motivator behind action’. Restatements of such descriptions, opponents feel, are not enough to elucidate the character of the ‘volition’ in any understandable way. Hypothesizing that ‘volitions’ are a species of intention undercuts this argument because it fits the concept into an already well recognised piece of ‘mental machinery’.​[117]​ The MSB, much as Moore does when he discusses the nature of volition, takes this latter view – that volition is a species of intention.





Clarkson and Keating note that ‘The distinction between positive acts and omissions is crucial...but it is not always clear whether one is dealing with a positive act or an omission.’​[118]​ This proposition, unhelpful as it is in providing the definitional clarity it speaks of, reflects both the need for such clarity, and current academic and legal thought on the subject of omissions. It is widely accepted that action is the antithesis of omitting to act​[119]​ but defining precisely when one omits and when one acts is a difficult and policy-ridden process. 

This section is devoted to exploring Clarkson and Keating’s proposition in a general, not strictly legalistic sense with a view to forming a rational (if tentative) definition of an ‘omission’. On the current law it is enough to point out at this juncture that an omission to act is punishable only if he who fails to act owes a duty to the person injured or killed by his omission. Consequently if a duty does not exist the omitter is not legally bound to render assistance, though arguably he would be morally liable if he could have assisted but chose not to.

How then should inaction be distinguished from action? This question is best approached on the understanding that the concept of omissions is not restricted to simple ‘not-doings’.​[120]​ One can unintentionally ‘not-do’ an action, to save a drowning child for example, because one is simply unaware of the child’s existence. In such a situation it is ill-advised to refer to the ‘not-doing’ as an omission at all given the inactive party’s lack of knowledge of the circumstances that his inaction affects. The lack of a duty of care between the not-doer and the affected party is another clear indicator of where the line between ‘not-doing’ and culpable omission lies.

It is possible, by contrast, to intentionally omit to act – knowing that the child is drowning and omitting to save him irrespective of the fact that one could.​[121]​ Situations can also arise in the medical context where treatment is withdrawn, removed or withheld completely from a dying patient when, on the basis of the judgement in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland​[122]​, continued treatment is no longer in his best interests. These facts though are simply restatements of Clarkson and Keating’s observations that omissions exist alongside actions. As such they offer minimal aid in formulating a workable definition of what it is to omit to act. 

According to Davis, and as was briefly noted above, there are types of omission which are intentional. Roderick Chisholm provides the following example: ‘...one man greets another and the second man does not respond.’​[123]​ The silent man in the example may have intended to remain quiet despite the greeting. According to this understanding of volitional theory and the definition of action given at the end of the preceding section, the silent man’s bare intention would be maintaining his silence and his complex intention may have been to act rudely by snubbing the man who greets him. The presence of these forms of intention (used as they are in section 1.3.1 to describe an action) does not make the omission of a greeting an action. Instead they signify the background mental states which underlie most if not all of human perception and cognition (in much the same way the same phrases are used to describe action). In order for the omission to become an action, a volition must be present as Davis explains: ‘...omissions, intentional or otherwise...are not actions...actions are volitions, but an omission is the failure of a volition to occur.’​[124]​ Volitions are therefore not synonymous with ‘bare intention’; they are a species of it only and it is the absence of a volition (and the physical action which is caused by the volition) which, on this understanding, distinguishes action from omission. Intentional omissions may therefore be described as the (bare) intentional not-doing of an otherwise volitional action to effect the (complex) intention of the omitter. 

On this logic, unintentional omissions would be characterised by their complete lack of any kind of basic or complex intention, as well as the absence of a volitional action to effect that intention. The situation which the omission affects is unknown to the person who is ‘omitting’ to provide assistance and because of this, that person is neither morally nor legally bound to assist.









 ‘…the distinction between acts and omissions leading to death is also commonly understood to be the basis for the distinction between killing and allowing to die…’​[125]​

As Brock notes in the above quotation, the distinction between acts and omissions is best seen at law as that between killing and letting die. Arguing that there is no distinction between these differing ‘acts’ is currently illogical since, simply by looking at Wreen’s criteria and contrasting cases like Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland,​[126]​ R (on the application of Pretty),​[127]​ R v. Cox,​[128]​ R v. Moor,​[129]​ R v. Adams​[130]​ and those of NHS Trusts A and B v. M​[131]​ and H,​[132]​ it is clear that a division is maintained vigilantly.

The distinction is a telling one, since generally, at law one must act to be guilty of a criminal offence. To be culpable for omitting to act, a duty of care must exist between the person omitting and the person that omission affects. Duties arise between people who share some kind of ‘special relationship’,​[133]​ but may be abrogated if inaction is in the best interests of the person affected.​[134]​ 

Later it will be argued that maintaining the distinction between acts and omissions perpetuates an illogicality within the law; that in order to withdraw or remove treatment the doctor responsible must act. To ground this supposition in fact it is necessary to first explore how the distinction is made.


1.4.1 The distinction based on acts and omissions: what it is and how it is wrong

The distinction at law between lawful inaction and unlawful action is made on semantic grounds. Phrases like ‘active euthanasia’ and ‘passive euthanasia’, acts and omissions, the ‘withdrawal’ of, ‘withholding’ of and ‘removal’ of treatment are used to separate the concepts. Lord Goff in Bland summarised the current law:

‘It is not lawful for a doctor to administer a drug to his patient to bring about his death, even though that course is prompted by a humanitarian desire to end his suffering, however great that suffering may be…So to act is to cross the Rubicon which runs between – on the one hand the care of the living patient and on the other hand euthanasia – actively causing his death to avoid or to end his suffering. Euthanasia is not lawful at Common Law.’​[135]​

To put these concepts into practice, let us imagine for a moment two patients; patient C and patient D. These patients are identical in every way. They are both suffering from terminal lung cancer and have been receiving treatment for the disease for a number of years. Both are on respirators, are unable to independently care for themselves and rely on nurses for round the clock care. C and D decide, after all these years of fighting and increasingly painful treatment and symptoms that they wish to seek euthanasia. 

After much discussion C’s doctor makes it clear that he will not perform active euthanasia on C. Instead he incrementally reduces the amount of oxygen fed through C’s ventilator every day. C dies two weeks later. D’s doctor on the other hand is not discomforted by the idea of active euthanasia and administers a lethal dose of Potassium Chloride to him, killing him instantly.

Nothing but the manner of their deaths separate C and D. However, the fact that D’s doctor is said to have ‘acted’ intentionally in causing the death makes him culpable for his patient’s death, where the ‘omission to treat’ which precipitated C’s eventual death would not bring a similar guilt upon his doctor.​[136]​ This reflects the popular view that the duty not to harm others is stronger than the duty to assist​[137]​ and that it is more just, in cases like that of C and D, not to act than to do so.

It is clear from the C and D example that the ‘ends’ of both sets of circumstances are the same but for the two week time lapse between them. Both of the patients die in the end. Thus Rachels’ Equivalence thesis (detailed in greater depth later) and the MSB on this issue appear correct. The ends of both acting to end life and omitting life sustaining treatment are equivalent. While this observation is objectively accurate, it says nothing of the moral equality of C and D’s doctors’ actions, nor does it prove the MSB’s claim that both means AND ends in cases concerning active and passive euthanasia are the same.

Motive feeds into the discussion of the first of these issues. At law one does not take motive into account at trial.​[138]​ That said it is used to assist the judge in passing sentence in cases where it is thought relevant to do so. Take for example the Guidelines on assisted suicide created by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) following the case of Purdy v. DPP.​[139]​ Paragraph 21(5) makes the compassionate motive of the person who assisted in a suicide a prime consideration in determining whether his case is brought to trial. The fact that there has never been a conviction for ‘mercy killing’​[140]​ in England and Wales reinforces the idea that motive is indeed relevant as the only appreciable difference between a ‘mercy’ killing and a murder. As such the physicians’ motives in C and D’s cases are relevant considerations in determining whether either doctor’s actions were morally more abhorrent.
What were those motives then? It is profoundly unlikely that either doctor would desire his patient’s death​[141]​ – irrespective of the actions of people like Harold Shipman​[142]​ – in the same way a would-be murderer desires his victim’s. The situations are incomparable on almost every level but for the procurement of a death. 

The most often cited motivation is the amelioration of pain. Indeed double effect is not available to the doctor who acts to end his patient’s life, foreseeing that end but not intending it, with a substance which has no analgesic properties.​[143]​  It can therefore be assumed that C and D’s doctors are doing what they are doing for good motives. Both knew their patients suffered greatly and both wished to stop that suffering, and yet despite this, C’s doctor will not be culpable while D’s will. Brock makes a similar point:

	‘A physician who stops a respirator at the voluntary request of a clearly competent patient who is terminally ill and undergoing unrelievable suffering would commonly be understood by all involved as allowing the patient to die, with the patient’s underlying disease being the cause.’​[144]​

The physician in this example, since he is acting with the patient’s consent, is seen to be a bastion for his self-determination and his right to choose how he wishes to end his life. His pure motives, the want to safeguard those rights and most likely relieve the patient’s suffering, allow us to label his actions as ‘passive’; as allowing to die rather than killing. 

Suppose however that the patient had a greedy nephew. This nephew stands to inherit his money and has become impatient for the old man to die so he will get it. 

	‘Thinking that his uncle is prepared to continue on the respirator indefinitely, he slips into the room, turns off the respirator, and his uncle dies. The nephew is found out, confronted, and replies, “I didn’t kill him, I merely allowed him to die; his underlying disease caused his death…’​[145]​

‘Surely’, Brock notes ‘this would be dismissed as specious nonsense.’​[146]​ The nephew killed his uncle deliberately. Yet, it is not implausible to argue that he acted in the same way the physician did in the first example. Even down to the physical movements it took to disconnect the respirator. The distinction is firmly based on his motive for acting the way he did, not on whether he acted or omitted to act. Identical ‘actions’ can therefore be seen as both killing and letting die, depending on the circumstances surrounding them and who performs them.

The basis for this reasoning, in Fletcher’s opinion, is ‘...one of the principles which sets the framework for assessing moral responsibility.’​[147]​ Simply by their nature, acts which cause death are seen as worse than omissions with the same effect. Moore elaborates: ‘Drowning a child makes the world a worse place, whereas not preventing its drowning only fails to improve the world.’​[148]​ In cases like this the MSB and Rachels’ thesis noticeably falter in their logic. Indeed both theses struggle in cases where an action which causes death is contrasted with a complete or pure omission of involvement.

However, if the contrasted scenarios concern the withdrawal of positive involvement, the lost ground is slowly regained.​[149]​ Rachels’ thesis focuses on the equivalence of the ‘ends’ of active and passive euthanasia. The MSB, as noted above, takes this a step further by alleging a similar parity between the ‘means’ by which those ends are pursued. The opinions of Beauchamp and Childress are an appropriate starting point for exploring this facet of the MSB. They state, in critiquing the act/omission distinction (as the MSB does) that:

‘…the distinction between killing and letting die suffers from vagueness and moral confusion. The language of killing is so thoroughly confusing – causally, legally, and morally – that it can provide little if any help in discussion of assistance in dying.’​[150]​

Similarly, Lord Goff said in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland:

	‘…it can be asked why, if a doctor, by discontinuing treatment, is entitled in consequence to let his patient die, it should not be lawful to put him out of his misery straight away, in a more humane manner, by a lethal injection, rather than let him linger on in pain until he dies. But the law does not feel able to authorise euthanasia, even in circumstances such as these, for, once euthanasia is recognised as lawful in these circumstances, it is difficult to see any logical basis for excluding it in others.’​[151]​

The judgement in Bland gives rise to an obvious problem for the MSB. A thesis which intends to prove there is no distinction (in certain qualified circumstances) between acts and omissions falters on the back of a judgement which states the categorical opposite. Indeed in the wake of Bland it could be asked whether omissions can kill at all. 

Having said that, case law exists in which an omission to act caused culpability to accrue because that omission breached a duty of care between the defendant and the victim. R v. Pittwood,​[152]​ where a signalman omitted to close the gates bracketing a tram line resulting in a pedestrian being knocked down and killed, is a prime example. The same can be said for the case of R v. Instan,​[153]​ where the niece of an elderly woman took it upon herself to care for her but later came to omit to do so, denying the woman food and necessary medical care. The resultant death-by-omission was held to be murder. R v. Stone and Dobinson​[154]​ is a further example. Here the pair of defendants took in an ailing relative, despite the fact that neither of them had the mental capacity to summon an ambulance for her when her condition became critical. The court found them guilty of manslaughter by gross negligence. R v. Gibbons and Proctor​[155]​ is a further example of killing by omission. Here the defendants were convicted of the murder of ‘Nelly’ the male defendant’s daughter. 

Gibbons and Proctor raises a slight voice of dissent to the earlier claim that the MSB and Rachels’ Equivalence thesis cannot properly be applied to cases of pure omission or pure non-involvement. It is clear from the outcome of the case that killing by the complete omission to feed incites culpability. However, extending the MSB past its above recognised limitation in pure omission cases cannot be achieved on stable academic ground. Doing so will therefore be avoided and attention returned to cases where an omission concerns the taking away or stopping of some already started action.

Re-centring the discussion on medicine, the MSB claims that in switching off a life support machine the doctor acted; he did something. It is common sense to say so for had he not, nothing would have occurred at all and the patient would have continued living on his life support. Katz’s thesis is instructive here. To Katz, an ‘act’s’​[156]​ defining characteristic is that it (the act) would not have occurred if the person causing it suddenly did not exist. In his book Bad Acts and Guilty Minds​[157]​ he propounds the case of Kitty Genovese as an example. Ms Genovese’s murder, witnessed by numerous people from surrounding apartment blocks, was only reported after her assailant had fled the scene, some 15 minutes after his initial attack. He had returned twice prior to fleeing, finally killing his victim as she lay prostrate at the bottom of a stairway. In using this case to distinguish acts from omissions Katz notes:

‘If the witnesses to Kitty Genovese’s murder had not existed, she would still have died. But if her assailant had not existed, she would not have died.’​[158]​

The same reasoning can be brought to bear in situations regarding medical omissions, like that purportedly occasioned by the withdrawal of life support. If current medico-legal rhetoric is to be believed, the physician is a mere witness to his patient’s death, like the people who witnessed the Genovese murder were. If this was the case – if the physician truly did nothing in withdrawing life support from his patient – his abrupt disappearance from the scenario would have no effect on the outcome. 

However, as it was posited in section 1.3.2, this conclusion is arguably inaccurate. Referring back to the case of Bland,​[159]​ had life support been maintained, the patient would in all likelihood have remained in his PVS for a number of years. The MSB’s argument can be restated by applying Newton’s​[160]​ law of physics to the situation. Every action has an equal and opposite reaction. So for something, a reaction, to occur, there must first be an action. The doctor acts, turns off the life support, and the patient dies. Whether one can argue that it was his underlying illness that killed him or not,​[161]​ the doctor’s action precipitated the patient’s death. Where there is an action, there is a reaction. For every cause, there is an effect; or better stated, for every effect there is a cause. Actions and omissions to act, in this sense, are interchangeable.

James Rachels’​[162]​ Equivalence thesis expresses a similar opinion and states that since the outcome of both killing and letting die are the same i.e. the patient dies and his family grieves, the two forms are morally equivalent. Neither practice is seen as more or less reprehensible than the other, unless they are practiced against the patient’s wishes.





1. A retraction of a previously held position.  
2. The act of taking out money or other capital. 
3. The act of withdrawing; “the withdrawal of French troops from Vietnam”.
4. The act of ceasing to participate in an activity. 





1.The act of removing.​[164]​  
2.The act of removing.​[165]​  
3.The act of removing; “he had surgery for the removal of a malignancy.”​[166]​  
4. The act or process of removing: the fact of being removed.​[167]​

There is an obvious crossover between killing and letting die here, at least on the semantic level. It is contended therefore that the practice of ‘letting die’, despite this label, is not truly an omission at all. In order to withdraw or remove treatment the doctor responsible must act. That is not to say that doctors involved in withdrawing treatment from patients when it is in their best interests are committing murder. The MSB alleges the opposite in fact. Since letting die or omitting treatment is seen in a positive light, it is argued here that active steps which achieve the same result should be similarly positively cast. As such the distinction between an act that ends life and an omission to act that ends life is illogical. Yet, as it has been shown, it endures. According to a survey by Coulson​[168]​ 75% of UK medical practitioners accept a moral distinction between active and passive euthanasia, and by extension killing and letting die, as of important moral significance. 

In response to this declaration of significance Gillon asks the obvious question: ‘What if any, moral importance resides in the distinction between killing and letting die?’​[169]​ This question is all the more pertinent when the MSB’s efforts to diminish the distinction between the two practices are taken into account. If action and inaction are equivalent in practical terms (in their ends and means), it would be assumed that their respective moral weighing is also equivalent. Gillon notes that to most people ‘...actions that result in some undesirable consequence are always morally worse than inactions, or failures to act, that have the same consequence…’​[170]​ However, much as the MSB does, he rejects this distinction on the basis of Rachel’s Equivalence argument and concludes that ‘it is not the acts and omissions doctrine that explains the moral distinction (between killing and letting die).’​[171]​ 

Rather, it is argued here (and implied by Gillon), that it is the actor’s reasons for acting that dictate the moral rightness or wrongness of his actions or omissions, and indeed, in certain circumstances, their characterisations as ‘acts’ or ‘omissions’.​[172]​ This conclusion is best explored by using the following example:

‘A patient suffering from untreatable widespread metastatic cancer has been labelled by the consultant and his ward team as “Do not resuscitate”; cardiopulmonary resuscitation would not, they think, benefit him and would probably harm him. The patient had a myocardial infarction in the presence of the consultant, who quite deliberately does not resuscitate him, and the patient dies...Now, consider the same patient except that this time the houseman and cardiac arrest team on night duty have resuscitated him after his infarction, and he is unconscious on a respirator...The consultant turns off and disconnects the respirator, and the patient dies almost immediately...’​[173]​

There is no doubt that in the second case the consultant acted in turning off the patient’s respirator, as opposed to omitting to act in the first, and caused his death as a result.​[174]​ He would not, however, be seen as acting immorally in either instance because his reasons for doing so in both are laudable, based as they are on an assessment of the harm occasioned by the patient should he be subjected to resuscitation. The same cannot be said though if the consultant’s reasons for acting were disreputable. Gillon points this out rhetorically by asking: 

‘...whether the consultant who did the same thing for bad motives – for example, to get away for the weekend – would be described as causing the patient’s death by disconnecting the ventilator.’​[175]​

It seems common sense that, with these changed circumstances, the consultant’s act in disconnecting the ventilator is seen as immoral, irrespective of the fact that nothing in the chain of events leading up to its effect – the patient’s death – has changed. The same can be seen in Rachels’ example:

‘Smith and Jones both stand to inherit fortunes if their 6 year old cousins predecease them. Smith drowns his cousin in the bath, making it seem like an accident. Jones intends to drown his cousin, but on creeping into the bathroom sees the boy slip, bang his head, and slide unconscious beneath the water. Jones waits to make sure the boy really does die and is ready to push his head back under the water if he should surface, but the boy drowns accidentally.’​[176]​





The conclusion of this chapter is best put over as a statement of fact. At law ‘killing’ is seen as wrong and ‘letting die’ is arguably not. Irrespective of the stance the MSB takes regarding the faulty act/omission distinction when it comes to active and passive euthanasia, at law the distinction is upheld and defended jealously.  Harris asserts that we, when facing matters of such moral importance, should 

‘...be absolutely sure that we have faced squarely the full import of what we are doing…if we disguise the facts from ourselves and others by various distancing strategies, we may permanently shield ourselves…from full awareness of what we are about…’​[177]​ 

In light of this statement it is claimed here that the distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ in euthanasia cases should instead be expressed as one between ‘non-permissible’ and ‘permissible’ killing. This is an undoubtedly strong piece of phraseology. In it there is no way to distinguish, as law and policy is fond of doing, between when the doctor involved can take the ‘step back’ from the patient’s death by pleading that he ‘only’ let him die and when he cannot. Furthermore this phraseology declares that certain forms of killing are permissible. By distinguishing ‘killing’ from ‘letting die’ it is assumed that the processes behind both are different; one active and therefore wrong, the other passive and therefore justifiable. The MSB alleges this distinction to be a contrivance. With the terms ‘permissible’ and ‘non-permissible killing’ that option is taken away. The modus operandi of the person doing the killing is the same. It is the circumstances surrounding the resultant death which absolve him of guilt.

























The argument was made in sections 1, 1.2 and 1.4.1 of chapter 1 that the difference between acts and omissions is ‘blurred beyond distinction’​[178]​ by the courts, to allow doctors to take a ‘moral step back’ (MSB) from the possible negative consequences of providing (or omitting to provide) proper medical care to their patients. This chapter moves on from that to introduce the second part of the MSB theory: that the distinction between intention and foresight in the context of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) is, like that between acts and omissions, inescapably imprecise. It will be argued in section 2.4 that, although it is possible to foresee a consequence and not intend it, the distinction between intention and foresight does not survive when the foreseen consequence is realised through action. Kuhse is of a similar point of view as regards the moral weight of action:

‘...moral agents do not just bring about certain consequences in the world, they bring them about intentionally and are responsible for them because they have brought them about voluntarily and deliberately...’​[179]​

In questioning the importance of the distinction between intention and foresight in the context of the DDE, Kuhse argues that it is the exercise of a choice to act in pursuance of a ‘state of affairs that includes the...(unwanted) consequence’​[180]​ rather than the ‘...distinction between ‘intended-as-a-means’ and ‘foreseen-as-a-consequence’...’​[181]​ that defines the moral rightfulness of pursuing that consequence. This is a view shared by Hart and Frey, the former expressing it through the notion of control,​[182]​ and the latter through his ‘control responsibility’ theory.​[183]​  A doctor, claims Frey, has the choice of whether or not to proceed with a course of action – usually providing a dose of medication to control symptoms or pain. If he decides to do so and death follows he is a ‘...causal factor in (that) death, whether he...directly intends (it) or knowingly brings it about.’​[184]​

Others, Duff​[185]​ for example, believe that the doctor in Frey’s example is merely acting intentionally when providing the medication as opposed to acting with the intention to procure the foreseen consequences of doing so. He cannot therefore be said to have intended to cause the death – if one occurs at all – because, while his actions were performed intentionally i.e. they were not forced or coerced, he did not intend the unwanted consequence acting brought about.​[186]​ 






2.1 Intention and Foresight

Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act (1967) lays down an evidential rule as to how intention is to be proved and makes it clear that intention is a subjective state of mind. In trying to ascertain what the defendant intended, the court or jury must draw inferences from all of the relevant evidence. That said, there is no statutory definition of intention in English law.​[187]​ Generally speaking it is agreed that there are two broad categories of intention relevant to the criminal law:

1.	A consequence is intended when it is the aim or objective of the actor: ‘direct intention’.
2.	A consequence is intended when it is foreseen as a virtual certainty: this is known as ‘oblique intention’.

With reference to the second bullet point, the courts once adopted a broader view in holding that a consequence was intended when it was foreseen as a probable or likely​[188]​ result of the defendant’s actions. Lord Diplock in the case of R v. Hyam​[189]​ for example, spoke of intention in terms of a ‘willingness’ to produce an evil consequence as being the mens rea needed to satisfy a requirement in the law of homicide. To Lord Diplock intention did not connote want or desire, and he did not distinguish between a person who does an act because he desires to produce an ‘evil’ consequence, and the state of mind of one who does the same act possessed of foresight of the likely ‘evil’ consequence. Lord Hailsham in Hyam on the other hand does make such a distinction, and cites Lord Asquith’s ruminations on intending future events to support his claim:

‘An ‘intention’ to my mind connotes a state of affairs which the party ‘intending’...does more than merely contemplate; it connotes a state of affairs which, on the contrary, he decides, so far as in him lies, to bring about, by his own act of volition.’​[190]​

Since the case of Hyam the House of Lords has retreated from the idea of foresight of consequences amounting to intention. A collection of cases spanning over 20 years of jurisprudential reasoning has drawn current legal thinking to the conclusion that the concepts are separate, yet closely enough linked that foresight may be taken as evidence of intention. 

After Hyam came R v. Moloney, where Lord Bridge noted:

‘...the first fundamental question to be answered is whether there is any rule of substantive law that foresight by the accused of one of those eventualities as a probable consequence of his voluntary act, where the probability can be defined as exceeding a certain degree, is equivalent or alternative to the necessary intention...I would answer...in the negative…’​[191]​

This understanding was adopted by Lord Lane C.J in R v. Nedrick:

‘Where the charge is murder and in the rare cases where the simple direction is not enough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty as a result of the defendant’s acts and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.’ ​[192]​

The Nedrick direction as to foresight’s role in determining intention was taken on, much as certain portions of the reasoning in Moloney were in Nedrick, in the House’s ruling in the case of R v. Woollin. However a crucial difference between the rulings is evident in the following extract from Lord Steyn’s opinion:

‘… (it has been observed) that the use of the words ‘to infer’ in (Nedrick) may detract from the clarity of the model direction. I agree. I would substitute the words ‘to find’...’ ​[193]​

Although the substitution of an indefinite article (the idea of inferring intention from foresight not presupposing intention’s existence from the existence of foresight) for a definite one appears on its face of little significance, it was later opined in both legal and academic​[194]​ writing that the House in Woollin interpreted the Nedrick direction incorrectly. Rix L.J in the case of R v. Matthews and Alleyne implies this when he states:
‘...the law has not yet reached a definition of intent in murder in terms of appreciation of virtual certainty... (We) do not regard Woollin as yet reaching or laying down a substantive rule of law. On the contrary, it is clear from the discussion in Woollin as a whole that Nedrick was derived from existing law...and that the critical direction in Nedrick was approved, subject to the change of one word... In these circumstances we think that the judge did go further than the law as it stands at present permitted him to go...’ ​[195]​

The evidentiary approach, that which after R v. Matthews and Alleyne is the current representation of jurisprudential thought on the issue, allows juries the scope to conclude that, in cases where a defendant acted in a certain way despite the foreseen certainty of some undesired result, he did not intend that result.​[196]​ While the legal definition of intention is arguably settled by legal precedent, the academic meanings ascribed to the concept are multifarious. Subsection 2.1.1 will tackle the facets of it relevant to the MSB: the definitions of intention and foresight, and the distinction between intentional action and acting intentionally.

2.1.1 Intention, Foresight and what it is to Act Intentionally

The MSB, like Davis, claims that intention ‘...is a (mental) state that precedes action.’​[197]​ This state is best described, according to chapter 1 sections 1.3 and 1.3.1, as a ‘volition’ to do an act and ‘volition’ is understood to subsume two kinds of intention; bare and complex. Bare intention (BI) describes ‘...an intention to do a future act’​[198]​ and complex intention (CI) is the reason behind one’s bare intention. In coming to the conclusion that volition is best described as a species of intention, the MSB distanced itself from the idea that wants, desires, wishes or beliefs could be described in the same way. Thus, one does not intend what one wants to cause, or what one desires, wishes or believes will result from one’s actions.​[199]​ In seeking to quench a thirst for example one may want a drink from the nearest glass of water; one may desire it, wish for it and believe, once consumed, that one’s thirst will be quenched. One only intends to pursue quenching it however when one picks up the glass (expressing one’s BI) in order to consume its contents (pursuant to one’s CI).

Hart​[200]​ and Duff​[201]​ likewise divide intention, but into three kinds over the MSB’s two: ‘bare intentions’ which have not yet been put into practice;  ‘intentional actions’ – doing something  intentionally or with the intention to do so; and ‘further intentions’ with which an agent acts – the ends towards which her present actions serve as a means or preparation. This division is mirrored by the MSB’s reliance on BI and CI. The former corresponds with Hart and Duff’s similarly named form, and the latter with their ‘further intention’ and in part with ‘intentional actions’ – for acting with both the basic and complex intention to do so equates, in the MSB’s understanding, to an intentional act. The difference between intentional actions and acting intentionally will be discussed momentarily. It is important however, prior to this, to briefly define foresight, as both foresight and intention are integral to making sense of the distinction.

Foresight is taken here, as it is at law, to be entirely separate from intention. Like intention, the exercise of foresight is the exercise of a mental faculty which may or may not lead one to performing an action on the basis of what is foreseen. Foresight, the MSB contends, is also entirely separate from the concept of ‘want’, for one can foresee an outcome as almost certain to result from a course of action without wanting that result to come about. This supposition rests heavily on the distinction between an intentional action and bringing about a result intentionally, to which this section’s focus now returns. 

Intentional acts and acting intentionally are widely understood to be separate, and the MSB recognises this. The concepts are distinguishable, even though by definition ‘intentionally’ means literally ‘with intention’,​[202]​ because the former describes a mental state and the latter a course of action carried out in pursuance of a mental state. Hart adds to this by noting that ‘acting intentionally’ implies the bringing about of some consequence at which the action is aimed.​[203]​ Duff explains:

‘I do not intend the expected (foreseen) side effects of my actions, but I may be said to bring them about intentionally...the concept of intention both does and does not encompass...side effects; it does in that they are brought about intentionally; it does not, in that the agent does not act with the intention of bringing them about.’​[204]​

Duff’s words echo the opinions of Buxton​[205]​ and Anscombe,​[206]​ who distinguish situations where one is concerned with the ‘immediate or concurrent results’ of one’s actions and those where ‘an intended action is concerned with...(the) future results of actions...(with) aim or purpose.’​[207]​ This suggests, as Williams points out, ‘...that in order for an activity to be intended, there must be some kind of plan...and conversely...an intentional action can be performed without forming a prior intention or making a plan.’​[208]​ To put this into a common medico-legal scenario, a doctor who plans to relieve his patient’s pain with morphine intends to do so. In giving the infusion he acts intentionally to relieve his patient’s pain. The side effect of this infusion may be that the patient dies, and the doctor may be perfectly sure that the patient will do so, but he does not bring about that death intentionally. As Duff notes (above), ‘I do not intend the (foreseen) side effects of my actions, but...I may...bring them about intentionally...’​[209]​ 





The DDE is favoured by proponents of the Sanctity-of-Life Principle, who have traditionally appealed to it in order to maintain the absolute prohibition on the intentional termination of human life in situations which, to Kuhse ‘...reduce (it: the SLP) to absurdity because (it is) so obviously contrary (to competing) values...including the value of human life.’​[211]​ According to Baroness Warnock, the DDE is ‘…an absurdly Jesuitical doctrine…’​[212]​ It finds its moral genesis in the work of Aquinas, who sought to delineate circumstances where it is acceptable for agents to bring about or allow death to occur as a secondary effect of an action or omission that is morally good. The DDE’s grounds have been framed many times, the example below drawn from the New Catholic Encyclopaedia:​[213]​ 

1.	The act itself must be morally good, or at least indifferent.
2.	The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may permit it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect he should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary.
3.	The good effect must flow from the action at least as immediately (in order of causality, though not necessarily in the order of time) as the bad effect. In other words, the good effect must be produced directly by the action, not by the bad effect. Otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end, which is never allowed.
4.	The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the allowing of the bad effect. In forming this decision many factors must be weighed and compared, with care and prudence proportionate to the importance of the case.

The doctrine therefore propounds that a bad effect (the death of a patient in the medical context) is sometimes permitted, though it cannot be intended by the person causing it. 

Philosophical interest in the DDE is divided between those with deontological opinions​[214]​ and those who follow consequentialism.​[215]​ Deontologically speaking the DDE’s central distinction is essential to discussing the implications of agency and its impact on both the general issue of killing, and on specific kinds of killing; abortion, euthanasia and so forth. On the other hand, consequentialists like Rachels​[216]​ and Tooley​[217]​ argue that the DDE is used to allow morally unacceptable consequences while never allowing a doctor to directly end a patient’s life. This moralistic quirk condones a greater level of patient suffering, based on a distinction which is, to Kuhse,​[218]​ Rachels​[219]​ and the MSB, ‘morally irrelevant’.

The critique surrounding the DDE is not only restricted to its possible effects and the questionable nature of the distinctions it employs. Foster et al​[220]​ question the very existence of the doctrine at law, and Huxtable​[221]​ cites evidence that the majority of deaths occasioned in situations where the DDE would apply are actually caused by sedatives, not pain killing medication. Since discussion of the doctrine is predicated on its use in cases where death as occurred as a side effect of the provision of pain killers, he questions if physicians have any need of it. This issue will be raised again in section 2.3.1 so discussion of it over and above this formative mention is not necessary here. Foster et al's query as to the doctrine's requires addressing however, for it would be remiss for this work to propound a theory concerning it without ascertaining its nature first.

The case of R v. Adams​[222]​ is that which is most often said to have brought the DDE into English law.​[223]​ In it, Lord Devlin directed the jury as follows:

‘There has been a good deal of discussion about the circumstances in which a doctor might be justified in giving drugs which would shorten life in cases of severe pain. It is my duty to tell you that the law knows no special defence of this character. But that does not mean that a doctor aiding the sick or the dying has to calculate in minutes or hours, or even perhaps in days or weeks, the effect on a patient's life of the medicine which he administers. If the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of health can no longer be achieved there is still much for the doctor to do, and he is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if the measures he takes may incidentally shorten life.’​[224]​

Even after being advised that regardless of the victim’s health and the motive​[225]​ of the accused, the law would treat as murder any action which intended to kill and did in fact kill, the jury acquitted Dr Adams of all charges. What is not clear from this case though is how, if at all, the particulars of the DDE as defined above were utilised in reaching this conclusion. Kennedy and Grubb appear to believe that this answer is quite obvious, claiming that Adams ‘injected’​[226]​ the doctrine into English law. They opine:

‘It (the doctrine) seems to say that if an act may have two effects and the actor desires only one of them, which is considered a good effect, then he should be regarded as blameless even though his act also produces a bad effect. The words "primary" and "secondary" are used to describe the intention concerning the good and the bad effect.’​[227]​

Foster et al offer a worthy critique of this conclusion however, which the MSB agrees with. Nowhere in his judgement does Lord Devlin use the phrase ‘double effect’. Nowhere does he refer to ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ intention, and nowhere is the need for either the good effect alone being that which is intended, or for there to be a proportionately grave reason for allowing the bad effect to occur mentioned in the judgement.​[228]​ Claiming therefore that this case marks the doctrine's inception into English law is best described as ‘...reading far too much into a rather amorphous direction to the jury.’​[229]​

Just as its presence was implied though not explicitly made clear in the Adams case, the DDE has been scantily referenced by name in case law. Lord Bingham refers to the doctrine in the case of Pretty,​[230]​ but does little more than state broad principles and note that the distinction between intention and foresight is central to its use. 

The case of Re A​[231]​ provides the only really detailed analysis of its possible application to the conjoined twins, Jodie and Mary, but did little outside of clarify the doctrine's parameters and draw to the conclusion that it would not, in fact, absolve the doctors involved in the case of guilt if their actions ended in the death of the weaker twin.​[232]​ Outside of these cases however there are no explicit references to the doctrine itself. Perhaps, in the face of this conclusion, it is best to think of the doctrine as a kind of reasoning rather than an actual legal test applied in a particular kind of case.​[233]​ There are, after all, numerous examples of ‘double effect’ cases that have been decided based on one or more of the principles that the DDE subsumes.​[234]​

Take the case of R v. Carr​[235]​ for example. Dr Carr was charged with the attempted murder of his patient, who died after he administered a large dose of Phenobarbitone. Compelling evidence showed the patient to have been suffering terribly with inoperable lung cancer and that he had repeatedly requested that his inevitable death be hastened. As in Adams, Dr Carr was acquitted but in the course of summing up Mars-Jones J had this to say:

‘However gravely ill a man may be...he is entitled in our law to every hour...that God has granted him. That hour or hours may be the most precious and most important hours of a man’s life. There may be business to transact, gifts to be given, forgiveness to be made, 101 bits of unfinished business which have to be concluded.’​[236]​

This case shows perhaps the loosest construction of the doctrine seen in the cases in which it has been used. As was noted above, in order for the DDE to function, the doctor’s intention must have been to alleviate the patient’s pain and suffering, not to kill him. Carr it seems, breaks this rule given that Phenobarbitone, a Barbiturate, has no known or recognisable analgesic effects and yet the defendant was still acquitted. This is a precedent seemingly ignored in the R v. Cox​[237]​ case, detailed later.

R v. Arthur​[238]​ further advances the precedent for acquittal in cases concerning double effect. Doctor Arthur was charged with the murder of a neonate with Down’s syndrome. The child had been rejected by its parents who instructed Arthur that they did not want the baby to survive. A note was entered into the child’s records for ‘nursing care only’ and he was provided with strong painkillers, allegedly to ease his distress. He died three days later and Arthur was brought to trial. Evidence of other congenital defects present in the deceased was advanced and the charges facing Arthur were reduced from murder to attempted murder. Acquittal followed, but as the case of R v. Cox​[239]​ came to show, it is not always a certainty.

Dr Nigel Cox was charged with the murder of his patient, a Mrs Lillian Boyes. Mrs Boyes suffered from arthritis and, like the patient in Carr, was in terrible pain because of her illness and repeatedly asked for her death to be hastened. Having acceded to her repeated requests Dr Cox was taken to trial and, though members of the jury were reported to have wept as they delivered their verdict, he was convicted of attempted murder. The original charge of murder was reduced due to an evidential inconsistency regarding the precise cause of Mrs Boyes’ death. The DDE failed Cox because the drug he had administered, Potassium Chloride, had no analgesic properties. Therefore the second clause of the test, that death is not a means through which pain relief is achieved, could not be satisfied. 

The avoidance of either moral or legal culpability for a bad consequence occasioned by a good act is as central to the DDE as the distinction between intention and foresight. In almost all cases it is death that is said to be the foreseen but not intended outcome of a course of action, and this is so irrespective of the fact that death will occur regardless of whether it is intended or foreseen. The DDE also assumes that death, however it occurs and whether it is requested or not, is always a bad thing. This fails to take account of both its biological certainty and, in the case of a requested death, its desirability to the one asking for it.​[240]​ 

Surely, Mclean​[241]​ observes, the decision as to what is ‘right’ in terms of treatment, even treatment which will result in a hastened death, rests in the lap of the cognisant patient. According to the case of Re T:

 ‘…an adult patient who...suffers no mental incapacity has an absolute right to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose an alternative treatment.’​[242]​
 
Credence is given to this claim by the case of Re C.​[243]​ The patient, a 68 year old paranoid schizophrenic developed gangrene in a foot while being detained in Broadmoor psychiatric hospital. On removal to a general hospital, a consultant concluded that he had only a 15% chance of survival if the leg was not amputated below the knee. The patient refused, the hospital took the question of his autonomy to the court and C applied for an injunction restraining the hospital from operating on him without his express written consent. Thorpe J held that C was entitled to refuse treatment and noted that capacity was to be determined by the answer to the following question: ‘has the capacity of the patient been so reduced that he did not sufficiently understand the nature, purpose and effects of the proffered medical treatment?’​[244]​

With those facts in mind the question remains, if C, a man whose mental competence was put to the courts, was entitled to determine how he should or should not be treated, why is the perfectly competent patient who asks for assistance (assistance which may well have the same effect upon him or her as C’s refusal) unable to receive it? The answer is directly relevant to the distinction between acting and omitting to act;​[245]​ a stance that section 1.4.1 of chapter 1 endeavoured to prove indefensible. 

A crucial link between the DDE, the MSB and killing and letting die is apparent here. If one acts to end a life, one feels morally closer to the results of one’s actions than if the life ended as a result of an omission to act or if the death was only foreseen.​[246]​ Thus, in the case of Re C, a refusal of consent to treatment, amounting legally to an omission on the part of the medical staff, would leave them, if C died as a result, guilty only of following the express wishes of their patient. This circumstance is a great deal more comfortable for the conscientious physician than one where his actions directly precipitate death. Take for example the opinion of ‘Doctor 10’, who, when asked about her feelings regarding removing a ventilator from a patient replied:

‘...I think if you’d asked me that 10 or 15 years ago I would have said yes...but...I’m not sure if I could personally switch it off...so...I sit uncomfortably because I can agree and say yes that’s acceptable (to remove a ventilator at the request of a competent patient like Ms B) but then I’d want someone else to do it... I don’t feel comfortable at the moment about being the person actually doing the action...’​[247]​


It appears that, as Shaw alleges ‘…the double effect (and arguably the killing/letting die) distinction is psychologically relevant to the doctor.’​[248]​ He can hope, when death is only a side effect of his action, or when he is omitting, that it may not follow, no matter how remote the chance. However when he intends death and causes it as a means to an end to alleviate suffering, he must be sure it follows. This idea of ‘deception for the sake of conscience’ is supported by Gillon who states that:

‘...it seems to be simply self-deceiving…to say one does not intend it…We cannot get off the moral hook by saying, however truthfully, that although we foresaw…a bad result, we did not intend it…(that we) only (intended) the good result.’ ​[249]​

Huxley’s Brave New World​[250]​ treads similar ground, though makes no mention of the DDE. In his writing Huxley disavows the compatibility of happiness and truth, and provides his characters with a drug, ‘Soma’, which plunges them into a state of blissful though false happiness at the expense of the truth of their situation. Gillon’s ‘deception for the sake of conscience’ appears to describe a similar effect through the use of the DDE, and the MSB implies such a parity here. The truth of the physicians’ situation is unpalatable to them, and so they deceive themselves or allow themselves to be deceived, relying on the concept of foresight to save themselves from that unpalatable truth.

Now that the DDE’s workings have been explored, discussion can move on to the MSB and how it impacts on the DDE.


2.3 Double Effect and the Moral Step Back

To briefly restate the protestations made by the MSB, it is alleged that the DDE allows for the shifting of blame for the results of one’s actions​[251]​ by proclaiming that the patient’s death was only foreseen. This allows practitioners to take a ‘moral step back’ from that death because direct, unfettered involvement in the procurement of it would line them up for legal sanctions. While this allowance is not a negative thing, relying on a mechanism as flawed as the DDE to effect it is felt both illogical and dangerous; illogical because the theory itself is based on counterintuitive thinking, and dangerous because, by allowing the DDE’s use, acts which would otherwise not be justifiable are permitted. 

The MSB’s argument will be presented in two separate sections, the first of which provides the background to that following it. It will detail the assertions of DDE supporters regarding the likelihood of death being brought about as a consequence of the proper application of painkilling medications in cases where the DDE is likely to be relied upon. Commentators like Sykes and Thorns​[252]​ state that the fact that there is no certainty of death resulting from the provision of steadily raised doses of morphine means that any resultant deaths must be merely foreseen and not directly intended as the MSB argues. Though this fact is recognised as accurate, the MSB notes that, while the likelihood of certain events occurring may have an effect on their moral relevance, this effect ‘can be no comfort to adherents to the doctrine of double effect because it accords more significance to intentions not probabilities.’​[253]​ 

The second section will focus on the physician’s intention, foresight and wants regarding the management of his patient. Conventionally the DDE states that it is the amelioration of pain alone that the physician intends, not the death of his patient. He is said to act intentionally in pursuing the desired end, without the intention to procure the unwanted one. The MSB counters this assertion by claiming:

1.	 Firstly, that the distinction between intentional action and acting intentionally is circular and purely semantic in nature. 
2.	And secondly that, while the distinction between intention and foresight is, at law, correct, it cannot be maintained in a situation where a person acts to achieve the foreseen but unwanted end.​[254]​

2.3.1 Pain relief, certain death and uncertain consequences

Huxtable has, on numerous occasions, raised a voice of dissent regarding the application of the DDE in cases where physicians have used painkilling drugs in the management of their patients.​[255]​ His work can be utilised to provide definitions of the concepts under discussion:

‘...judges have tended to employ words like ‘morphine’, ‘diamorphine’, ‘heroin’ and ‘opioid’ without explaining the meanings of, and relationships between, the terms. Starting with morphine, this is an opiate analgesic (painkiller), that is, it is obtained from opium, the juice secreted by poppy seeds. Opioid drugs act on the body’s opioid receptors, and ‘opioid’ is an umbrella term that includes opiates and synthetic, or semi-synthetic, morphine-like drugs. Morphine itself is viewed as the most usefully versatile analgesic for addressing both moderate and severe pain. However, its side effects include nausea, vomiting and respiratory depression. Although the latter is less likely to occur in patients with chronic pain, since pain opposes this potential to slow or stop breathing, morphine should nevertheless be used cautiously in patients suffering from chest disease... ‘Heroin’ is actually another name for ‘diamorphine’, which is a more soluble and more potent opioid than morphine. Diamorphine has the same effects (and side effects) as morphine, and has great utility in caring for people with terminal illness, since effective dosages can be delivered in smaller volumes, thus providing more comfortable injections in the emaciated patient.’​[256]​

Based on a panoply of evidence regarding the use and effects of opioids, Huxtable states that ‘...the (need for) double effect simply will not be present in cases where pain is managed...in accordance with accepted standards of practice.’​[257]​ The findings of Sykes and Thorns further support this hypothesis. In their empirical study of 237 patients, only two were felt to have had their lives shortened as a consequence of the management decisions their physicians made, and those by the use of sedatives, not opioid based pain relief.​[258]​ Huxtable therefore asserts that, in the majority of cases, conscientious physicians have no need for the DDE as it is sedative medication, not the opioids used in practices like pyramid painkilling that are liable to hasten death.​[259]​ The clarification necessitated by these findings is this: the MSB’s claims in section 2.3.2 apply irrespective of the kind of drug employed in the management of patients’ conditions. The discussion is framed in terms of the use of opioids and pain relief because the majority of legal cases in the area concern their use or misuse. 

It is recognised from the outset that the DDE is not applicable in every case where a physician employs opiates in treating a patient’s pain. The circumstances necessitating its being in the physician’s ‘back pocket’​[260]​ are those which surrounded Dr Cox,​[261]​ Dr Arthur​[262]​ and Dr Adams​[263]​ and it is situations akin to these that provide the context for the coming discussion, where a physician, faced with a patient in the last stage of his life, takes measures in the knowledge​[264]​ that the patient’s death is at least highly likely to occur in the near future. Whether or not the drugs that doctor employs may hasten the death is the question to which this discussion now turns.

When used properly opioids, like all forms of medication, are safe and for the most part (discounting side effects) beneficial to those to whom they are prescribed. Commentators like Sykes and Thorns,​[265]​ MacDonald and Roy​[266]​ and Hanks and Twycross​[267]​ all attest to the safety of morphine and diamorphine when they are used in line with accepted practices. Only negligible danger is attributed to their use in recognised medical scenarios and the MSB does not dispute this. When used improperly however, opioid medication has never been doubted in its potential to be deadly. The actions of Francis Inglis,​[268]​ who took it upon herself to kill her disabled son with injections of Heroin, only serve to make the danger more clear. 

What though of situations where, as part of proper medical practice, the dose of medication is steadily raised so that it is not ‘chasing the pain’​[269]​ but effectively ameliorating it? Pyramid painkilling is common in palliative care and is that most likely​[270]​ to require recourse to the DDE because of the proximity of the patient’s death to the provision of, what may be to an unaccustomed patient, a lethal dose of medication.​[271]​ Stauch, Wheat and Tingle acknowledge this possibility in the following example:
‘Imagine a gravelly ill patient in the last stages of terminal cancer. The patient is in pain and only a substantial dose of morphine will relieve the pain. However, such a large dose will also hasten the patient’s death (emphasis added).’​[272]​

Whether or not the doctrine of beneficence holds that the doctor’s only intention is to do good by providing the pain relief in such a circumstance, the acknowledgement of death’s seeming inevitability cannot be overlooked. Harris is of the same mind regarding the distinction ‘between (the) effects, side effects and double effects’ of such medication, and states:

‘What matters...is how our decisions and action affect the world, not whether that effect is direct or indirect...I should emphasise that there is a perfectly respectable everyday use of the term ‘side effects’ and I am not denying that for some purposes it may be useful to distinguish between the direct effects and the side effects of a drug or a course of treatment...(however) this distinction is entirely without moral significance and cannot be used to limit our responsibility for bringing about those side effects.’​[273]​

Whether or not the physician’s intervention caused death must be assessed in each individual case,  though there is no doubt that in any such circumstance the doctor involved would be aware of the risk posed to his patient through his thoroughly blameless ‘chasing’ of the pain. Take for example the experience of ‘Doctor 6’ who, when asked whether he would stop giving a diamorphine infusion if the dosage was such that death and the therapeutic effects of pain relief were likely side by side, replied: 

‘You realise the therapeutic effect will actually kill the patient...I wouldn’t have any problem with that at all. If you’ve got a patient who’s in pain you have to increase the dose. And if the by-product of that is the patient may well die, I wouldn’t have a problem with that.’​[274]​

‘Doctor 7’ was of a similar opinion regarding the use of pain relief and the possible adverse effects it may have on a patient’s longevity:

‘It’s...usually the sort of excuse is that the patient has worsening pain, worsening symptoms. And...they’re semi-conscious and agitated. And...so people want everything to be calm and peaceful in this situation so they increase the dose until the patient is calm...the side effect of that is they stop breathing and die...and we all know it’s going to happen.’​[275]​

When questioned further regarding this known-of effect being a foreseen but unintended consequence of increasing the dose to keep the patient comfortable he replied: ‘...everybody knows it’s going to happen, so you’re doing the same things at the same time.’​[276]​ These experiences appear to run in opposition to the opinions expressed by Sykes and Thorns,​[277]​ MacDonald and Roy​[278]​ and Hanks and Twycross​[279]​ regarding the safety of properly used opiates. In both interviews the participants were referencing accepted medical procedures and patient management practices, and in both, death was an openly acknowledged, if obviously unwanted, possibility. Kuhse provides further recognition of this:

‘It would seem...that in many cases the stage will be reached where a doctor foresees that a particular dosage which is sufficiently large to alleviate the patient’s pain will also positively cause the patient’s death.’​[280]​

 It would be reckless to conclude on the basis of the evidence presented here that death by opiate intoxication is a certainty in every case where proper medical practice prescribes their use in palliating symptoms. However neither the MSB nor the DDE requires that death be a certainty. Foresight of death being a very likely consequence – as Doctors 6 and 7 attested – is all that is required and that, in the knowledge that opiates can cause death if given in high enough doses, appears to be knowledge with which physicians in a position to use the DDE work on a daily basis. Discussion can now turn to the MSB’s main arguments regarding the DDE.

2.3.2 Intention, Foresight and the effect of Action

As section 1.3.1 in chapter 1 and section 2.1 in the present chapter have shown, the MSB understands intention and foresight to be complementary but completely separate mental states. It does not however leave the distinction between intentional action and acting intentionally unquestioned. The impact of this questioning and the MSB’s conclusions regarding it will be discussed later in this section. 

To begin deconstructing the intention/foresight distinction it is important to understand the impact semantics have on the perception of actions and chains of events. A simple alteration made to a description can affect the understanding of when death is caused directly (and therefore intentionally), and when it is a ‘mere’ side effect. This changeability is the DDE’s primary weakness, and is evidenced in the following scenario from Anscombe’s work:

	‘Imagine a potholer stuck with people behind him and water rising to drown them. And suppose two cases: in one he can be blown up; in the other a rock can be moved to open another escape route, but it will crush him…there might be people among them who…would move the rock, though they would not blow up the man because that would be choosing his death as a means of escape…they thus show themselves as people who will absolutely reject any policy making the death of innocent people a means or an end.’​[281]​
 
The only way this scenario could possibly be plausible, Harris says, is if it is accepted that blowing up the potholer could only be described as killing him, whereas moving the rock is a ‘complete action description’ of which killing him is a mere side effect. If the wording is adjusted slightly it is clear that the impression of which course of action involves direct killing and which involves death as a side effect is different:

	‘Suppose two cases: in one he is crushed leaving room to escape; in the other a hole can be blown in the rock at its weakest point but this will dismember the potholer…’​[282]​

According to this amended example the potholer is either crushed to provide a means of escape, or dies as a consequence of actions taken to procure a means of escape. Though the result of both scenarios is the same, the former appears to be an instance of direct intentional killing and the latter one of indirect unintentional killing. This outcome is the reverse of that of the unedited version of Anscombe’s example and evidences as a result the abovementioned weakness of the DDE. With a simple semantic adjustment the perceived consequences of a chain of events can be altered, and with this the moral imperative to either laud (in the case of indirect unintentional killing) or punish those performing them (where direct intentional killing is concerned).

A similar example can be drawn from the writings of Geddes, who argues, contrary to traditional Catholic teaching,​[283]​ that a doctor who crushes the skull of a foetus in order to remove it from the womb and thus saves the woman’s life is not directly (and therefore intentionally) killing the unborn child:

‘The surgeon must remove the child from the mother’s womb; the dimensions of the child are such that if the surgeon attempts to remove it without changes to these dimensions the mother will surely die. He therefore alters these dimensions in certain ways. A necessary but quite unneeded and unwanted consequence of this procedure is that the child dies. Clearly, the death of the child does not enter into consideration as a means to anything. So, in the relevant sense, the killing of the child was not intended by the surgeon, either as an end in itself or as a means to an end. Hence, it is a mistake to think that the principle concerning the killing of the innocent applies to (this) sort of killing...’​[284]​

How else though could this action be described other than an intentional termination of life? Indeed, how else could the death of the potholer in the above example? As Kuhse aptly points out, one could go so far in re-describing an action – making sure death was neither its end nor its means – that an intentional decapitation could be seen as not being an intentional termination of life.​[285]​ Even Duff, a proponent of the DDE, proclaims that Geddes’ example generates ‘...sophistical and unacceptable conclusions’​[286]​ because it effectively nullifies the absolutist moral principles the DDE exists to protect – the prohibition on intentional killing most obviously.

Duff makes his own attempt at framing a scenario consummate to the DDE with reference to Captain Oates and his desertion of his comrades so that they might live through the blizzard that engulfed them.​[287]​ In recounting the tale Duff postulates that if Oates had shot himself, instead of walking out into the blizzard to face his certain death,  this would have been an instance of the intentional termination of life and would have therefore fallen foul of the prohibition on intentional killing. However merely walking out into the storm was, according to Duff, not an instance of prohibited intentional (self) killing. This is so irrespective of the fact that death was equally certain in either case, and even if ‘the end aimed at is the same.’​[288]​ The distinguishing feature between the scenarios, Duff notes, is the means by which death was procured:

‘...in one case (Captain Oates’ comrades) will go on because he is dead and he intentionally kills himself, by shooting, as a means to this. But in the other case...he intends them to go on because they realise that he has chosen to withdraw from the group; and to achieve this, he needs simply to walk away.
	Of course, he knows, and they know, that he will certainly die but this is now a consequence, not a part, of his intentional action. It is separable from it, in a way in which his death is not separable from shooting himself. This separation – this logical gap between what he intentionally does and his consequence death – is important, not because it allows him or them to hope that he will in fact survive (they had no such hope), but because it shows that his intention, and attention, need in no way be directed toward his death: the rest is up to God.’​[289]​

The sophistry in this example, Kuhse​[290]​ proclaims, is as evident as that in Geddes’. Harris too felt the argument for a differential in means (the means Oates went to in procuring his demise) impacting on the moral weight of an actor’s actions, in terms of the DDE and its precepts regarding the intentional and non-intentional termination of life, lacked weight. He wrote in his work Violence and Responsibility:

‘Had Oates lacked the strength to remove himself from the group physically but possessed a revolver, he might have equally effectively disassociated himself by putting the barrel in his mouth, pulling the trigger and thinking ‘whether or not I die is up to God.’​[291]​

Duff, despite his work on the Oates case, freely admits that there are issues which are almost impossible to adequately tackle using the DDE. He gives the example of a man who throws himself onto a grenade to save his friends. The man sacrificing himself is not generally regarded as doing so intentionally in this instance.​[292]​ But, Duff concedes, if this is true it cannot be said that a person who throws another on top of the grenade is guilty of murder, or of intentionally killing him. 

Precisely how ‘intentional action’ is defined then is a matter of great debate. Though numerous academics have mulled over this quandary, Fried,​[293]​ Devine​[294]​ and Finnis​[295]​ to name three, none have truly given an encompassing answer to it. Foot​[296]​ and her proposals regarding ‘closeness’ require exploration however, and provide a fitting link between this more general discussion and the MSB’s main argument regarding intention and foresight in cases where the DDE is used.

In stipulating what it is that makes an action intentional Foot notes ‘...anything very close to what we are literally aiming at counts as if part of our aim.’​[297]​ Her thesis can be applied to the examples previously given in this section; crushing an unborn child’s skull and crushing the potholer to free his trapped friends. These, Foot holds, must be regarded as instances of the intentional termination of life because, even if they could be broken down into two acts (crushing the skull and death; crushing the potholer and death), they would be ‘much too close for an application of the doctrine of double effect.’​[298]​ In these circumstances, crushing the skull is killing the foetus, and crushing the potholer is killing him. The action and the action’s consequence cannot be distinguished. 

Foot’s assertions are lent support by Anscombe,​[299]​ Davidson​[300]​ and by the ‘identity thesis’ of Alvin Goldman, to which the MSB subscribes in part.​[301]​ These theses equate one’s actions with the consequences they bring about. Thus, if an agent does X (kills the patient) by doing Y (giving a potentially lethal dose of opiates), then his X-ing is identical to his Y-ing, since the physician kills the patient by giving him a lethal dose of medication. The same formula can be used to demonstrate another of the effects of Y-ing: ameliorating pain. The formula now looks like this: the agent does X (ameliorates the patient’s pain) by doing Y (giving a potentially lethal dose of opiates). Again, it is the doing of Y that causes X; the giving of the medication that ameliorates the pain. 

While the MSB does not dispute these outcomes, using ‘closeness’ as a measurement of intention appears counterintuitive to the logic of the DDE in cases of pyramid painkilling. Kuhse’s words on this practice, as cited earlier, are instructive here:

‘It would seem that in many cases the stage will be reached where a doctor foresees that a particular dosage which is sufficiently large to alleviate the patient’s pain will also positively cause the patient’s death.’​[302]​ 

If Foot’s criterion was used to determine whether a certain action or actions constituted the intentional termination of life in such a circumstance, the doctor’s deliberate administration of what he thinks is a lethal dose of pain-killers would clearly be an example of the intentional termination of life.​[303]​ Yet, notes Kuhse, proponents of the DDE would hold just the opposite: ‘...what the doctor (would be) said to ‘do’ is merely...relieve the patient’s pain.’​[304]​ If this though is not the direct, intentional termination of life, then nor would the death of the potholer or the foetus be understood as such. The removal of a ventilator from a dependant patient would likewise be indistinguishable from the consequential death, as would many other deliberate actions that proponents of the DDE support.

















As is necessitated by the DDE’s third criterion,​[305]​ there is a clear means-ends progression from the actor to the foreseen and intended consequences of his actions. The means employed are themselves ‘good’ in that they are undertaken by the physician with the intention of ameliorating pain (his intended consequence),  and not to hasten or cause death (the foreseen consequence) no matter the likelihood of this occurring. By acting with the intention of relieving the patient’s pain, the physician is taken to be acting intentionally when the unintentional consequence (death) occurs, in that he is doing what he is doing of his own free will. He is not however, according to the DDE, acting with the intention of causing that unintended consequence when he acts, even though he is acting intentionally in giving the morphine and foresees the death.

This conclusion brings the discussion back to Duff’s definition of acting intentionally. Recall from section 2.1.1, ‘I do not intend the (foreseen) side effects of my actions, but...I may...bring them about intentionally...’​[306]​ Rewriting this based on the dictionary definition of ‘intentionally’ exposes a clear double standard, ‘I do not intend the (foreseen) side effects of my actions, but...I may...bring them about with intention...’ Thus, one may bring about a consequence with intention, yet be said not to intend what one brings about. 

Important ramifications for the DDE as a whole are brought on by this contention because, without the intentional/intentionally distinction, that between intention and foresight is brought into question. Since all talk of foresight is apparently rendered spurious when the dictionary definition of ‘intentionally’ is used in place of the phrase ‘with intention’, the following examples will eschew its use. According to the rewritten version of Duff’s quotation, a physician would say this of the ‘foreseen’ consequences of his actions: ‘I did not intend to cause death (what would have been ‘foreseen’ if ‘intentionally’ did not mean ‘with intention’), but I caused death with intention.’ To coin an even more spurious phrase, ‘I did not intend to cause death, but I intended to cause death.’

As fervently, and rightly, as any physician may deny intending to kill his patient in giving him morphine, or indeed raising the dose of morphine in an infusion as the need requires it, it is impossible to deny that he knows​[307]​ what giving that drug will likely do.​[308]​ As section 2.1.1 noted earlier a want, wish, belief or desire is separate from intention itself, and as such it is plausible to claim that a doctor may intend both to ameliorate pain, and end his patient’s life in the process, without wanting to do the latter. Ashworth explicitly states that it is possible to possess more than one intention at one time:

 ‘It is quite possible – indeed quite normal – to do things with more than one intention in mind. The approach of the criminal law, however, is generally to...ask whether one particular intention was present when the act was committed. The law...is interested in the presence or absence of one particular intention – that specified in the definition of the offence charged – and not in conducting a general review of D’s reasons for the behaviour in question.’​[309]​

In a similar vein the Remmelink Report recorded the recognition of three new categories of intention, the most popular one among the physicians polled being that which described the situation where a physician, acting with the primary intention of relieving pain could also act partly with the intention of hastening death. van der Maas et al, the authors of the study on which the Remmelink Report was based note that this intermediate category was aimed at the situation where ‘...(the) death of the patient was not the foremost in the physician’s mind but neither was death unwelcome.’​[310]​ 

At first glance Ashworth’s assertion regarding one particular intention being the law’s focus behind ascribing culpability appears to unseat the MSB on principle. Any physician asked why he is providing palliation to a patient, no matter the dosage, will quite honestly reply that he wants to ease the patient’s suffering and intends to do so by giving him the appropriate medication. If he acknowledges the possibility of death at all he will certainly not claim to be intending to cause it as a result of his actions. However, without the intentional/intentionally distinction and the knock-on effect its loss has on the clarity of that between intention and foresight, can the claim that one does not intend consequences one brings about with intention hold water?






The smaller rectangles either side the central one represent the separate mental states ‘intention’ and ‘foresight’, while that in the centre and the arrow below it signify the changing of the mental states and the progression of a course of action respectively.  

It is an obvious observation to make that one’s mental state changes over the course of performing an action. Prior to performing the action one thinks about doing it, paying mind to its possible consequences and outcomes.​[312]​ Both the amelioration of pain and death are foreseen prior to any action being taken. Once decided, one performs the action in the knowledge of those foreseen consequences, mentally prepared to bear them as needed. The change brought to foresight by action comes directly from the MSB’s understanding of action itself. Recall from chapter 1 section 1.3.1 of this work:

‘For movement to become an action ‘volition’ must be exercised and ‘volition’ is a species of ‘bare intention’. Complex intention represents the ends to which the action prompted by the bare intention is aimed. Acting therefore is the realisation of an intention through volitional physical movement.’​[313]​





This chapter concludes with a supposition. The idea that one can foresee a consequence and not intend it is entirely valid until that foreseen consequence is realised through action. The physician could foresee that giving his patient a dose of morphine may well kill him while he stood in the doorway of his patient’s room and simply thought about it. As a doctor he would know through clinical experience that such was the case.​[314]​ His foresight becomes INTENTION however when he acts to cause that foreseen consequence; when he gives his patient the morphine irrespective of his knowledge that he is likely to die as a result. The DDE is, therefore, little more than a ‘pious fiction’.​[315]​ One which Price argues is ‘…the prime catalyst for jurisprudential distortion…’​[316]​ and that allows practitioners to ‘deceive themselves’ in situations where ‘…analgesics are used to relieve pain and simultaneously…hasten death…’​[317]​

Furthermore it is claimed here that the DDE’s reliance on the distinction between intentional action and acting intentionally offers no maintainable distinction between instances of ‘permissible’ and instances of ‘non-permissible’ killing. On the strength of these arguments the DDE could, hypothetically, be dismissed as fallacious. However, without it there would be no way for the courts to abrogate the harshness of the law in this area when faced with cases like Arthur,​[318]​ Carr,​[319]​ Adams​[320]​ and Cox.​[321]​ It is concluded therefore that, in order to protect both the morally blameless doctor from prosecution, and patients from the unregulated use of practices which amount to active euthanasia and intentional killing, urgent reform is required.​[322]​ 
































Chapters 1 and 2 have explored the theoretical underpinnings of the Moral Step Back (MSB), and have alleged that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia and the doctrine of double effect (DDE) are based on flawed reasoning. The maintenance of the distinctions at the centre of both of the contested mechanisms, it is claimed here, is assured because with them a practitioner who withdraws treatment or provides pain relief whilst foreseeing death as a possible but unintended consequence of that provision is saved from culpability if a death should result. 

It must be reiterated that the MSB does not seek to imply a moral or legal imperative in making practitioners who rely on the DDE or perform passive euthanasia criminally liable.​[324]​ It points out only that the current methods of exonerating the well meaning practitioner in such a circumstance are illogical because they are based on principles which are highly flawed, and cites reform to the law as the most viable method of correcting this problem.​[325]​ 

This chapter seeks to show how the courts deploy the principle of autonomy based on the precepts it proclaims as discredited. It begins with a broad discussion of English and American case law concerning consent and capacity, the prerequisites of making an autonomous choice (made by the patient himself or by the person who has been granted LPA under the Mental Capacity Act (2005) where the patient has lost competence).​[326]​ After the current law is set out, it will be argued that the courts in England and Wales habitually respect the competent patient’s autonomy when requests to withdraw treatment are made, but do not do so in cases where the requested assistance is ‘active’. This difference in approach, apparent whether or not the patient is competent, is questionable under the MSB’s reasoning. It appears, in light of chapter 1’s claim that the active/passive distinction is a misnomer, that the courts are acting arbitrarily in respecting certain patients’ autonomy while disregarding or overriding others.​[327]​ It will be concluded that, because of the aforesaid arbitrariness, the law should be reformed to allow a competent patient the ability to decide the manner of his or her passing. The courts, in allowing autonomy to be exercised in the ‘passive’ circumstance but not the ‘active’ one, perpetuate the illogicality evinced by the MSB.

3.1 Capacity, competence, choice, consent

The concepts of choice and competence are invariably bound together in principle. In order to choose, one must be competent; if one is competent one can choose. Stauch, Wheat and Tingle point out the essential elements of valid consent to treatment as follows:

‘(a) the patient must have sufficient understanding, variously described as mental capacity or mental competence, to make the decision;
(b) the patient must consent to (or refuse) the treatment of his own free will, with no duress or undue influence; and,
(c) the patient must have been given sufficient information about the proposed treatment.’​[328]​

The latter points are equally as important as the first in determining capacity. An extensive review of them is outside the scope of this section, as it is focussed on defining competence in terms of the patient’s ability to understand information, not the content of that information​[329]​ or the absence of duress.​[330]​ The aim here is to explore the courts’ approach to defining consent in refusal cases. Even with the guidance provided by case law and the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper on Mental Incapacity,​[331]​ the assessment of capacity is far from straightforward in practice. It is by its very nature a subjective assessment made by one person, who judges the ‘cognitively not directly accessible’​[332]​ mental state of another. In the medical context it will fall primarily to doctors, at the point of treatment, to make the assessment. The law provides assistance for this, but how effective that assistance is in practice is debateable.

The Law Commission provided three possible alternative approaches to determining capacity; the ‘status’, ‘outcome’ and ‘functional’ approaches.​[333]​  Criticisms of these approaches were wide ranging. The ‘status’ view was felt to be oversimplified, as it delineated between the competent and the incompetent by virtue of age. A child would therefore be seen as incompetent, even if by rights he is Gillick competent.​[334]​  The ‘outcome’ view on the other hand was derided as overly paternalistic. The Law Commission described the approach as follows:

‘An assessor of capacity using the ‘outcome’ method focuses on the final content of an individual’s decision. Any decision which is inconsistent with conventional values, or with which the assessor disagrees, may be classified as incompetent...’​[335]​

To adopt such an approach would mean that the patient’s consent would only be required when a doctor did not recommend a type of treatment, but described a number of alternatives to a patient inviting him to decide which to choose. In any situation where there was only one choice of treatment, a patient who refused it would be deemed to lack capacity, and the treatment would go ahead on the ground that it was in his best interests. 

The Law Commission therefore recommended the ‘functional’ approach. Here the assessor asks whether an individual is able, at the time when a particular decision has to be made, to understand its nature and effects. This approach is reflected in the Walton Report​[336]​ and the Mental Capacity Act (2005),​[337]​ both of which define competence in terms of the ability to understand and use information to make decisions regarding medical treatment. The courts have also adopted similar reasoning in key cases on capacity and consent to treatment. In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) Lord Donaldson MR made it clear from the beginning of his judgement that the competent patient’s right to consent to or refuse to consent to treatment is an absolute one. He stated that:

‘An adult patient who, like Miss T, suffers from no mental incapacity has an absolute right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than another of the treatments being offered.’​[338]​

Later, he went on to note:

‘…every adult has the right and capacity to decide whether he would accept medical treatment, even if a refusal might risk permanent injury to his health or even lead to premature death, and regardless of whether the reasons for the refusal were rational or  irrational, unknown or even non-existent…’​[339]​

The competent patient is therefore allowed to make his own decision about the treatment he or she wishes to refuse, regardless of his reasoning. The same principle was reiterated in Re C,​[340]​ a case which has already been mentioned briefly in section 2.2 of chapter 2 of this work. The facts of the case are as follows.

C, a 68 year old patient suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, developed gangrene in his foot during his confinement in a secure hospital while serving a 7 year term of imprisonment. He was removed to a general hospital, where the consultant surgeon diagnosed that he was likely to die imminently if the leg was not amputated below the knee. An application was made on C’s behalf to the court for an injunction restraining the hospital from carrying out an amputation without his express written consent. On behalf of the hospital it was alleged that C’s capacity to give a definitive decision had been impaired by his illness and that he had failed to appreciate the risk of death if the operation was not performed.

In concluding that C possessed the requisite capacity to refuse treatment the High Court stated ‘…Although his general capacity is impaired by schizophrenia, it has not been established that he does not sufficiently understand the nature, purpose and effects of the treatment he refuses.’​[341]​ Thorpe J explains how this right is approached by the court:

‘…the ultimate conclusion should be reached by weighing in the scales the preservation of life against the autonomy of the patient. If the patient’s capacity is reduced, the lighter autonomy weighs.’​[342]​

On this principle it is no leap of logic to make the suggestion that in cases sharing similar facts, the completely competent patient’s decisions would weigh all the more heavily against the steps taken to preserve his life. As such, were he to refuse life sustaining treatment, there would be little the doctors caring for him could do to impose it upon him barring proving his incapacity to make such decisions in court. The case of Re C is helpful in this regard also because it provides numerous suggested tests for determining capacity. 

Dr Eastman, one of C’s physicians, analysed the decision-making process and split it up into 3 stages; (1) comprehending and retaining treatment information, (2) believing it and (3) weighing it in the balance and arriving at a choice. This approximation was built upon in the case of Re MB​[343]​ by Butler-Sloss LJ. She noted:

‘A mentally competent patient has an absolute right to refuse to consent to medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all, even where that decision may lead to his or her own death.’​[344]​

In this case a 23 year old woman was admitted to hospital when 40 weeks pregnant. Her foetus was in the breech position and because vaginal delivery would pose a serious risk of death or injury to the foetus, she agreed to a Caesarean operation to deliver it. However, because of a needle phobia, she panicked and, at the last moment, withdrew her consent. The High Court granted a declaration that it would be lawful to carry out the operation because, on the evidence, the patient was suffering from a temporary impairment of her mental functioning and was, therefore, not competent. This decision was upheld in the CA where Butler-Sloss LJ made a number of conclusions on the ‘capacity to decide’. Those appropriate to the current discussion are quoted below:

‘(1) Every person is presumed to have the capacity to consent to or to refuse medical treatment unless and until that presumption is rebutted...
(4) A person lacks capacity if some impairment or disturbance of mental functioning renders the person unable to make a decision whether to consent to or to refuse treatment. That inability to make a decision will occur when:
(a) the patient is unable to comprehend and retain the information which is material to the decision, especially as to the likely consequences of having or not having the treatment in question;
(b) the patient is unable to use the information and weigh it in the balance as part of the process of arriving at the decision. If, as Thorpe J observed in Re C…a compulsive disorder or phobia from which the patient suffers stifles belief in the information presented to her, then the decision may not be a true one…
(5) The ‘temporary factors’ mentioned by Lord Donaldson MR in Re T (confusion, shock, pain or the effects of drugs) may completely erode capacity but those concerned must be satisfied that such factors are operating to such a degree that the ability to decide is absent.
(6) Another such influence may be panic induced by fear. Again, careful scrutiny of the evidence is necessary because fear of an operation may be a rational reason for refusal to undergo it. Fear may also, however, paralyse the will and thus destroy the capacity to make a decision.’​[345]​

While these observations provide a comprehensive legalistic framework for determining capacity, the concepts relied on in jurisprudence – ‘understanding’, ‘retention’ and ‘ability to weigh’ treatment information in a ‘balance’ – are not based on medical literature, and have a fluid character to them. It may be the case that this fluidity lends flexibility to complex concepts and situations, but it is equally likely that it engenders arbitrariness in the decision-making process, with different practitioners relying on their own understanding of what the components of capacity are.

The next section builds on section 3.1 by exploring how the courts in England and Wales assess capacity in cases where the patient is competent and refusing further treatment. This discussion and those immediately following it will form the basis upon which the claim in section 3.5, that the courts’ respect for requests for the cessation of treatment and/or the refusal of further treatment, contrasts starkly with cases where active means of ending life are requested, will be made.

3.2 The competent patient in England and Wales

It must be noted from the outset that the MSB recognises that there are situations where the concepts of refusing further treatment and requesting the withdrawal of treatment can be differentiated. The former is most often seen as a pure omission of treatment; pure in the sense that the patient simply says ‘stop treatment A’ and the physician accedes to that request. This kind of omission occurs when, for example, a course of medication is stopped. The physician simply does not do what he was doing before, giving the next dose of medication.

The ‘ceasing treatment’ situation can be contrasted with that where a patient requests that a type of treatment is withdrawn e.g. where a respirator is relied upon but unwanted and the patient requests that his doctor withdraw the tubes connecting him to it. It is more likely than not that this kind of ‘omission’ will result in the patient’s death, and also that the physician involved will resist it more readily than the ‘ceasing medication’ example. This approach was displayed in the case of Ms B.​[346]​

The claimant, who was 41 years of age, suffered a haemorrhage of the spinal column in her neck in 1999. She was admitted to the respondent hospital and a cavernoma was diagnosed, a condition caused by the malformation of blood vessels in the spinal cord. When she was transferred to another hospital, she was informed by doctors that there was a possibility of a further bleed, or surgical intervention, which would result in severe disability. On the basis of that advice the claimant executed a living will dated the 4th of September 1999, in which she expressed her wish for treatment to be withdrawn if she suffered a life-threatening condition, permanent mental impairment or permanent unconsciousness. 
 
Although the claimant recovered sufficiently to work, her condition deteriorated in 2001. She was readmitted to hospital where she suffered an intramedullary cervical spine cavernoma, as a result of which she became tetrapelgic and suffered complete paralysis from the neck down. She was subsequently transferred to an Intensive Care Unit and was put on a ventilator. She was informed by a consultant anaesthetist that the living will she had made was not specific enough to authorise the withdrawal of ventilation. 

After neurological surgery to remove the cavernous haematoma, the claimant was able to move her head and to articulate words. She gave formal instructions to the respondent through her solicitors that she wished artificial ventilation to be removed. Two consultant psychiatrists at the respondent hospital concluded that she did not have the capacity to make a decision in respect of the withdrawal of treatment. Numerous re-assessments were undertaken, none of which provided a firm conclusion as to her mental capacity. Indeed, contrary to the first assessment the claimant was declared competent after a re-assessment on the 8th of August 2001. She was offered a referral to a weaning centre where, over a period of time, assistance from a ventilator would be reduced allowing her body to become used to breathing again. However, the claimant refused to be put on the programme.

She applied to the court seeking a Declaration that the hospital had been treating her unlawfully since the 8th of August 2001. The issue before the court was whether she had the mental capacity to choose whether to accept or refuse medical treatment in circumstances in which her refusal would almost inevitably lead to her death, and whether she had capacity from August 2001. Ruling in Ms B’s favour Butler-Sloss P stated:
‘...the right of a competent patient to request the cessation of treatment had to prevail over the natural desire of the medical profession to try to keep her alive…’​[347]​

In coming to this decision she noted that ‘Her (Ms B’s) mental competence was commensurate with the gravity of the decision she might wish to make’​[348]​ and reiterated the fundamental principle that: 

‘If...the patient, having been given the relevant information and offered the available options chooses to refuse, that decision has to be respected by the courts. Considerations of the best interests of the patient are irrelevant.’​[349]​

This clear respect for the patient’s right to choose regarding her end of life care and its withdrawal are reflections on the decisions taken in Re T, Re C and Re MB and make up the main body of case law on consent in England and Wales. However the cases discussed so far have been based on requests for treatment to be withheld or withdrawn. Respect for competence does not seem to transfer over to cases where the crux is clearly based on a request for ‘active’ assistance in dying. The cases of Annie Lindsell​[350]​ and Dianne Pretty​[351]​ exemplify this distinction, while that of Leslie Burke​[352]​ provides a point of comparison regarding requests for the continuation of specific treatments.

Lindsell and Pretty both suffered from MND, much as the patient in Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent)​[353]​ did. AK concerned a patient who indicated by blinking that he wanted his ventilator turned off two weeks after he lost the ability to communicate completely. The court’s decision was firmly based on the competent patient’s right to refuse medical treatment and Hughes J, quoting Lord Goff in the Bland judgement, confirmed that ceasing treatment was a lawful omission to continue with procedures to which the patient did not consent.​[354]​ 

Unlike the AK case however, both Mrs Lindsell and Mrs Pretty asked unequivocally for assurances to be given that if they received active assistance in suicide, their abettors would not be punished. Lindsell went to the High Court for a ruling that her doctor could lawfully administer diamorphine to ease her mental and physical suffering, even if this shortened her life. She dropped her case when the judge, the solicitors appointed by the Official Solicitor and the Attorney General assured her that the DDE applied to mental distress and physical pain, even if this shortened her life.​[355]​

Mrs Pretty, by contrast, took her case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) after her request for a reprieve from culpability for her husband should he assist her suicide, failed in the English Courts. A fuller discussion of the Pretty case will take place in chapter 4. For now it is necessary only to mention that the ECtHR refused to acknowledge that the denial of clemency by the DPP infringed Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Unlike Mrs Lindsell, she could not be availed of the DDE as her request for assistance in dying was made to her husband, not a medical practitioner who could use the doctrine should he need it.

The case of R (Burke) v. General Medical Council​[356]​ is a further contrast to Lindsell and Pretty. Mr. Burke went to court because he is suffering from a progressive degenerative disease, Spino-cerebellar ataxia, which will eventually lead to loss of speech and movement and he will require treatment by way of artificial nutrition and hydration to keep him alive. 

Given his expressed wish to fight his disease until the end of his natural life, he was concerned that his physicians, once he lost capacity, would withdraw the ANH and allow him to die on the basis of an approximation of his best interests. He sought to clarify when, once started, the treatment could lawfully be withdrawn, if it could be at all. To this end he argued that existing guidance issued by the General Medical Council (GMC) was unlawful in so far as it failed to protect the rights of a patient expressing an advance directive to carry on life prolonging treatment.​[357]​ 

He feared that when he became unable to communicate, although he would likely still be conscious of what was happening to him, artificial feeding would be withdrawn. Naturally enough, he found such a prospect altogether horrifying. Accordingly, Mr. Burke wanted to be sure that doctors would not, contrary to his wishes, be able to withdraw feeding. 

Mr. Burke relied on principles of Common Law and on Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights dealing respectively with the ‘right to life’, and the ‘prohibition against inhumane and degrading treatment’. In his judgment Munby J emphasised four issues he encountered in the disputed set of Guidelines that he felt required amendment. These were:

1)	The need to emphasise the right of the competent patient to require, as opposed to refuse, treatment.
2)	To make it clear that a doctor who had assumed responsibility for a patient’s care was under a duty to continue providing treatment, even if he or she was unwilling to do so, until he had found another doctor to assume responsibility for the patient’s care,
3)	To acknowledge ‘intolerability’ as being the touchstone for the patient’s best interests, when considering withholding or withdrawing treatment from him or her.
4)	To make clear the legal requirement to obtain prior judicial sanction for the withdrawal of artificial feeding in cases where there was disagreement about capacity, best interests, the patient’s condition and prognosis and/or the applicability of an advance directive.


His conclusions were reversed unanimously by the CA, which emphasised that the patient was amply protected by the existing Common Law, and that nothing in the GMC’s Guidance should be read as detracting from this. Lord Phillips MR delivered the judgment of the court:

‘So far as ANH is concerned, there is no need to look far for the duty to provide this. Once the patient is accepted into hospital, the medical staff come under a positive duty at Common Law to care for the patient…A fundamental aspect of this positive duty of care is a duty to take such steps as are reasonable to keep the patient alive.’​[358]​

Mr. Burke was therefore entitled to receive all of the treatments offered to him by the hospital he went to. This duty, according to Lord Phillips, extended to the provision of ANH when it was necessary to keep the patient alive but would not, on the same token, ‘…override the competent patient’s wish not to receive ANH.’​[359]​ Mr. Burke could therefore refuse the ANH should he wish to, on the understanding that he be competent to make such a decision. This ratio supports those of the cases mentioned in the preceding sections insofar as the competent patient has every right to refuse treatment, even life sustaining treatment, should he or she wish to. Lord Phillips then went on:

‘Where the competent patient makes it plain that he or she wishes to be kept alive by ANH, this will not be the source of the duty to provide it. The patient’s wish will merely underscore that duty.’​[360]​

Thus the courts recognise that when life involves an extreme degree of pain, discomfort or indignity to a patient who is sentient but not competent, and who has manifested no wish to be kept alive, these circumstances may absolve the doctors of their positive duty to keep the patient alive. Also, it is accepted that there may be no duty to keep alive a patient in a persistent vegetative state.​[361]​ However: 

‘No such difficulty arises...in the situation that has caused Mr. Burke concern…(where the patient) makes it plain that he wants to be kept alive (irrespective of pain, suffering or indignity)…No authority lends the slightest countenance to the suggestion that the duty on the doctors to take reasonable steps to keep the patient alive in such circumstances may not persist.’​[362]​

In concluding, Phillips MR made it clear that Munby J’s observations pertaining to the illegality of paragraphs 13,​[363]​ 16,​[364]​ 32,​[365]​ and 42​[366]​ of the GMC’s Guidance were unfounded. He noted that while 13 and 16 are general principles, and while they do not state explicitly that a doctor cannot withdraw ANH from a patient who does not wish it to be withdrawn, that ‘…that this is their (the sections’) inference.’​[367]​ The same was held to be true of sections 32 and 42. They suggest: 

‘…that the wishes of the patient should be respected unless this is ‘clinically inappropriate’ and….administering treatment that is necessary to keep a patient alive cannot be described as clinically inappropriate.’​[368]​

As such, it was held that Mr. Burke’s fears were felt to have been adequately allayed by the GMC’s Guidance, and his appeal was dismissed. This is a deceptive conclusion to make however, given that Burke was concerned that, as his condition and treatment progressed, his physicians would come to the conclusion that prolonging his life was no longer reasonable, or that doing so would become ‘clinically inappropriate’.​[369]​ The court appeared to simply restate the status quo, that treatment could not be demanded, instead of actually answering Burke’s concerns.

In an interview undertaken as part of this work ‘Doctor 2’ expressed a similar opinion regarding a patient’s rights as regards demanding specific treatments:

‘I’m a doctor. I’m trained at the expense of the tax payer, I’m employed at the expense of the tax payer so I’ve got a particular set of duties which I’ve voluntarily taken on. To provide health care. But that is not a specific duty to provide a specific treatment that is a duty to provide what’s best and appropriate. What I don’t think that’s describing is a right on the part of a patient, a person, to say this is the treatment I want. I don’t think there is anything in the theoretical opinions on autonomy and the respect for autonomy that says that means I can tell you what I want. It’s a right to non-interference. And that’s the difference I think between saying no to treatment and saying this is what I demand.’​[370]​

It is therefore clear that while a patient has every right to say ‘yes please’ or ‘no thank you’ to an offered treatment, he cannot by the same token say ‘give me treatment A’.​[371]​

3.2.1 Burning Burke’s Bridge?

It might be questioned whether a different ratio could be read into the Burke judgment. At the time of Munby J’s and Lord Phillips MR’s judgments, Mr. Burke did not require ANH. He feared that in the future, when he would require it, it might be taken away as a result of his losing competence and his doctors then deciding that continued treatment was not in his best interests. 

There is a possible, though improbable point of conjecture raised on a slightly different interpretation of Mr. Burke’s case. It could be argued on the facts that the central issue espoused by the ratio in the case (that one may not demand treatment but may refuse it) was improperly formulated given that Mr. Burke had not explicitly demanded anything at all. He simply desired that a future status quo be preserved. As Lord Phillips MR rightly noted:

‘So far as ANH is concerned, there is no need to look far for the duty to provide this. Once the patient is accepted into hospital, the medical staff come under a positive duty at Common Law to care for the patient…A fundamental aspect of this positive duty of care is a duty to take such steps as are reasonable to keep the patient alive.’​[372]​

As such Mr. Burke would receive the treatment as of right once he consented to it. His doctors would choose the most effective treatment for him to receive, as per their duty of care, and he would receive it as all patients do, by virtue of the fact that he is a patient who needs it and has been offered it. There is no element of demanding that specific treatment present. It could be argued that this thought exercise is simply one of the same kind of semantic sophistry criticised in chapter 1 of this work: that instead of saying that Mr. Burke demanded a specific treatment, he asked for a specific treatment not to be taken away and that, in effect is a non-point given that both formulations of the ratio achieve the same result i.e. that Mr. Burke demanded his treatment.

It is also questionable whether the MSB would change this outcome. By applying it to these facts one could conclude that the act/omission distinction complained of is non-existent based on the explanations in chapter 1. As a result of this non-existence the court should be willing to either accept both forms of Burke’s request or deny both, instead of maintaining the non-distinction and perpetuating the double standard the MSB purports to display in cases concerning ‘passive’ euthanasia. This is an uncomfortable conclusion to come to, however, as it is not the nature of the act or omission itself that is under scrutiny, but the nature of the request precipitating that act or omission. As such, it would be a safer conclusion to draw for this section that Burke makes a clear case for one to be able to consent to the withdrawal of treatment, but not to be able to demand a specific form. 

The coming section adds to this chapter’s discussion of competence by focusing on the American courts, their appreciation of competency and the right of the competent patient to refuse treatment. 

3.3 The competent patient in America

In much the same way the English courts in Re T, Re C and Re MB show personal autonomy to be a central theme running through cases concerning competent patients, the American courts in Satz,​[373]​ Farrell,​[374]​ Vacco v. Quill​[375]​ and numerous others, place autonomy at the crux of their reasoning. 

The case of Satz concerned a patient who was ventilator dependent and suffering from MND. He had on numerous occasions tried to disconnect himself from the respirator, but had been physically restrained by hospital staff. The Florida Supreme Court made a decidedly contradictory judgement. On the one hand it agreed that the right to privacy of a competent terminally ill person in Mr Satz’s position took precedence over numerous State interests – one of which was the prevention of suicide. On the other, however, it asserted unequivocally that, despite his numerous attempts at disconnecting the ventilator keeping him alive, he had no intention to die. Price is of the opinion that ‘...the courts typically adopt a narrow construction of intention in this context, equating it with desire, yet seemingly then deny the self-evident truth.’​[376]​ He later asserts that this denial is based on the ‘dubious’ DDE and concludes, as the MSB does, that applying it to circumstances like those facing Mr Satz is ill-advised. The usual distinction the doctrine is based on is twisted minutely to distinguish instead between desiring death for its own sake and intending to avoid continued existence in an unacceptable condition, knowing death is the consequence of the decision. However, this distinction leads to treating almost all ‘rational self-killings’​[377]​ as non-suicides because it is invariably the case that people, like Mr Satz, only chose death to escape a more undesirable fate. It is therefore misleading, because self-killings in such circumstances are commonly perceived as instances of suicide.

Like the Satz case, that of Farrell has at its centre the principle of respect for the competent informed patient’s autonomy. The court noted that there would be no liability, civil or criminal, for any person who withdrew life sustaining treatment at the request of an informed and competent terminally ill patient. This statement and the principle behind it were echoed and extended in the case of Bouvia​[378]​where, unlike Ms Farrell, the patient was not terminally ill. 

Elizabeth Bouvia, a 28 year old quadriplegic woman with cerebral palsy and crippling arthritis, who required others to feed her, refused to allow further food to be administered to her.  The court of first instance denied Ms Bouvia's request that she not be force-fed, stating that her prognosis, a further 15-20 years of life if she received proper care, justified the state's interest in preserving her life. The court said that to rule otherwise would be tantamount to aiding and abetting suicide, since Ms Bouvia's motive for refusing treatment was to die. Ms Bouvia immediately appealed the trial court decision.

The appellate court acknowledged that a competent adult has the right, in the exercise of control over his or her own body, to determine whether and to what extent to submit to medical treatment.​[379]​ It also held that a competent adult has a basic and fundamental right to refuse any medical treatment, even if it may save or prolong his or her life.​[380]​ The right was held not only to extend to ‘terminal’ patients, but to those like Ms Bouvia who did not have such a prognosis. It was further asserted that the ‘patients interests and desires…(are) the key ingredients of the decision-making process…’​[381]​ The court recognised that the right to refuse treatment is based upon the patient being competent to make that choice and to understand the consequences of the refusal of care.





(3)	protecting innocent third parties, and 
(4)	maintaining the ethical standards of the medical profession, including supporting the right of physicians to effectively render necessary and appropriate medical services.
 
The court ruled however that while these interests were important and valid, they could not overcome Ms Bouvia’s right to refuse treatment. It was felt that the court of first instance had erred in deciding that, just because Ms Bouvia could live an additional 15 to 20 years with sufficient care, the state’s interest in preserving her life for that period prevailed over her individual right to autonomy. It was emphasised that the length of the life ahead of Ms Bouvia did not correlate to the quality of it during that time. Indeed considering those possible additional years was erroneous without considering their quality alongside their number. Thus the court deferred to Ms Bouvia’s wishes regarding how her life was to end and affirmed her right to have her naso-gastric tube removed.

Following Bouvia is the case of McKay v. Bergstedt.​[382]​ The appellant here, like Ms Bouvia before him, had been paraplegic for a number of years, was not terminally ill and was competent. The court confirmed that the right to refuse treatment was not absolute, and in granting the patient’s request for the withdrawal of his respirator, balanced that right against five state interests,​[383]​ his constitutional liberty interest and the Common Law right of self determination. Springer J, dissenting, was deeply critical of what he considered a ‘killing act’​[384]​ which knowingly caused a human being’s instant death. His judgement and others like it make the importance of intention and causation in treatment refusal cases obvious, and later cases, Vacco v. Quill​[385]​ and Washington v. Glucksberg​[386]​ to name but two, reaffirm this importance.​[387]​ The principle underlying these decisions i.e. respect for patient autonomy under the caveat of competence, does not diminish entirely when that competence is taken away. 

The next selection of cases displays the continuing trend towards the respect of patient choice, even when the patient is incompetent and that choice is expressed by the patient’s relatives or by the person who has been granted LPA under the Mental Capacity Act (2005).

3.4 The incompetent patient in English and American law

As the preceding sections have shown, where a patient is competent, both English and American law is constructed to allow him to consent to and withhold consent from any treatment that has been offered. He may not however, as the Burke case makes clear, demand that specific kinds of treatment be provided indefinitely. The law concerning incompetent patients is little different, but for the use of the best interests principle in England and Wales, and a substituted judgement approach in the United States. 

3.4.1 Best interests and the English cases

The once purely case law based concept of best interests is now detailed in section 1(5) of the Mental Capacity Act (2005). This section states that ‘...an act done, or a decision made under this Act for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must be made in his best interests...’​[388]​ while sections 5​[389]​ and 6(6)  through 6(7)​[390]​ outline guidance for the application of the test in cases concerning the end of life. The principle exists so that in situations where a patient is rendered incompetent by an illness or injury, his doctors may determine which courses of treatment to provide and which to withhold based on an evaluation of his best interests. Perhaps the most detailed exposition of the principle is found in the case of Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland.​[391]​ 

The patient in Bland was a victim of the Hillsborough stadium disaster. He received acute brain damage as a result of being crushed and trampled, and descended into a persistent vegetative state from which he would never recover. His doctors, in agreement with his parents, applied to the court for a declaration to the effect that:  
1)	they might lawfully discontinue all life-sustaining treatment and medical support measures, including ventilation, nutrition and hydration by artificial means,
2)	any subsequent treatment given should be for the sole purpose of enabling him to end his life in dignity and free from pain and suffering,
3)	if death should then occur, its cause should be attributed to the natural and other causes of his present state,
4)	and that none of those concerned should, as a result, be subject to any criminal or civil liability.
Although Lord Mustill expressed unease over classifying the steps taken to withdraw treatment from Bland as ‘omissions’, the requisite order was granted and treatment was withdrawn. In coming to this decision Lord Keith noted:

‘...The fundamental question...(is) whether continuance of the present regime of treatment and care...would confer any benefit on Bland. It has been argued for the respondents...that his best interests favour discontinuance. I feel some doubt about this way of putting the matter...’​[392]​

Lord Keith’s doubt arose from his knowledge of the precedent surrounding best interests cases. Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment)​[393]​ was decided on the basis of the perceived quality of life of the minor patient. The Court of Appeal (CA) held that it would be lawful to withhold life-saving treatment from a very young child in circumstances where the child’s life, if saved, would be racked by pain and agony. The problem faced by Lord Keith and the HL in Bland was that the patient was insensate. As such, making a value judgement as to his best interests was more difficult because he had no appreciation of his condition that treatment might make better, or that the lack of treatment might make worse. 

Similar issues were confronted in the case of NHS Trust A v. M, NHS Trust B v. H.​[394]​ Mrs M and Mrs H were two patients who had been in PVS, like Bland, for three years, and nine months, respectively. The applicant hospital trusts, with the support of the patients’ families, applied for Declarations to the effect that, notwithstanding the Human Rights Act (1998) and its incumbent right to life, it would be lawful to discontinue artificial hydration and nutrition. Butler-Sloss P, in granting the Declarations made the following observation:

‘If a decision to cease treatment in the best interests of the patient is to be characterised as intentional deprivation of life, in view of the absolute nature of the prohibition on intentional killing...there would be a duty in every case to take steps to keep a terminally ill patient alive by all means possible, and continue those steps indefinitely...such an interpretation...cannot be correct...’​[395]​

Practicality and an appreciation of the problems caused by overly burdensome treatment are both clearly shown in this preliminary justification. Butler-Sloss P was, as Lord Keith was in the Bland case, keenly aware of the need to weigh the benefits and burdens of the treatment under discussion to the patient. She went on to say:

‘...the intention in withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration in PVS cases is to hasten death...the phrase ‘deprivation of life’ must import a deliberate act, as opposed to an omission, by someone acting on behalf of the state, which results in death...Such a decision based on clinical judgement is an omission to act...the death...is the result of the illness or injury from which he suffered and that cannot be described as a deprivation.’​[396]​

There are two issues which require analysis here, the first of which necessitates a brief reference to the MSB. Since chapter 1, sections 1.2 and 1.4 define and discuss the MSB, as do sections 2.3 through 2.3.2 of chapter 2, a thorough exposition is unnecessary here. It suffices to point out that Butler-Sloss P was adamant in her conviction that even though ‘the intention of withdrawing (treatment)...is to hasten death...’​[397]​ such a withdrawal in the present case would not qualify as a ‘deprivation of life...which results in death...’​[398]​ The MSB, for the reasons discussed in earlier sections, contests this claim by relabeling ‘withdrawal’ as an action – one in this case which would be ‘...a deliberate act, as opposed to an omission, by someone acting on behalf of the state, which results in death.’ The first point of analysis then is simply this observation – the MSB contests the distinction between action and inaction in cases like A v. M and B v. H.​[399]​ 

The second issue is linked to the first, and is brought to light when Butler-Sloss P notes: ‘...the death...is the result of the illness or injury from which (the patient) suffered...’​[400]​ It is common practice in cases where treatment is withdrawn for the courts to proclaim, and for physicians to assert, that the cause of death was the underlying illness or injury, not the effect of the withdrawal itself. This, like the first issue (above) is contested by the MSB. 

It is important to concede from the outset that in cases of ‘pure omission’, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the MSB to cogently maintain its stance regarding the cause of death. That said, in circumstances like those faced in A v. M and B v. H​[401]​ the argument may be advanced that, had the withdrawal of treatment not taken place, the patients would in all likelihood still be alive now. How then can Butler-Sloss P maintain that it is not the withdrawal of treatment that precipitates the patients’ deaths, if, without that interference, death would not have occurred? These questions notwithstanding, the case of A v. M and B v. H​[402]​ solidifies the precedent set in Bland, and makes it clear that the outcome of that case did not contravene the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 

Another pair of cases equally influential in the discussion of best interests are, In the matter of a Ward of Court​[403]​ and W NHS Trust v. KH.​[404]​ Ward of Court concerned a 22 year old woman who suffered brain damage from three cardiac-arrests during surgery. She was diagnosed as being ‘borderline’​[405]​ PVS and the court decreed that the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration was lawful. In coming to this decision, as occurred in both the Bland and A v. M and B v. H​[406]​ judgements, reference was made to the patient’s best interests and the classification of artificial hydration and nutrition as a type of treatment (per Bland) was affirmed, as was the right of an incompetent patient to refuse treatment. As the later case of A v. M and B v. H​[407]​ restated, the majority held that the cause of death in this instance would be the patient’s underlying illness, not the lack of nutrition precipitated by the withdrawal of treatment and Hamilton CJ, in the Ward of Court case, went as far as to assert: ‘...without the benefit of the nourishment provided by the treatment...she would die within a short period, and in this regard, she must be terminally ill.’​[408]​

If Hamilton CJ’s opinion was taken out of context it would appear that every living human being on the planet is terminally ill, as they cannot survive without the provision of nutrition. This is of course not what was implied in Ward of Court, but the level of disbelief one would be required to suspend in making such a sweeping statement is comparable. Indeed it is arguable that being in a PVS is not a terminal illness at all. Characterised most predominantly by a finite life expectancy, a terminal illness will inevitably cause death fairly soon. Existence in a PVS however can be maintained for many years if the patient’s basic needs are met. In deeming the patient in Ward of Court ‘terminally ill’,​[409]​ Hamilton CJ seemed to overlook the primary and proximate causes of her eventual death – or at least looked to excuse the withdrawal of treatment by not addressing the issue. Mason and Laurie took this line of thinking when they commented:

‘...no matter how euphemistically worded it is, the patient was killed because the tube was removed...the proximate cause of her death must...be the result of starvation because, otherwise, there was nothing to cause the death.’​[410]​

W NHS Healthcare Trust v. KH​[411]​ was decided on similar grounds as Ward of Court, though here the patient was not in a PVS. The court had to consider withdrawing artificial hydration and nutrition when the family of a patient who had her PEG tube reinstated, appealed against that reinstatement. They felt that her prior expressed wishes were tantamount to a living will, and that she would not have wished to persist in the condition she was in when the case was brought to court had she the choice. Brooke LJ however did not share this outlook. He held that firstly, the prior expressed wishes of the patient when she was competent were not ‘of the quality to constitute an advance directive’ and secondly that her expressed wishes did not cover the circumstances which would have involved dying over a protracted number of weeks from starvation. The withdrawal was therefore denied.

Unlike the decision in the A v. M and B v. H​[412]​ cases (above) the cause of the patient’s death in W v. KH was, as Brooke LJ’s ruling shows, felt to be starvation-induced. Looking back at the cases discussed in this section and those in section 3.3 it appears that where a competent or incompetent patient refuses treatment, the court decides that his cause of death is his underlying illness or injury. The cases of Burke, A v. M and B v. H,​[413]​ Ward of Court, Bland and the American case of Vacco v. Quill make this trend clear, Rehnquist J in the latter noting:

‘...when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if he ingests lethal medication prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication.’​[414]​

Of all those cases discussed so far, only the W v. KH judgement references the possibility of starvation, not an underlying condition, as being the cause of death. It could be argued that the fact that KH was not insensate, as Mr Burke was not (though KH was incompetent where Burke was not), lead to the decision that she would face protracted suffering in reaching her end where a patient in a PVS would not. In Burke however it was clearly noted by Lord Philips that it was the disease that would eventually shorten the patient’s life, not the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition. It is open to question whether this distinction is a further incidence of moral distancing, like those the MSB proclaims necessitate the maintenance of the acts/omissions distinction and the DDE. 

The concordance of English and American law (but for the KH judgement) reaffirms the currently accepted legal consensus on the refusal of treatment. When the patient refuses it himself he dies as a result of an underlying illness, even in situations where it is quite plain that if the withdrawal did not take place, he would survive for a considerable period. 

The way in which incompetent patients are dealt with in the US differs for practical purposes from how they are dealt with in English law. Instead of the Bland best interests standard, a substituted judgement approach is adopted – critically, one which was dismissed in Bland by Lord Goff:

‘I wish however to refer at this stage to the approach adopted in most American courts under which the court seeks, in a case in which the patient is incapacitated from expressing any view on the question whether life-prolonging treatment should be withheld in the relevant circumstances...the substituted judgement test...usually involves a detailed inquiry into the patient’s views and preferences...in PVS cases...the surrogate decision maker has to implement as far as possible the decision which the incompetent patient would make if he was competent...I do not consider that any such test forms part of English law in relation to incompetent adults, on whose behalf nobody has power to give consent to medical treatment...’​[415]​

3.4.2 American law, the substituted judgement test and incompetent patients

Much as cases mooted in English courts follow a certain formula, the American courts employ certain principles in all cases concerning the treatment of incompetent patients. The starting point is usually confirmation of the patient’s right to self-determination; a right that subsumes the right to refuse treatment. The cases of Lane v. Candura,​[416]​ Hamish​[417]​ and Boyd​[418]​ clearly display this penchant, the Lane case providing the following statement: ‘The law protects (a person’s) right to make her own decision to accept or reject treatment, whether or not that decision was unwise.’

These rights are not lost when a patient becomes incompetent, as the cases of Cruzan,​[419]​ Brophy​[420]​ and Quinlan​[421]​ have shown. The case of Hamish, extrapolating on the Lane judgment, made it clear that the doctrine of informed consent and the right to bodily integrity extended to the incompetent patient, and in Boyd it was held that not only the previously noted rights, but all of the rights possessed by the competent patient are possessed by incompetent patients as well. The application of the substituted judgement test to cases like these will be explored in section 3.4.2a.

While these principles are relatively easy to apply to a patient who was once competent, the status of never-have-been-competent patients and the suitability of the substituted judgement doctrine for them have been hotly debated.​[422]​ The cases of Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz​[423]​ and Guardianship of Jane Doe​[424]​ will be discussed in section 3.4.2b to highlight how the courts applied the substituted judgement test to them, irrespective of the fact that neither patient had ever possessed the competence to make judgements for themselves. 

3.4.2a Dealing with the once competent but now incompetent patient

The seminal case of Quinlan is likely the best documented in the body of American case law on incompetent patients and the right to refuse consent to treatment. Karen Ann Quinlan was 21 when she fell into a coma after taking a cocktail of alcohol and drugs at a party in 1975. She subsequently fell into a persistent vegetative state and was described by a neurologist, Dr Fred Plum, as no longer having any cognitive function but retained the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function. She was unaware of anyone or anything around her, yet did not, according to her doctor, meet the Harvard criteria for brain death. As such he was unable to accede to her father’s request to terminate all life sustaining treatments, including the use of a ventilator, to allow her to die.

Mr. Quinlan, Karen’s father, approached the court seeking an order of guardianship over his daughter to gain the power to authorise the desired discontinuance, yet his petition was denied at first instance. He appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey,​[425]​ requesting that the treatment be withdrawn under the U.S Constitution’s First Amendment,​[426]​ but again his petition was denied. The court also considered the applicability of the Eighth Amendment,​[427]​ but found that it only applied to protection from excessive punishment in criminal cases. Ms Quinlan's cruel and unusual circumstances did not result from excessive punishment inflicted by the law or state, but from an accident of fate and nature. However, the court felt that an individual’s right to privacy was ‘...broad enough to encompass a patient’s decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances.’ The cases of Griswold v. Connecticut​[428]​ and Roe v. Wade​[429]​ were affirmed, and the court further presumed that the right to privacy extended to situations like Miss Quinlan’s, where the withdrawal of life sustaining medical care was countenanced.

‘If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a valuable incident of her right to privacy, as we believe it to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice...If (the conclusion of the incompetent patient’s family)...is in the affirmative this decision should be accepted by a society the overwhelming majority of which would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise such choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to them. It is for this reason that we determine that Karen’s right to privacy may be asserted on her behalf, in this respect, by her guardian and her family under the particular circumstances presented by this record.’​[430]​

Based on these cases the court ruled in favour of Miss Quinlan, and noted that on balance:
‘We think that the State's interest…weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State's interest.’​[431]​
It was also stated that:
‘We have no doubt … that if Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which she would soon return) and perceptive of her irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death.’​[432]​
As such, even in a case concerning an obviously incompetent patient, the courts deferred to Miss Quinlan’s perceived wishes and allowed treatment to be withdrawn. Unexpectedly her breathing continued even after her respirator was removed and she died in 1985 after contracting numerous infections.

The same principles that guided the Quinlan case were exercised in that of Brophy.​[433]​ The question brought before the Massachusetts Supreme Court was whether an incompetent patient in a PVS, which Brophy himself was, could refuse consent to the use of artificial hydration and nutrition through a surrogate decision-maker or proxy. While it was found, in line with previous precedent, that he could refuse consent, the court did not rule that the hospital where Mr Brophy was cared for had to desist from providing the unwanted interventions. It is questionable therefore exactly how far a refusal of consent in Brophy’s circumstances will weigh against a refusal by the patient’s medical team to comply with his wish. 

In a similar vein, the Cruzan​[434]​ case involved the possible withdrawal of treatment from Miss Cruzan, who was in a PVS and therefore unable to express her wishes as to her continued care. At first instance the case was lost when the Supreme Court of Missouri held that because there was no clear and convincing evidence of Miss Cruzan’s desire to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn under the circumstances she was in, her parents lacked authority to effectuate such a request. The court reasoned that whilst there was a right to refuse treatment embodied in the Common Law doctrine of informed consent, it expressed scepticism about the application of that doctrine in the circumstances of this case. It also declined to read a broad right to privacy into the State Constitution which would support the right of a person to refuse medical treatment in every circumstance and expressed doubt as to whether such a right existed under the United States Constitution. It rejected the argument that Ms Cruzan’s parents were entitled to order the termination of her medical treatment, concluding that, ‘…no person can assume the choice for an incompetent in the absence of...clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence (as to the incompetent patient’s wishes)…’​[435]​

The case was then appealed to the US Supreme Court. In a 5-4 decision the Court affirmed the ruling of the Missouri Supreme Court, stating that while individuals enjoy the right to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourth Amendment,​[436]​ incompetent persons were not permitted to exercise such rights. It was concluded that the State of Missouri’s actions designed to preserve Ms Cruzan’s life had been constitutional, especially in the light of lacking evidence that she would have wanted treatment withdrawn. 

The result of the Cruzan judgement was a reaffirmation of the Court’s and individual States’ interests in preserving life, even in respect of patients in a PVS. Questions pertaining to the scope of the recognised liberty interest in refusing treatment and whether it subsumes such a right with respect to PAS have been raised and mooted. The majority of commentators as yet feel the Supreme Court is reluctant to ‘constitutionalise’ such a diverse and contested area of law and policy, and that in such cases its inclination is to defer to the states’ judgements, as evidenced by Cruzan itself.​[437]​

As the Quinlan, Brophy and Cruzan cases have made clear, when evidence of a patient’s wishes is forthcoming, the substituted judgment test works without encountering a great deal of difficulty. Contested accounts of a patient’s thoughts or wishes may cause factual problems and require settling, but the test itself is sound and workable. Whether or not it is equally so when the person in question has never been competent is the subject of section 3.4.2b.

3.4.2b Dealing with the never-has-been-competent patient

Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz​[438]​ is perhaps the most contentious example of the American court’s appreciation of incompetence and substituted judgement. The patient was a profoundly mentally retarded man who had lived all of his life in the care of various institutions. He was diagnosed with an acute form of leukaemia, and was faced with the choice to either attempt extensive chemotherapy for a possibility of slight but never complete remission, or receiving palliative care only. Because of his disability, Mr Saikewicz was unable to appreciate his situation, weigh the pros and cons of undergoing the likely excruciating therapy, or make an informed choice. The court therefore was faced with assessing the wishes of a patient who had never been competent enough to articulate them himself. It was noted:

‘The decision in cases such as this should be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that patient was competent, but taking into account the present and future competency of the individual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent person.’​[439]​

Lists of reasons for and against going ahead with treatment were drawn up to aid this process. Those in favour were firstly, the fact that most competent people in the patient’s position would elect to have chemotherapy, and secondly, the chance at a longer life should treatment be administered. Those against on the other hand were more numerous – Saikewicz’s age, the probable side effects of treatment, the low chance of producing remission, the certainty that the treatment would cause immediate suffering, the fact that he would, by virtue of his incapacity, be unable to cooperate with the treatment and finally the fact that his quality of life, even if the treatment brought about remission, would be comparatively poor. Weighing these issues in the balance the court decided that an aggressive chemotherapy regimen would be unbeneficial to Saikewicz, and the patient later died. 

The influence of the Saikewicz case is considered negative, with much of the criticism being levied at the court’s liberal interpretation of subjectivity. Annas notes:

‘...that equity required that a mechanism exist to permit incompetent patients the same right to refuse treatment that competent patients have "because the value of human dignity extends to both." Any such decision must be based solely on the "best interests" of the incompetent patient.’​[440]​

Ramsey too is critical of the court’s treatment of Saikewicz’s competence, noting that it ‘...braintwistingly allows the incompetent lucidly to take account of his incompetence in exercising an absent capacity to refuse treatment.’​[441]​ This seemingly backward state of affairs came about through the ascription of mechanisms suitable to competent (or previously competent) patients to a man who had never been competent or communicative, let alone able to convey his opinion on refusing treatment.

Nolan J in the case of Guardianship of Jane Doe​[442]​ was equally scathing of the Saikewicz decision. Jane Doe was, when the Supreme Court heard her case, in a PVS and had been severely mentally handicapped all her life, much like Mr Saikewicz had been. The majority, as well as confirming that both competent and incompetent patients had the right to refuse treatment, held that Doe’s decision, had she been competent to make it, would have been to have the treatment sustaining her withdrawn. 

Nolan J’s dissent concerned the lack of evidence as to the patient’s wishes regarding the manner of her death. He said ‘...there is absolutely no basis on which to conclude that Doe would choose to die by starvation and dehydration if she were competent.’​[443]​ As was posited in the Cruzan case, noted above, ‘…no person can assume the choice for an incompetent in the absence of...clear and convincing, inherently reliable evidence (as to the incompetent patient’s wishes)…’​[444]​ The judgements in Saikewicz and Doe run exactly counter to this assertion, the judges in both cases taking it upon themselves to substitute their own judgement for that which neither patient had ever possessed. As a consequence:

‘...the...courts, composed as they are of competent persons...(were able to) impute their subjective situated judgement to incompetents whose will and wishes are unknown to them, and unknowable...’​[445]​

In making this argument Ramsey does not express disagreement with the use of the substituted judgement principle in cases where incompetent persons are involved, and the MSB too recognises its utility. However the courts in Doe and Saikewicz, by ascribing the interests of a competent person(s) to the patients in question, stepped on questionable logical ground. Instead of trying to fit their respective circumstances into the mould left by cases where a once competent patient is presently incompetent,​[446]​ it would have been more appropriate to conclusively distinguish between the rights and interests of the competent (or previously competent as was the case in Quinlan) and the never-have-been-competent person.

As the preceding sections have shown, there is marked judicial respect for the competent patient’s wishes regarding the omission of treatment. Yet, coupled with this is a palpable disdain for acceding to requests either for active assistance in ending life, or for specific treatments, no matter their purpose. Section 3.5 will expand on this issue and, as well as considering certain reasons for this respect, will show how, through the MSB, it perpetuates the arbitrariness noted in section 3.

3.5 Exploring respect for autonomy

Certain truths can be drawn from the discussion in sections 3.1-3.3 on the boundaries of the courts’ respect for a patient’s exercise of his or her personal autonomy. The cases of Re T, Re C and Re MB make it clear that competence is a requisite of decision-making. A competent patient is entitled, as long as he remains competent, to make choices as to how his treatment is to progress from the options his doctor provides for him. It is also the case that he retains the right to refuse any offered treatment if he does not want it, and to withdraw his consent at any time to receiving further treatment, even if that decision will shorten his life appreciably.​[447]​ To this extent the courts, in refraining from overriding the competent patient’s decision, respect his judgement as to the efficacy of his treatment and the foreseen effects of its withdrawal and allow him to exercise his autonomy in making his choice.

This respect ends however when a patient, as the case of Burke illustrates, requests specific treatment as opposed to accepting or refusing treatment that is offered. This is the boundary this section aims to investigate and push. As was explored in section 3.2.1, Burke’s facts and the ratio in the case cannot comfortably be stretched to accommodate the MSB. The theory can be applied here however in order to expose and evaluate the boundary, one which ‘Doctor 2’, a participant in the empirical portion of the research undertaken in this work referred to as the difference between ‘No thank you and please give’.​[448]​ 

According to both the law and medical practice, and as ‘Doctor 2’ rightly pointed out, a patient cannot request active assistance in ending his life, whether he is competent or by having his once expressed wishes made apparent by the person who has been granted Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA) under the Mental Capacity Act (2005).​[449]​ This assistance cannot be lawfully offered or given, but a patient can request that his or her treatment be withdrawn. Indeed, should the patient be incompetent his LPA can make that request in his stead. Thus they can say ‘no thank you’ but not ‘please give’; they can refuse treatment and their physicians can omit to provide it, but they cannot ask for a specific kind of treatment or assistance and expect their physician to provide active steps to assist them. 

Why though is this the case? According to the MSB both the means and the ends of the contested practices, the giving of active assistance (‘please give’) or the withdrawal or omission of treatment (‘no thank you’), are equivalent.​[450]​ Section 3.5.1 will postulate a pair of reasons for the disparity, before section 3.5.2 reintroduces the MSB and uses it to allege that respecting a competent patient’s request for the withdrawal of treatment, but not doing so when some kind of action is required to fulfil the request, causes arbitrariness.

3.5.1 Possible reasons for the respect

There are numerous reasons why the courts may, when a patient says ‘please give’, find in favour of the opposition. After the Burke​[451]​ case it may be felt too contrary to legal precedent to allow a similar case to be resolved differently. The reticence may imply judicial recognition for the limited resources available on the NHS, and to the unfeasibility of a situation where every patient in England and Wales, as of right, could demand a particular treatment at a particular time. Allowing this would bring the already struggling health service to a standstill and would cost an unfeasible amount of money to support. These issues however are not those with which this section is concerned. Rather, it is the impact of the act/omission distinction and the court’s respect for patient autonomy on issues concerning physicians personally that this section focuses on.

Section 2.2 of chapter 2 of this work briefly touches upon the question of why the courts chose to respect the requests of certain patients but not others, and cites the ‘psychological wellbeing of the doctor’ as intrinsically relevant to the maintenance of the DDE.​[452]​ Double effect, chapter 2 alleges, allows physicians to provide Soma for their consciences​[453]​ or psychologically distance themselves from the results of their actions,​[454]​ and the same argument is applicable here with reference to the ‘no thank you’ ‘please give’ issue. ‘Doctor 4’ makes direct reference to this point:

“...it’s more of a psychological thing. Do we feel more psychologically responsible if we, or the nurse we’ve instructed...had our hand on the end of the needle? Perhaps we do...”​[455]​

In Doctor 4’s opinion then, it would be more troubling to her to act in response to a ‘please give’ from a patient than it would be withdrawing a course of treatment in response to a ‘no thank you’. This issue will be taken up in detail in chapter 6 section 6.6 of this work, rendering a thorough exploration of it at present unnecessary. A brief look at findings indicating a negative effect on physicians’ mental health occasioned by assisting deaths is appropriate however, and sets the tone for chapter 6’s discussion. 

Doctor Kenneth Stevens, Vice-President and one of the founders of Physicians for Compassionate Care, authored a damning report on the psychological effects of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia on participating physicians from The Netherlands, the United States and Oregon.​[456]​ The following quotations span the breadth of these jurisdictions and are representative of the overall findings of the study:

“Many physicians who have practiced euthanasia (in The Netherlands) mentioned that they would be most reluctant to do so again.”​[457]​

“(Question from Baroness Finlay): The first time you performed euthanasia, how did you feel about it as a clinician? (Responses from Drs van Coevorden and Mensingh van Charente): Awful. It is not a normal medical treatment. You are never used to it.”​[458]​

“But my thoughts are about the fact that I know that is it a very difficult thing as a physician...I wonder if I have the necessary emotional peace to continue to participate.”​[459]​

“That afternoon...I wrote the prescription for the 90 secobarbital. I hesitated at the signature and stared out the window...I tried to imagine deciding to die...Whenever I tried, I felt a sadness much more profound than what I saw in her (the doctor’s patient)...I slept badly.”​[460]​

While they may make no direct references to the action/omission distinction, and therefore may not represent the feelings of the participants on that issue, inferences as to the psychological effect of participating in end-of-life decisions of this sort may still be gleaned from the quotations. Each of the examples exhibits some hint of the physician being involved in an active manner in the procurement of a death, either by actually performing active euthanasia or by writing out a lethal prescription. As such, while the physicians’ feelings regarding the ‘no thank you’ scenario are unknown, it is safe to infer that active assistance affected those involved in a negative way. 

The courts, in refusing to respect the request of a competent patient for such assistance, appear to be protecting the physicians involved in his care from the possible negative effects of going through with the assistance. Quite how much this practice would impinge upon the patient’s autonomous choice in pursuing his death is difficult to say, but it is undeniable that he is not the only autonomous actor involved in a case on assisted dying. His physicians are equally autonomous and are well within their rights to refuse to render the desired assistance if they choose to.​[461]​

Perhaps then, to protect the autonomy (and, arguably the mental health) of physicians who are disinclined to assist suicide or perform euthanasia, the courts take a Utilitarian stance in dealing with cases where a patient is saying ‘please give’. Gillon, writing on the Millsian understanding of autonomy notes, ‘...to maximise overall human welfare, respect for the autonomy of others (is) required in so far as such respect (does) not harm others...’​[462]​ Because asking for assistance in dying could be argued to impinge upon the physician’s autonomy (he would have to act to assist the patient), the courts withhold their respect for the patient’s autonomy when such a request is made.​[463]​ 

Callahan draws attention to this issue with reference to the difference between legal suicide, which is a personal, autonomous and self-regarding act, and illegal AS or euthanasia, which require the involvement or assistance of a third party.​[464]​  This distinction is crucial, argues Callahan, because it turns what in suicide is a purely private act to one which has ramifications for the public at large. While the MSB does not discount the distinction Callahan makes between the practices, it has a more conservative estimate on the public impact assisted suicide has than is evidenced in Callahan’s work. It could be argued that, since a suicidee is a member of the public, both issues, suicide and assisted suicide, affect the general public similarly. In both cases, but for the assistor’s presence, there is a death which was desired by he who died​[465]​ and in both it is the suicidee’s closest relations, familial or otherwise, who are most affected by the death.  

Callahan however is speaking in terms of assisted suicide having a direct effect on another member of the public, the assistor, and this effect cannot be denied. On the issue of third-party involvement Otlowski notes:

‘It must be conceded that the involvement of third parties in suicides changes the necessary character of the acts undertaken. To deny such would be to deny an obvious and incontestable truth. However, differentiating the two courses of conduct does not give credence to one being legal and the other not. The most relevant consideration is the patient’s request for the assistance he or she wants. If seeking out assistance in dying is an exercise in patient autonomy and self-determination, this choice ought to be respected.’​[466]​

While the MSB agrees with Otlowski’s observations for the most part, it would add to them, based on the same Utilitarian grounds on which Gillon writes, the need to recognise that the physician’s autonomy is as important as the patient’s. That is not to say that one cannot assist a suicide or perform euthanasia autonomously. Physicians are just as able to make an autonomous choice regarding a proposed course of action as their patients are. The request for assistance does not bind the physician inexorably to procuring the end result and, as was mentioned above, he is able to refuse his aid as of right.​[467]​

3.5.2 Respect and the MSB

The preceding sections have made it clear that, in certain circumstances, for certain reasons, the courts are predisposed to respect a competent patient’s choices regarding the continuation or cessation of his treatment. However, while competence may be the starting point in determining how a case is dealt with, this section asserts that the type of request made by the patient is equally, if not more influential than the presence or absence of competence. This disinclination facilitates the distancing noted by the MSB in section 1 of chapter 1 of this work, through which practitioners remove themselves from the idea of actively procuring the consequences of the patient’s request.​[468]​ 

The assertion that the type of request is more influential than the patient’s competence is backed up primarily by the case of Re C.​[469]​ Section 2.2 of the preceding chapter questioned how C, a man whose competence was affected but not destroyed by his mental illness, was able to refuse his consent to further treatment, where a patient like Ms B, unaffected by such an illness, could not have her consent to her ventilator being withdrawn respected. It was concluded in section 2.2 that it was the nature of the actions required of the physicians in fulfilling the requests which differentiated them. C’s refusal of treatment was argued to be ‘a great deal more comfortable for the conscientious physician’​[470]​ to effect than a request like that Ms B made would be. This is because in fulfilling the latter, the physician’s actions could be seen as directly precipitating the patient’s death,​[471]​ where the former only concerned ceasing an unwanted intervention. 

Further evidence of the court’s favouring a questionably competent patient’s refusal of consent to treatment is found in the case of Re JT (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment).​[472]​ Here a patient with mental difficulties, including behavioural disturbances and learning impairment, refused her consent to receiving renal dialysis. Despite this, she was found to be competent under the guidelines set out in Re C ​[473]​ and her refusal was upheld. 

On the facts it is clear that this case, unlike Re C, concerns withholding consent to a treatment that had not yet begun.​[474]​ It is questionable though, if Ms JT had already been receiving dialysis, like C had been receiving antibiotics, and wanted the treatment discontinued, whether the courts would defer to her wishes as they did in the instant case. Doctor 2, when asked to consider the limits of a patient’s autonomous choice regarding the withdrawal of treatment commented:

‘…What I don’t think that’s (the phrase ‘autonomy’) describing is a right on the part of a patient, a person, to say this is the treatment I want. I don’t think there is anything in the theoretical opinions on autonomy and the respect for autonomy that says it means I can tell you what I want. It’s a right to non-interference...(emphasis added).’​[475]​

The right of non-interference is maintained in both law and policy and is the basis for much of the law of consent this chapter has touched upon. However, by taking an example of a currently accepted ‘non-interference’ or omission to treat, say, the withdrawal of ANH from Anthony Bland, and applying the MSB, it can be seen that the cogency of the argument falters. It falters because non-interference, in cases where treatment has already been instituted and is being withdrawn because the patient or his LPA has decided that continuing it would not be prudent, necessitates interference to effect the desired withdrawal i.e. the physical withdrawal of the feeding tubes from Anthony.

This already curious state of affairs is made all the more so when the nature of Ms B’s request is looked at more closely. While it could not be argued that simply stopping C’s antibiotics was anything more than a pure omission of treatment, Ms B’s predicament necessitated an intervention by the staff caring for her to disconnect her from the ventilator keeping her alive. The fact that this intervention painted the withdrawal in an active light made her physicians uneasy about carrying it out, irrespective of the fact that precedent, specifically the case of Bland,​[476]​ labels the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment as an omission. Farsides and Dunlop explain this unease:

‘...patients cannot use the claim of competence to demand that we should end their life...The interests of the person are trumped...by societal concerns about deliberate killing, or by an individual’s moral reluctance to end a life.’​[477]​

The MSB however, alleges equivalence between the ends and means of both the ‘action’​[478]​  in Ms B’s case and the ‘omission’ in Bland’s, and contends that both cases should have reached the same conclusion – that the withdrawal of treatment from each patient was either a lawful omission, as it was in Bland, or ‘active’ and therefore of questionable legality, as it was in Re B.​[479]​ Since Bland’s case was decided in favour of his parents and physicians who favoured withdrawing treatment, Ms B should have been able to access her chosen course of action just as readily, especially since she was requesting same thing – that treatment be withdrawn to allow her to die.​[480]​ Allowing one request but refusing the other is, on this interpretation, illogical. 





In conclusion, this chapter has endeavoured to show that the current law perpetuates an inconsistency between cases where a patient requests, or has requested, ‘passive assistance’ by way of withdrawing treatment to end his or her life, and those where ‘active assistance’ is requested. This inconsistency sees competent patients like Ms B refused assistance,​[481]​ even if that assistance is seen, through precedent, as an omission,​[482]​ yet allows claimants like C and Ms JT, whose competence is suspect, to refuse treatment altogether. This difference in how patients are treated in terms of having their autonomous requests allowed by the courts is groundless, alleges the MSB, because the acts that the law seeks to distinguish, active assistance and passive assistance, are equivalent.​[483]​ Therefore, respecting a patient’s autonomy in a situation like that in the Bland case, but not doing so where Ms B’s circumstances are concerned, on the basis of the aforementioned non-distinction perpetuates groundless arbitrariness.




































This chapter is devoted to discussing life, its value, the questions raised by claims that life is ‘sacred’, and to making a number of interrelated arguments based on the concept of choice. In maintaining that the unbiased protection of autonomy should be seen as the cornerstone of judicial reasoning where competent patients are concerned, this chapter makes two interrelated claims. 

The first builds upon the discussion of competence in section 4.1 of this chapter and section 3.1 of chapter 3 by claiming that once the capacity to choose is proven, the patient in cases concerning euthanasia and AS makes an autonomous choice to pursue his desired end after (and indeed during) a personal assessment of his life’s value. The value of life, this argument asserts, is estimated in two ways: objectively by society at large and subjectively or personally by the patient. The objective valuation often involves invocations of life’s ‘sanctity’ and inviolability while the subjective one may feature both or neither. It will be argued that, in cases involving a competent patient it is the latter that should be respected as opposed to the former, which if imposed upon that patient, disregards his autonomously reached conclusions on the value of his life.

The second claim concerns the competing values of life and personal autonomy. As section 3.1 of chapter 3 of this work noted, at law the exercise of autonomous choice is invariably bound up in the concept of competence. To be able to exercise the power to choose one must be competent to do so. This ability is presumed by the courts until it is disproven, as the cases of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals​[485]​ and Re T (adult: refusal of medical treatment)​[486]​ make clear. If the presumption of capacity remains unchallenged, no treatment may be begun without the patient’s specific consent. Indeed so great is the courts’ respect for the competent patient’s autonomy, that this includes life sustaining treatment,​[487]​ and remains true of the withdrawal of such treatment even when that withdrawal will cause the patient’s death.​[488]​ 

The same is not true however of requests for what physicians and the courts perceive to be active interventions, despite the fact that the result of such interventions will be the same as that occasioned by a withdrawal. As section 3.5.2 of the preceding chapter noted, the moral step back (MSB) disputes this difference in approach, and alleges that it is a product of the act/omission distinction – a distinction which chapter 1 section 1.4.1 of this work aimed to prove indefensible with reference to Rachels’ Equivalence Thesis.​[489]​ In light of this alleged equivalence, it is posited here that the respect shown for patient autonomy in allowing requests for the withdrawal of treatment, should likewise be shown in cases where a putative action is required. If it is not, the autonomy of the competent patient is being groundlessly impinged upon.

Framed in terms of primary and secondary ‘goods’​[490]​ and with reference to the MSB’s reasoning, the argument will dispute the conclusion that the value of life always outweighs that of respecting autonomy in cases where a competent patient chooses to pursue assisted dying. Before these claims are explored however, it is prudent to briefly revisit the concept of competence, and to discuss the numerous ways in which the value of life is estimated.

4.1 Choice and the need for competence

As sections 3.1 and 3.3 of the preceding chapter and section 4, above, have shown, one must be possessed of competence to be able to make an autonomous choice about anything at all. The competent patient, in exercising his ability to choose, makes his decision in the light of numerous interrelated factors, as well as a personal belief about his quality of life. If he believes that, on balance, the quality of his life outweighs its ‘sanctity’, he may consider refusing treatment preferable to continued burdensome attempts at prolonging his life. As Farsides and Dunlop have noted however, a patient cannot use the fact that he is competent to demand that his physicians end his life.​[491]​ It appears therefore that the patient’s personal valuation of his life can effectively be nullified by the reluctance of his physician and society to accept that he feels that his life is of limited value.​[492]​

Often, the root of the above noted concerns is the sanctity of life. The concept of sanctity has roots in both Eastern and Western theology and moral philosophy and proclaims that life is somehow sacrosanct, sacred and inviolable simply because it exists. The stringency of this claim can be contrasted between the Eastern Jain tradition and Western Christianity, the former believing that every life is sacred, the latter that every human life is.  Regardless of its origins however it is agreed between both traditions that life is invariably sacred and should be treated with the utmost reverence, and this claim is not disputed here. Indeed the MSB recognises and lauds the idea that human life has innate worth, because of the good that can come from living life, the enjoyment living brings, the cacophony of experiences life can yield and so on. The numerous ways that worth can be estimated are explored in the coming section, and provide a background against which the MSB’s claims will be made.

4.2 Various ways of valuing life

While discussing the character of the criminal law Lord Devlin observed that: 

‘...there are certain...moral principles which society requires to be observed...the breach of them is an offence, not merely against the person who is injured but against society as a whole.’​[493]​

The most pervasive of these principles is the sanctity of life. Sanctity is one of a pair of overarching principles which form the building blocks for discussing the value of life: the quality of life and the sanctity of life. According to the former approach, life’s worth is dictated by its quality. Quality can be estimated by both the person in question and society at large. This estimation is influenced by innumerate factors and depends heavily on one’s personal beliefs and opinions. Sanctity of life on the other hand is less a mechanism for quantifying value and more a belief that life’s value is immeasurable. 

The understanding one has of sanctity depends, much as the appreciation of the quality of life does, on one’s belief system. In discussing sanctity Herring draws attention to the concept of ‘vitalism’​[494]​ and distinguishes between it and the belief that life is possessed of innate sanctity. 

‘Vitalism...holds that human life is an absolute moral value. It is never justifiable to kill a person...(The) sanctity of life holds that human life is a fundamental basic good. It states that a person should not be intentionally killed, be that through an act or an omission.’​[495]​

Keown is of a similar opinion regarding vitalism’s distinction from the sanctity of life principle. In his work ‘Restoring moral and intellectual shape to the law after Bland’ he writes:

‘Although life is a basic good it is not an absolute good, a good to which all other basic goods must be sacrificed in order to ensure its preservation. The sanctity of life doctrine is not vitalistic. The core of the doctrine is the principle of prohibiting intentional killing, not an injunction requiring the preservation of life at all costs.’​[496]​

The claim that life is simply too valuable to be ascribed material worth is a staple of vitalism’s proponents, but, claims the MSB, is a questionable one to make. There are numerous examples of mechanisms which apply value to life, Paterson’s work being a notable example. Paterson writes at length about how life is a primary good and how, in so being, its worth is added to and pursued through various secondary goods. Primary goods, to Paterson, are those things which are good in and of themselves. Life is the most obvious example, while health, knowledge, truth and contemplation, practical reasoning, family, friendship, work, play and beauty​[497]​ make up various others. Secondary goods on the other hand enable the pursuit of primary goods. Capital for example, material goods and power, pleasure, avoiding pain and autonomy​[498]​ are all secondary goods in Paterson’s mind. ‘Together, (primary and secondary goods) constitute the irreducible ingredients of a humanly fulfilling life’​[499]​ and it is this fulfilment which ascribes life its value.​[500]​

Numerical approximations of life’s worth are also possible. There is already in use a statistical device known as a Quality Adjusted Life Year or ‘QALY’, which plots life’s worth against its quality and works on the assumption that ‘…a person would prefer a shorter healthier life to a longer period of survival in a state of severe discomfort and disability.’​[501]​ Harris quotes Alan Williams, creator of the QALY:

‘The essence of a QALY is that it takes a year of healthy life to be worth 1, but regards a year of unhealthy life as worth less than 1. Its precise value is lower the worse the quality of life is. If being dead is worth 0, it is, in principle, possible for a QALY to be negative, i.e. for the quality of someone’s life to be judged worse than being dead. 

The general idea is that a beneficial healthcare activity is one which generates a positive amount of QALYs, and that an efficient health care activity is one which the cost per QALY is low, and a low priority activity is one where the cost-per-QALY is high...’​[502]​

Applying the QALY to a scenario assists understanding. Jackson​[503]​ presents the following situation: treatment X gives patient A 5 further years of life, and treatment Y gives patient B 1 more year. Both treatments cost £5000. Because treatment X will provide patient A with a greater amount of (quality adjusted) ‘life years’ it is taken to be more cost effective than treatment Y, which has a lesser life years yield. Michael Rawlins and Andrew Dillon, the chair and CEO of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) respectively, expand on this outcome by bringing the age of the patient into consideration.​[504]​ They give the example of treatment for osteoporosis, the cost of which is slashed by almost two thirds from £32.936 per life year for patients aged 50, to £12.191 per life year for patients over 70. ‘...This occurs’ explains Harris ‘because older patients have a greater risk of complications from osteoporosis and thus benefit more.’​[505]​ 

The QALY’s function is therefore to generate the maximum amount of life years possible at the lowest cost. It indicates which of the numerous available treatments for a particular patient is most cost-effective and has the most positive effect for him in terms of adding more life years to his life. The fact that patient A’s quality of life may be better than patient B’s after receiving the treatment is inconsequential if A’s number of life years is increased less by the treatment than B’s would be.​[506]​ 

For all its efficacy in statistical terms, the QALY has been subject to rigorous criticism.​[507]​ Farsides and Dunlop question whether one can value a life as less than ‘0’, as is possible with the QALY, and therefore dictate which lives are worth living and which are not. Their thesis concludes that such a negative valuation is ‘not very useful’ except in situations where it can be used to ‘...support a decision not to treat a patient and so...prevent a life from being prolonged or saved...’​[508]​ The MSB, while acknowledging this possibility as accurate, asserts that it is not the place of a statistical model to dictate, in individual cases, the worth of a human life. It will be argued in section 4.3 of this chapter that it is for each individual person, or for a person who has been granted Lasting Power of Attorney (LPA) under the Mental Capacity Act (2005)​[509]​ in the case of a person who has lost capacity, to value his or her own life personally.

Further to this critique, the QALY’s emphasis on the production of life years has been subject to debate. Because of this emphasis it has been argued that, as a system for allocating treatments in the most cost-effective manner, it is inherently discriminatory to certain groups of people. Harris names the elderly and the disabled as being particularly at risk because, while their quality of life may be improved by treatment, they are less likely to have an increased number of ‘life years’ than a healthy younger person may.​[510]​ Given that increasing the number of ‘life years’ is the main aim of the QALY, it is logical to conclude that people with a diminished ability to have more years added onto their life span may be overlooked when treatments are being weighed for cost-effectiveness.

Mullen and Spurgeon believe that QALYs, as well as being possibly discriminatory in terms of age and disability, are inconsistent with the principle that people with equal health needs should have equal access to appropriate medical treatment. Rather, maximising QALYs means that people with an equal need for treatment will not be treated equally given the discrepancies between the number of life years each person has. In line with what Harris points out (above) Mullen and Spurgeon feel that those people with more available QALYs will be allocated treatment, while those who have less may not.​[511]​

It is also arguable that the QALY scale may discourage innovations in treatment.​[512]​ New treatments, when they are first introduced, are often extremely expensive. This cost decreases as the technology becomes commonplace and all of the necessary additional training for practitioners in the treatment’s use is completed. Established and currently cheaper treatments may be favoured by the QALY because of their cost-effectiveness, irrespective of the possible long term cost-savings from adopting the new treatment.

Perhaps the most pertinent critique of the QALY when it is discussed in the context of the value of life is that which comes from its reliance on objectively and accurately predicting the anticipated length and quality of a person’s life. It is questionable whether a statistical measure can quantify such a notoriously unreliable quantity, and speculating about the future quality of a person’s life is equally uncertain. Take for example Doctor 2’s recollection of a conversation with Baroness Warnock:

‘…she said I will not (change my mind about how I wish to die). And the thing that I couldn’t help but say, and I made an apology for saying it…”You’re utterly convinced of that. So were the last 20 people who said it. But they DID! You may be the exception. You’re probably the brightest of them.” But interestingly she said something else in another conversation. When I was 35 I wouldn’t have thought that living at 85, half blind and half deaf would be acceptable. Now I find it’s not so bad. So, there’s some change in her mind. Clearly I don’t say that for a moment in criticism. The only logical and reasonable position is to be prepared to change your mind in light of changing circumstances (emphasis added).’​[513]​

It is difficult to reconcile the QALY’s professed accuracy with the obvious variability in the quotation. Cookson points this out with reference to the fact that what gives life value differs greatly from person to person,​[514]​ an argument that the MSB reiterates in section 4.3.  It is quite clear that the quality of life is not purely dictated by economic viability and its remaining length. Taken in isolation the QALY is therefore too crude to capture all of the variables that feed into estimating the quality of life accurately.​[515]​

This conclusion does not mean that the economic ‘value’ of life is useless. Economists have been calculating the worth of human lives for as long as their profession has existed, using measures such as lifetime earnings to weigh up the costs and benefits of things such as: 

‘…public programs, such as the control and eradication of disease, highway construction, accident control, education, vocational rehabilitation, welfare, housing, and flood control…’​[516]​

Indeed according to Rice and Cooper ‘…the valuation of human lives is a basic requirement for the proper calculation of the benefits to be derived.’​[517]​ 

Monetary value however is not the only measure of life’s worth. Scholars like Singer,​[518]​ Doyal,​[519]​ Harris​[520]​ and Rachels​[521]​ quantify life’s value ‘instrumentally’,​[522]​ and note that life may ‘not be worth living’ if it becomes too great an encumbrance upon he/she who must live through it. In their minds it is the ability to perceive and gain enjoyment from life, however that enjoyment is gained, which gives life its value. Others, as the brief look at sanctity in this section has shown, explain life’s worth with reference to God and intrinsic value.​[523]​  On this logic one’s ‘immortal soul’ is not one’s own to do with as one wishes.​[524]​ Life, they maintain, has some kind of inherent value​[525]​ and is therefore, by virtue of simply being ‘life’, endowed with the utmost importance.

The value of life is not measured, it is opined here, by considerations of the length of life lived against the length of life left to be lived. No matter the duration of one’s natural life, it is invariably venerated for the simple fact that it is life. Yet the fact remains that both society as a whole and individual persons value their lives and the lives of others to differing degrees and make choices based on those evaluations. This presents the question of how value should be attributed to life. It is agreed, as was noted above, that life has SOME value. Indeed life is a universal good.​[526]​ While we are in possession of it we can experience things, contribute to others’ lives and live our own. The chapter will now move on to discuss how value is attributed to life, by whom and why.

Broadly speaking there are three schools of thought on the matter; those who believe life is ‘intrinsically valuable’, those who feel it is ‘instrumentally valuable’ and those who feel that we, as human beings, should be able to choose the value of our lives. The coming sections endeavour to give a grounding in each of these schools, before section 4.3 situates the MSB within that framework. 

4.2.1 Life’s intrinsic value – religion and sanctity

Theologically speaking, the intrinsic value of life is expressed by the perception that we as human beings have gone through some kind of ‘ensoulment’​[527]​ and are therefore endowed with a life that is sacred. This belief is known as the ‘traditional ethic’,​[528]​ and it underlies most of the arguments against euthanasia, and a number of those in favour of it.​[529]​ 

Most historians of Western morals agree that the rise of Judaism and Christianity began what is now often referred to as the ethic regarding the ‘sacredness’ of human life. Set within the theological context, the particulars of sanctity can be broadly summarised in two points:

1.	The notion of sanctity explains why certain reasons for killing human beings are considered wrong, while others are not. The core of the principle establishes the requirement that one ought never intentionally kill an innocent, either by an ‘act’ or by an ‘omission’.

2.	The distinctive dignity of human beings belongs to them simply by virtue of being human. In Gormally’s words ‘…the necessary rational abilities are acquired in virtue of an underlying or radical capacity, given with our nature as human beings, for developing precisely such abilities.’​[530]​ As a result it belongs to all human beings equally.


The modern law on homicide reflects the sanctity these precepts imbue life with quite obviously by making illegal the intentional ‘…killing of a human being, in being, under the Queen’s peace’.​[531]​ There is a pair of obvious caveats within this general prohibition, the former reflected in the theological understanding of sanctity, the latter not. The first is the requirement that the being be ‘human’ in the biological sense, and the second is that the human must be ‘in being’ in that it can maintain its existence independently from its mother.​[532]​ 

The point at which one achieves ‘Humanhood’ is measured differently by different people and different branches of theological thought. While it is agreed between theologians that it is the soul that vests a person, or prospective person, with God’s image, the moment when one is ‘ensouled’ is subject for debate. The present Roman Catholic belief is that human life begins at the moment of conception,​[533]​ but this has not always been the case. Aquinas, perhaps the most well-known Christian scholar, postulated the concept of ‘delayed hominisation’,​[534]​ which was affirmed as truth by the 1312 Council of Vienne.​[535]​ This view contends that while life in the biological sense begins at conception, human life in the sense of an ‘ensouled’ life begins after birth; after 40 days in the case of boys, and after 60 for girls.​[536]​ Kuhse further describes this quality:

	‘Considered as immortal beings, destined for the extremes of happiness or of misery, and united to one another by a special community of redemption, the first and most manifest duty of the Christian man was to look upon his fellow men as sacred beings and from this notion grew up the eminently Christian idea of the sanctity of human life…it was one of the most important services of Christianity that besides quickening greatly our benevolent affections it definitely and dogmatically asserted the sinfulness of all destruction of human life as a matter of amusement, or of simple convenience, and thereby formed a new standard higher than any which then existed in the world…It was produced by the Christian doctrine of the inestimable value of each immortal soul.’​[537]​

On this logic our ‘immortal souls’ are not our own to do with as we please. Because of this, the ‘noble protecting human life ideal’​[538]​ stands even in the face of debilitating disease, of babies that are hopelessly deformed and will never grow into adults and of providing assistance to those who are dying and request help to end their lives. 

The MSB, in a similar vein to Young,​[539]​ argues that the religion-based​[540]​ concept of sanctity affords life neither absolute, overriding,​[541]​ infinite nor intrinsic value. This inference is based on concrete legal examples rather than esoteric concepts, and finds its genesis in the fact that it is legally permissible to end life in certain ways and in certain circumstances. Lawful self defence is the most obvious example. The case of Owino​[542]​ holds that so long as the force used by the person defending himself is reasonable and proportionate to the threat he faces he will not be guilty of an offence should his attacker come to harm. By providing this mechanism the courts seek to vindicate the innocent ‘defender’s’ actions in wounding his attacker. As a consequence it is impliedly recognised that the defender’s life, in life and death situations where his attacker dies as a result of his proportionate defence of his person, is more worthy of protection than the attacker’s.​[543]​

This is likely because, as Kuhse points out, innocent life, that of the ‘defender’ in the self defence example, is seen to be deserving of protection where non-innocent, guilty life is less so.​[544]​ Indeed, Leverick and Uniacke​[545]​ go so far as to postulate that the attacker, ‘...by virtue of her conduct in becoming an unjust immediate threat to the life of another...’​[546]​  forfeits her right to life entirely. While the MSB finds such sweeping conclusions difficult to justify, especially with respect to the asymmetry of the right to life between attacker and defender, it is safe to conclude that the worth of a ‘guilty’ life is not commensurate with that of an ‘innocent’ one. One need only look at the United States’ preservation of the death penalty for the worth of the latter to be apparent. It is clear then that life’s value is neither infinite nor absolute. It can change to reflect guilt or innocence, can be given a value in terms of QALY’s​[547]​ and, as will be argued in section 4.3, can be valued subjectively by the person who possesses the life in question as well as by society as a whole. 

Moving on, the issue raised by both Young and the MSB regarding life lacking an intrinsic value must be clarified. The idea of intrinsic value comes in two main forms – that life is intrinsically valuable because people are ‘ensouled’ and created in God’s image; and that which states life is valuable because with it comes a kind of dignity. It is this secular notion of intrinsic worth that the MSB, along with Dupré’s article on human dignity in European law,​[548]​ takes to be accurate, and it is this that section 4.2.1a will now discuss.


4.2.1a Life’s intrinsic value – secular sanctity

While it may be the case that religious reasoning underpins many of the law’s edicts regarding how human life is treated as inviolable, it does not give an exhaustive account of life’s sanctity. In modern Western societies ‘sanctity’ and ‘sacredness’ and their religious connotations have been transformed into secularised doctrines of equal dignity for all citizens.​[549]​ These doctrines are the basis for what is often termed the ‘politics of universalism’,​[550]​ which insist upon equal basic rights and entitlements for all citizens.

The Linacre Centre, in its Submission to the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Medical Ethics, makes a similar argument in relation to life’s importance and the inherent dignity of human beings with reference to the provision of justice. In this work commentators like Dworkin and Warnock are taken to task for their espoused belief that certain lives are more valuable than others. It is argued that such a premise,  ‘…is a direct attack on the principle of the basic equality-in-dignity of human beings (and) is radically subversive of justice’​[551]​ because it requires people to possess ‘…presently exercisable abilities in order to be counted subjects of justice, and specifically to be counted among those entitled not to be killed intentionally without just reason’.​[552]​ Such abilities are required if one is to find value and pleasure in what one undertakes, or to have a life for which one is responsible and able to make something out of;  abilities which,  according to Dworkin​[553]​ and Warnock,​[554]​ are necessary for life to be of value to he or she who has it. On such logic, the Linacre Centre argues, those lacking competence to make assessments of the quality of their lives would be in danger of arbitrary euthanasia. The recognition of the inherent dignity of human life is therefore paramount in upholding justice. 

Central to both the Linacre Centre’s argument and to the idea of human dignity as a whole is the concept of ‘life’, for the former is a quality of the latter. In the purely biological sense ‘…“life”…like “zinc” and “entropy”…is an intrinsically neutral descriptive term’.​[555]​ However, in the opinions of numerous scholars there is more to life than the purely biological processes which allow the body to function.​[556]​ Apart from them, though obviously facilitated by them and the consciousness they allow, is a ‘personal’ life and it is this component of life as a whole to which dignity and dignity’s inherent value is attributed.​[557]​ Rachels​[558]​ recognises this distinction and posits that only lives that can be lived​[559]​ are ‘sacred’, or possessed of dignity, and Aiken shares this opinion:

‘Life is not simply a matter of being alive in some purely biological or biophysical sense of the term. Something can be alive or capable of life in (this) sense yet not be (full of life or lively).’​[560]​

The MSB, while recognising that the value of individual human lives may vary, both in subjective terms personal to the patient and in objective terms to the people valuing the patient’s life, does not suppose that people who are not possessed of ‘presently exercisable abilities’​[561]​ are of less value than people who do possess such capabilities.  It will be argued in section 4.3 that value accrues based on the patient’s appreciation of what gives his life value, not on an objective list of capabilities which may or may not be present in the patient. This is a decidedly more ‘instrumental’ or perception-based ethic than that espoused by the intrinsic value school of thought, and it is to instrumentalism that this chapter now turns. 

4.2.2 Life’s Instrumental value

Those who subscribe to the ‘Instrumental Value’ school of thought, scholars like Fletcher,​[562]​ Singer,​[563]​ Doyal,​[564]​ Harris​[565]​ and Rachels,​[566]​ believe that life does not in and of itself justify its own continuation. Some kind of justification over and above the intrinsic school’s reliance on inviolability as of right is required before a life is deemed to have value enough for it to be worth saving if threatened, and that justification comes from the capacity to ‘live’ one’s life. ‘Living’, to an instrumentalist, involves the ability to find enjoyment and engagement with the world, however slight and in whatever form, and to be able to autonomously pursue more of that enjoyment. 

Fletcher describes this requirement in terms of the need for a level of self awareness commensurate with having what he calls a ‘personal life’, as opposed to a merely ‘human life’.​[567]​ All human beings, by virtue of simply being human, are possessed of a ‘human life’, but only those who can live their lives are possessed of value. To live one’s life, in Fletcher’s terms, is to express ‘Humanhood’, and this is characterised by ‘minimal intelligence, self-awareness, self control and mentation’.​[568]​ The loss of or inability to express these characteristics vitiates the ‘elemental reverence’​[569]​ otherwise shown for life, and can justify its termination if the circumstances are severe enough. 

On this logic, a patient in a PVS who lacks any presently exercisable capacity to engage with and draw enjoyment from his life might be a candidate for euthanasia, as might a severely congenitally disabled neonate, or a person suffering intractably as a result of a terminal illness. Clearly, on its strictest understanding the Instrumental Value school could be said to be permissive of the use of euthanasia in all cases concerning ‘non-person persons’.​[570]​

The precise definition of a ‘non-person person’ depends on whose opinion is sought on the matter. Fletcher for example would likely feel that a person without the ability to exercise cognisance would fall into the ‘non-person’ category.​[571]​ Rachels may expound the belief that someone who is unable to live his life due to incapacity should be thus categorised.​[572]​ The MSB however is wary of speaking in these terms, for they imply that certain human beings are less worthy of protection, or more likely to be seen as part of a demographic who are suitable for having treatment withheld than others. Beauchamp and Childress​[573]​ are of a similar opinion on this matter, and express staunch opposition to any blanket policy which denies treatment to the seriously ill, regardless of the intricacies of ‘personhood’. They are also firm in their opposition to certain conditions, Downs Syndrome for example, being indicative of non-treatment and emphasise that any decisions must be made in the patient’s best interests and the MSB agrees with this view.​[574]​ 

Despite their support for non-voluntary euthanasia, Singer​[575]​ and Doyal​[576]​ stress that the roles and opinions of the parents and loved ones of incompetent patients with regard to decisions about euthanasia can never be precluded. Quality of life thinking, warns Singer,​[577]​ cannot be used to justify involuntary euthanasia, because in that case we cannot be sure if our judgement of the patient’s quality of life is accurate, or any better in fact, than their own. 

The MSB supports Singer’s belief in the danger of using instrumentalism to support involuntary euthanasia. The imposition of objective estimations of life’s value on patients incapable of making such estimations personally brings with it real possibilities of mistakes being made on the grounds of best interests. Unlike the comparatively restrictive view taken by Singer and Doyal, the MSB claims the use of non-voluntary euthanasia to be equally troubling with regard to instrumentalism. It is as much an imposition of objective approximations of life’s value upon another to apply them to a person who has not been consulted as it is to apply them to one who cannot comprehend them.

4.2.3 Choosing Life’s value

The idea that life’s value is self determined is an attractive one. Autonomy and autonomous choice, notes McLean, ‘…have become the central and dominant biomedical ethics principle(s) of the modern era, and (are) routinely protected by law whenever possible.’​[578]​ Scholars like Brock,​[579]​ Doyal,​[580]​ Singer,​[581]​ Harris​[582]​ and Biggs​[583]​ hold autonomy and its preservation as the backbone of their philosophy. As Dworkin explains, ‘Making someone die in a way that others approve, but he believes a horrifying contradiction of his life is a devastating, odious form of tyranny.’​[584]​

At law the protection of one’s autonomy only appears to reach to a certain point.​[585]​ If one chooses to refuse life sustaining treatment, provided one is proved competent to choose, that choice is respected. Yet when the exercise of one’s autonomy impinges upon another’s, for example by asking one’s physician to assist in one’s suicide, such help cannot be compelled of the person asked. Scope therefore is the argument’s main flaw. 

Those who oppose the argument in favour of allowing autonomous choices regarding death maintain that the right of the patient to make the choice to die must be counterbalanced against the interests of society as a whole and, more specifically, patients with the same condition as he who chooses death. It is feared that if a patient with, for example, multiple sclerosis makes the choice to have his or her life ended, this choice will in some way stigmatise those sufferers who do not wish to die. There are also concerns with balancing the right to choose to die with the rights of patients who do not want to die, and who may be pressurised into saying they do. 

Now that the various theses regarding the estimation of life’s value have been explored, discussion can move onto this chapter’s first claim: that the value of life can be estimated both objectively and subjectively.

4.3 Claim One: How the MSB values life

Unerringly, as was highlighted in sections 4.2 through 4.2.3 of this chapter, life has SOME value no matter one’s philosophical or theological bent. The MSB takes from each of the above schools of thought in stating its own position; the idea of life having some kind of intrinsic value; experience-based value from the instrumentalist point of view and that of autonomy from the arguments for personal choice. 

It should be noted however that only select aspects of these points of view are subscribed to. It is not the case that the MSB, in advocating life’s experiences as a partial measure of value, goes on to posit that certain lives are worth more than others. All human lives are of equal intrinsic value when looked at objectively, simply because they exist and facilitate living.​[586]​ Rather, it is the value of those experiences from the point of view of the person who goes through them which grants life its worth. These events need not be grand to the objective observer, but to the person who experiences them their value, and life’s value given that it is through life that they are experienced at all, would be clear. 

The same way a person can judge for himself the value of his life, so too can he recognise when that life, in his eyes, has diminished in value. The value of life, in this way, can be estimated in an instrumentally valuable subjective manner – instrumentally valuable because it is the content of the life in question that is thought to give that life value, and subjective because it is valued by the person, personally. Describing the idea of subjective value in terms of ‘personal’ worth, Dworkin notes: ‘We treat a person’s life as subjectively valuable when we measure its value to him in terms of how much he wants to be alive or how much being alive is good for him.’​[587]​  

On Dworkin’s understanding, the ‘personal’ value of life and the ‘subjective’ value of life are interchangeable, yet his definition seems to involve both objective and subjective attributions of value: ‘when WE measure its value to HIM’. The MSB’s understanding differs from Dworkin’s in this way. The value of life, this section argues, is indeed personal. It is measured by the person whose worth is in question and while ‘we’, the objective observers may well be able to attribute a value to his life, it is not the objective estimation which gives that individual life its value. It is the subjective view of the person concerned which affords life its worth, and this estimation is one which should trump the idea that all life is inviolable when a person decides to forfeit his. 

The understanding that life may be valued both objectively and subjectively is not unique to the MSB by any means. The courts, it is argued here, habitually allow people to value their own lives, thus taking the subjective value as representative of that person’s true worth, so long as they are not requesting active assistance in dying. The cases of Re T​[588]​ and Re C​[589]​ support this conclusion, while the case of Bland​[590]​  shows that even an incompetent person can have his life’s value estimated as being low enough to warrant the withdrawal of treatment. In such cases, the value of life is impliedly less than the value of protecting the patient’s autonomy, expressed by the patient himself or by the person who has been granted LPA under the Mental Capacity Act (2005).

Where active assistance is requested or required however, such as it was in the case of Dianne Pretty,​[591]​ the sanctity of life and questions of competence are routinely invoked to explain why such assistance is denied. The courts therefore impose an objective value upon the life of the person in question, one which is routinely espoused by proponents of the sanctity of life as being overriding and ultimately inestimable due to its magnitude. The implication here is that the quality of the required assistance affects the perceived value of protecting the patient’s autonomy. Quite apart from the situations of patients like C and T, the courts in cases where active assistance is requested appear to value the patient’s life more highly than they do the protection of his autonomy.

It is argued here that, by respecting the choice of a person seeking an omission of treatment and denying it to one who seeks active assistance, the courts perpetuate a dangerous double standard concerning respect for autonomous choices, especially when the MSB’s refutation of the act/omission distinction is considered. Since the ends and means of both acts and omissions are arguably equivalent, the respective values of life and autonomy should likewise be the same, irrespective of the type of assistance the patient needs. 

This supposition encounters a problem from its inception however given that there is staunch opposition, from Paterson most vocally, to the idea that the value of a person’s autonomy can override that of his life in the way the MSB claims it can. Section 4.4 is dedicated to exploring this conundrum, and on making a case for the exercise of autonomy being of comparable value to that of one’s life.

4.4 Claim Two: Autonomy as a Primary good?

Disputing life’s ‘overriding’ value requires examining Paterson’s concept of the ‘goods’ of human life more closely than section 4.2 allowed. Recall that, ‘Primary goods...unlike secondary goods, are the purposes or goals in life that ultimately inform and shape the content of all worthwhile human action.’​[592]​ They are taken to be intrinsically valuable, that is valuable because they simply are what they are. Secondary goods by contrast ‘...are goods that are not capable of being grasped as fully intelligible ends of action to be pursued quite for their own sake.’​[593]​ 

Of ‘secondary goods’ Paterson feels it is counter-intuitive to say that: ‘...we can truly value such preconditions (autonomy specifically; all ‘secondary goods’ in general) as having intrinsic non-derivative value when we divorce them from the very content and actions they enable.’​[594]​ He goes on to question:

‘Why is a person’s autonomy to be regarded as intrinsically good when he or she uses that preconditional autonomy to gravely injure a person or execute a profoundly self-destructive choice? If autonomy is equally present in the making of worthwhile choice and the making of profoundly harmful and destructive choices, then we are right to question the claim that autonomy, valued just for its own sake, is a primary good of persons.’​[595]​

This explains why the person in question would be stopped in his attempts to seek medically assisted death. The value of his life, the intrinsically valuable primary good, outweighs, in Paterson’s view, the protection of his autonomy, a secondary good.  If this is indeed an accurate description, the MSB, in claiming that autonomous choice should, in cases concerning active assistance in dying, outweigh the sanctity to life, is treading on tenuous ground. 

On the face of it the relegation of autonomy to a facilitative role in the ‘goods’ sense is commonsense. It is through the exercise of autonomy that people are able to make decisions, weigh circumstances and apply their knowledge to them. Indeed, even the omission of engagement with one’s surroundings, if one is fully competent, can be seen as an exercise of autonomy – one’s autonomous choice not to interact. None of these facts unseat Paterson’s assertions regarding autonomy not being anything more than a facilitator. 

It is questionable, however, precisely what the phrase ‘autonomy’ refers to in Paterson’s thesis. The MSB breaks the concept down into two forms; ‘autonomy’ in and of itself, the attribute people who are mentally competent are possessed of, and the ‘exercise of autonomy’, the putting to use of possessed autonomy. Each of these forms is valued by the MSB in isolation from the possible consequences a person who possesses and uses his autonomy may bring about through that exercise. Paterson on the other hand assigns autonomy its status as a secondary ‘good’ on precisely that basis. He comments: ‘The goodness of an autonomous choice or action will, crucially, hinge on the pursuit of the objective to which autonomy is directed.’ Also, recall his words from the above quotation: 

‘...If autonomy is equally present in the making of worthwhile choice and the making of profoundly harmful and destructive choices...we are right to question the claim that autonomy, valued just for its own sake, is a primary good of persons (emphasis added).’​[596]​

It appears that the potential for negative consequences being occasioned through an autonomous choice, through the ‘exercise of autonomy’ as the MSB understands it, impacts its status in Paterson’s mind. He also appears to refer to autonomy and its exercise interchangeably, speaking of valuing autonomy for its own sake (above), yet later noting: ‘...autonomy...facilitates and supports our pursuit of worthwhile objectives.’​[597]​ 

This penchant for valuing autonomy with reference to possible consequences does not sit well with the MSB’s understanding of the concept, nor does it make clear sense in Paterson’s own work. He argues cogently on the one hand for the exercise of autonomy being ascribed the status of a secondary good, but does not do the same for autonomy itself. Perhaps the omission is a purposeful one, indicating that, unlike the MSB, Paterson’s thesis does not take autonomy to have a dual meaning. This is an uncomfortable conclusion however, given that he discusses the concept and utilises, even if it is done unconsciously, both of the meanings recognised here.

The clearest conclusion ascertainable from Paterson’s work is that he feels that autonomy, taking both of the meanings ascribed to it by the MSB, is a secondary good and is therefore instrumentally valuable as a facilitative agent, not intrinsically valuable in and of itself. The MSB agrees with this conclusion up to a point. It is conceded that the possession of autonomy facilitates the pursuit of life’s greater, primary ‘goods’. However, the exercise of autonomy is not equivalent to the possession of it – a distinction, as noted above, that Paterson seems not to make. 

Without the will and ability to exercise one’s autonomy there would be no way for a person to act according to his thoughts and wishes in pursuing his aims in life, in much the way Anthony Bland was unable to given his injuries. It is so intrinsically important to one’s experience of the human condition that labelling it otherwise makes little sense. It is also the case that one could not, logically, be said to possess autonomy and not exercise it. Even if one does nothing, one autonomously decides to do nothing. Thus, the MSB claims that the exercise of autonomy is a primary good, and its possession is a facilitative or secondary good. Life, therefore, while it is still a primary good, cannot simply override the exercise of autonomy when they come into conflict, as it can under Paterson’s understanding. 

This conclusion would be understandably unsteady if it was divorced entirely from legal precedent. However, as the discussion in section 4.3 noted, the courts already appear to ascribe differing values to life and autonomy depending on whether a competent person is seeking active or passive assistance in dying. By allowing a person to exercise his autonomy in deciding on a passive course of action that he knows will end in his death, the court implies that the value of that person’s autonomy outweighs that of his life. Such was the conclusion in the Bland case, where the ‘...all-powerful interest of patient autonomy’​[598]​ was cited as reason enough to allow Bland’s physicians to withdraw all of the treatments keeping him alive. This in turn implies that both life and the exercise of autonomy are primary goods. 





The above discussion aims to make the case for autonomy and personal choice being the backbone upon which end-of-life decision making should be based. Indeed it is, so long as the person in question is refusing treatment, not requesting it.  The MSB recognises the innate ‘sacredness’ or ‘goodness’ or ‘sanctity’ of life. It recognises that as an objective entity, society, quite apart from the person in question, may believe that that sanctity affords life with infinite worth. That being so, it is proposed that that ‘sanctity’ exists quite apart from life’s value and should therefore not, as it often is, be the basis upon which estimations of worth are based. In other words, one can recognise the innate goodness of life as a whole, yet decide that one’s own has diminished in value to such a degree that one wishes to end it.

If this construction of life’s value is taken as accurate, it is not prejudiced to note that certain lives can, subjectively, be seen as less valuable than others. It is not the life in and of itself that is less valuable than those of the rest of human kind; that is not a judgement people other than the person in question can make. It is that person’s own experience of living through that life, in his own mind, that affords his life its subjective value. Rachels provides an example which makes the process of subjectively valuing one’s life clearer.

‘If something is positively valuable because it contains certain elements, and those elements are removed and not replaced by anything equally valuable, then that thing is made less valuable as a result.’​[599]​

As a measure of one’s subjective value, this construction works well.  Revisiting ‘A’ and ‘B’ from section 1.1 of chapter 1 will assist understanding. This time they are both patients suffering from motor-neurone disease. A does not feel his increasing infirmity diminishes his experience of life. He was never one for sport or travelling and is, but for his worry about his illness, happy to live his life until his natural death. B however feels that his illness has robbed him of a great deal. He was a very active man, enjoyed travelling and feels, now that his disease is progressing, as A’s is, that his life has lost ‘certain elements…and (knows that) those elements…’ will not be replaced. Neither man entertains thoughts of PAS or euthanasia, but B, whose infirmity is equal to A’s, feels that his life is less valuable than it once was. His decision, and the MSB as a whole, makes no assumption that the lives of patients with motor-neurone disease are less valuable than others in the objective sense. It is simply B’s personal opinion that his life has diminished in value.

Why then, to bring the chapter to a close, should a patient’s estimation of his life’s worth and possible later decisions regarding the end of his life, trump society’s objective belief that all life is inestimably valuable? It has been argued throughout this chapter, and through chapter 1, that the courts already allow patients to value their own lives in cases where passive means are utilised in effecting the desired end. This fact, when taken in conjunction with the MSB’s understanding of Paterson’s precepts, produces arbitrary results when contrasted with the courts’ denial of active assistance to those who desire it, because both practices are seen as equal in their ends and means. A patient’s estimation of his life’s worth should therefore trump society’s proclamations of sanctity because the courts already allow him to value his own life.

This conclusion alone however cannot be taken as an adequate reason to reform the law on assisted dying. There is a cacophony of legal and moral arguments made both in favour of and against reform. Presently, chapter 5 will explore the arguments for and against reforming the law from a legal perspective.
Chapter 5





This chapter’s goal is to draw conclusions as to the efficacy of reforming the law on euthanasia and physician assisted suicide (PAS) from a legal perspective. Assisted suicide by the non-medical practitioner is not tackled separately from PAS because the quality of the acts in question is so similar as to make separate discussions unwieldy and overly repetitious. Where context demands mentioning non-physician assisted suicide, the following abbreviation will be employed: ‘AS’. 

Five of the most encompassing legal arguments in favour of reform will form the basis of the first half of the chapter. The first is concerned with the fact that currently available Common Law defences are ineffective when applied to physicians who have assisted a patient’s death through either active euthanasia or PAS. The second moves on from this to discuss the proposition that formalising current legal mechanisms for dealing with such cases may be an appropriate means of regulation, and the third brings to light the current discrepancies evidenced between legal practices and accepted ones.

The fourth and fifth arguments in favour of reform are marginally more esoteric than the first three. The fourth focuses on the legality of suicide and the concurrent illegality of PAS, and the fifth concerns the impact of the case of Purdy v. DPP​[600]​ on the law on assisted dying. As to that regarding suicide, a case will be made that the distinguishing features between PAS and suicide; the effect PAS is perceived to have on the public at large; the involvement of a third party and the impact this has on both the assistor’s and suicidee’s autonomy, do not present adequate reasons to maintain the former’s illegality. That is not to imply that the MSB supports legalising AS outright. The argument simply points out that the negative effects cited above do not present a compelling enough argument to negate the possibility of reforming the law at all.  

The fifth and final argument states that the House of Lords (HL) has made the need for reform explicitly clear by ordering the promulgation of the Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (2010) in the upshot of the Purdy​[601]​ judgement. 

After these arguments in favour of reform have been explored, the chapter moves on to focus on two of the most prominent arguments against it. The first will be that there are at present less contentious ways of having one’s life shortened legally than through active euthanasia and PAS. These alternatives are in fact part of common medical practice, and render legislative intervention to reform the law pointless.

The second is the slippery slope argument, arguably the main source of opposition to changing the law. This argument is so prominent a rebuke to the pro-reform lobby that the remainder of the chapter will be devoted to discussing and evaluating it. The numerous subsidiary, or non-slope, arguments in opposition to reform will be tackled in chapter 6 as they, unlike the slippery slope, are not strictly legalistic in nature. ‘Slope’ based arguments have direct legal relevance as they imply that a liberalisation of the law on voluntary euthanasia will, amongst other things, inevitably lead to at least legal toleration of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.

5.1 Current defences are ineffective

While it is true that there is a panoply of Common Law and statutory defences available in the English criminal law, it is difficult to countenance that any of them are truly applicable to cases involving euthanasia or PAS. Many of them, self defence and intoxication, automatism and insanity, are so far off the mark that they do not warrant extensive contemplation as a reason NOT to reform the law. Others, necessity for example, are arguably more pertinent, but still lack specific relevance to cases where a patient asks for assistance in dying to make them applicable in their current form​[602]​ and the same is true of the defences under the Homicide Act (1957). These, while closer to the issues being dealt with, are also arguably inapplicable. 

Take diminished responsibility (DR) for example.​[603]​ While it is certainly true that doctors, like the rest of the population can suffer from mental problems which could fall under the scope of this defence, claiming to have been labouring under such an impairment for the moment one provided one’s patient with euthanasia or PAS is a tenuous claim to make. DR is favoured by defence counsel in ‘mercy killing’ cases because it allows them to allege that the stress and anguish caused by the defendant’s situation drove them into depression and that this depression resulted in the fatal act.​[604]​ 

It is argued here however that this reliance on mental abnormality precludes practitioners from the defence’s ambit. The doctor patient relationship, whilst close, is not comparable to that between family members. Consequently it would be very difficult for a doctor to allege that his patient’s condition drove him into a state of depression and that that state of depression precipitated his actions. Furthermore the doctrine of double effect, discussed at length in chapter 2 of this work, is applicable in cases of alleged euthanasia. Thus recourse to diminished responsibility would be unnecessary. 

The Homicide Act’s section 3 defence of Provocation is arguably as irrelevant in cases of PAS and euthanasia​[605]​ as that in section 2. Williams notes this in her article ‘Provocation and Killing with Compassion’ which focuses on the defence’s application to cases of mercy killing. She defines the concept in this way:

‘... ‘mercy killing’ refers to the act of procuring the death of a person who has an incurable or intractably painful disease, by a family member or friend for reasons of mercy or compassion. It does not apply to professionals...’​[606]​

While it is conceded here that there may be parallels between the types of stress both familial mercy killers and practitioners face in caring for the dying, it would be unwise to extend the defence of loss of control to either.​[607]​ Much as is the case with diminished responsibility, it would be problematic for defence counsel to allege that a practitioner-defendant was so affected by the circumstances in which he found himself that he was provoked into taking his patient’s life. 

This difficulty is added to by the need for the provoking act to cause the ‘snap’ of self control.​[608]​ While this work recognises that it is possible for a protracted period of stress and torment to cause a defendant to react in the heat of the moment,​[609]​ it is less comfortable to claim that a trained medical practitioner would suddenly snap after repeated requests for assistance from a patient. The possible feelings of isolation carers nursing ill relatives at home may feel is much less likely to affect doctors in the institutionalised setting of the hospital ward, where the support and guidance of colleagues is routinely sought. It is therefore felt that the defence of loss of control is irrelevant in the circumstances faced by practitioners in euthanasia and PAS cases. It relies on a sudden loss of self control, not one’s accession to a patient’s repeated requests for assistance. Equally inapplicable is section 4 (participation in a suicide pact) for there simply is no pact to participate in.

If those defences are set aside, there are no others even moderately applicable to cases involving PAS and euthanasia. This fact supports the case for reform, especially in the light of the moral step back’s (MSB) dismissal of the distinctions relied on to separate permitted passive euthanasia from illegal active euthanasia and the doctrine of double effect. Without those constructs and without reform there is no other recourse at law but to deem the practitioners relying on them as guilty of their patients’ murders. A possible avenue for effecting that reform would be to formalise the practices currently performed lawfully. This option is the topic of section 5.2.

5.2 Formalise current practices





In their 1994 study, Ward and Tate​[612]​ distributed 424 questionnaires to medical practitioners on the subject of attitudes towards requests for euthanasia. 312 of these questionnaires were returned. The evidence collected showed that, of the 124 practitioners who had answered ‘yes’ to whether they had been asked for help in ending a life, 119 complied. 38 of those 119 did so ‘actively’. Similar evidence can be adduced from other jurisdictions showing that anywhere between 23% to 32% of those who responded, when asked if they had taken active steps to end a patient’s life, did so affirmatively.​[613]​ 

Clearly, as Otlowski points out, ‘…euthanasia has been performed by a…number of doctors.’​[614]​ Though it is true that the mere fact that the law is being broken is not an adequate catalyst for legal change,​[615]​ there are inherent difficulties within the system which calls for its re-evaluation. If active euthanasia is being performed, it must be done covertly to assuage the risk of legal sanctions. This truth is evinced in the case of R v. Cox​[616]​ (the doctor relying on double effect having administered a lethal dose of potassium chloride to his patient) where the jury relied on an evidential technicality regarding the exact cause of the patient’s death to save Dr Cox from a murder conviction. The illegality of euthanasia and the resultant need for actions to be taken covertly if they are taken at all, results in little opportunity for consultation between colleagues, or regulation.​[617]​ 

It has also been noted by Verhoef and Kinsella​[618]​ that even when fellow doctors become aware of their colleagues’ involvement in the practice, they are likely to maintain secrecy and not report them to the legal authorities. Decisions are most likely made on the participating physician’s own conscience and his or her willingness to run the risks of being caught and prosecuted.​[619]​ If one takes this value judgement in the light of the paternalistic nature of the medical profession, it may result in a situation where euthanasia is being performed by a doctor on the basis of what he or she believes to be the patient’s best interests; a step along the proverbial slippery slope towards non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.​[620]​ This is clearly diametrically opposed to the idea of self-determination and the requirement of voluntariness in the practice of euthanasia.
 
As noted above, the essence of the proponents’ argument is that since the practice occurs already, it is preferable to have it regulated by legislation and practiced openly in order that it can be effectively regulated.​[621]​ Reform would also promote an open discussion of the topic. It would provide physicians who do seek to assist patients in ending their lives with a lawful avenue to do so, removing the need for secrecy and covert unregulated actions which have a greater propensity for inciting abuse than their regulated counterparts. 

5.2.2 Discrepancies between ‘legal’ practices and ‘accepted’ practices

Furthermore it is claimed that irrespective of the evidence that some doctors have performed euthanasia,​[622]​ it is highly unlikely in view of the precedent surrounding such cases that prosecution would follow, and that even if it did it would be highly unlikely that the doctor would be found guilty. This precedent has been borne out through numerous cases,​[623]​ mostly focused on the doctrine of double effect, the only conviction being that of Dr Cox​[624]​ for his part in the death of his patient Lillian Boyes. From this premise Somerville​[625]​ argues that the practice is tolerated by the law despite its perceived illegality – hence the discrepancy between what appears to be accepted practice and the same actions being considered illegal.

 As the Cox​[626]​ case shows however, there is no guarantee that prosecution will not follow should a case be taken to court. In fact the nature of the current legal position invites, as Otlowski puts it ‘...capricious and arbitrary results.’​[627]​ Consequently it is felt by proponents to be unsatisfactory that doctors acting in good faith are exposed to the risk of prosecution. They therefore argue that it is in the best interests of both physicians and their patients that the law is changed to promote clarity.

Despite the seeming cogency of the arguments in favour of clarifying the law in this area, arguments have also been made in opposition to legislating to overcome the disparity.​[628]​ Some commentators, the Archbishop of Westminster included,​[629]​ are wary of the negative impact such reform could have on the macro or societal level, and this has been cited as reason enough to err away from the idea. In his recent article ‘The notion of a right to a ‘good death’ undermines society’, published in the Telegraph, the Archbishop takes exception to the idea that ‘…we have an absolute moral entitlement to have whatever kind of death we choose.’​[630]​ He blames this burgeoning philosophy on what he sees as the degradation of societal values, 

‘…including the decline of the family as the core unit, the rise of anti-social behaviour, the pursuit of profit at all cost and the increasing intolerance of non-materialist, philosophical or ethical views.’​[631]​

He also fears that, ‘Once life is reduced to the status of a product, the logical step is to see its creation and disposal in terms of quality control’. 

However, while the argument is a valid one with respect to the need to guard against involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, the fact that human beings are autonomous creatures capable of making choices as to how they wish to live, and ultimately how they wish to die, appears to have been glossed over in the text. The same is true of the fact that the law at present, by permitting personal self-regarding suicide,​[632]​ allows a person to value his own life and act to end it should he so wish.​[633]​ Consequently, it is arguable that the right the Archbishop fears will do damage to society appears to have already been legally realised, and has remained realised since 1961.​[634]​ The step along the slippery slope has long been taken, and has produced negligible negative effects. The coming section will take this assertion a step further by exploring the dichotomy between AS and suicide, with a view to making the case that the differences between the practices highlighted in section 5 of this chapter do not present adequate grounds for maintaining the former’s illegality. 

5.3 The legality of suicide and the concurrent illegality of assisted suicide

Section 1 of the Suicide Act (1961) (hereinafter ‘the Act’) decriminalised suicide and attempted suicide, while section 2(1), as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act (2009)(CJA), maintains AS’s illegality. The dichotomy between the legality of suicide and the illegality of assisted suicide is curious because, unlike anywhere else in the criminal law, one can be guilty for assisting the commission of a non-crime. Before discussing this issue it is necessary to outline the newly reformed scope of section 2(1) and comment on the effect Purdy v. DPP​[635]​ has had on it. 

5.3.1 Scope, the Coroners and Justice Act and Purdy v. DPP​[636]​

Section 3(3) is the Act’s extent provision and works to inform those who use the Act of the scope of its application. The section states “This Act shall extend to England and Wales only”. Its roots rest in the Common Law presumption that criminal sanctions are not imposed on British citizens for crimes committed outside of the jurisdiction, except in cases of murder. Without this section, as Lord Phillips points out in the case of Purdy v. DPP, it appears that:

“…a person who assisted another to commit suicide abroad, whether the assistance took place within this jurisdiction or outside it, (would be) guilty of murder...”​[637]​

His Lordship’s reasoning was based on an ‘inclusionary’ approach to statutory interpretation – reasoning first applied by Lord Diplock in Treacy v. DPP​[638]​ and subsequently adopted by the Court of Appeal (CA) in Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No 4).​[639]​ In Treacy Lord Diplock argued that the ambit of the English criminal law should only be limited by principles of “international comity”. This idea was praised by some commentators, but, points out Hirst, ‘...if comity was the only such limitation, British citizens would be punishable in England for any acts abroad that would be punishable in England, and this is manifestly not the law.’​[640]​ Hirst himself, and later Lord Diplock, whose thoughts on an inclusionary approach changed in Secretary of State for Trade v. Markus,​[641]​ favours the ‘terminatory principle’ of criminal liability. This states that a crime is deemed to be committed where its last essential element is completed. In cases of assisted suicide like those considered in the Purdy case, the suicide would take place in Switzerland, well outside the jurisdiction of the English courts.

Lord Phillips however took Hirst’s thesis a step further than its author intended it be taken. Section 3(3) of the Act, mentioned above, limits its application to England and Wales. While no clear direction as to the effect the Purdy case would have on inter-jurisdictional liability was given in the ratio of the judgment, obiter Lord Phillips interpreted section 3(3) to imply that section 1 of the Act, the assurance that suicide is no longer a criminal offence, only extends to England and Wales. Hence he concluded that suicide committed abroad must still be regarded as self-murder, and complicity to murder (to assist in a person’s suicide abroad) must therefore be punishable as murder. As a result Hirst’s thesis is extended beyond boundaries it was never intended to cross.

With respect to Lord Phillips’ thoughts on Purdy and the inclusionary and terminatory principles, the MSB mirrors Hirst’s opinion in feeling his Lordship’s interpretation of section 3(3) was incorrect. The section itself, as noted above, is an example of an extent provision. Such provisions are not, as Lord Phillips took 3(3) to be, used to impose any territorial limitation on the ambit of the various provisions of the Act. ‘So, when section 1 abrogated liability for committing or attempting to commit suicide, it did so for all purposes in English law, but only for the purposes of English law.’​[642]​ A comparison between section 3(3) and the extent provisions of other statutes makes his Lordship’s error more clear. Section 313 of the Merchant Shipping Act (1995) for example states:

‘Except for sections 18 and 193(5), this Act extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.’

British merchant ships still sail all around the world. The Act would not be practical to use if its application ceased as soon as a vessel left UK waters. Indeed it includes several provisions that apply specifically to events or acts abroad. Section 282 for example reads:

‘(1) Any act in relation to property or person done in or at any place (ashore or afloat) outside the United Kingdom by any master or seaman who at the time is employed in a United Kingdom ship, if done in any part of the United Kingdom, would be an offence under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, shall – 
(a)	be an offence under that law, and
(b)	be treated for the purposes of jurisdiction and trial, as if it had been done within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England.’

There is no contradiction with s. 313 here, because it is not concerned with the subject-matter of the Act or the circumstances or places in which it applies. Its function is merely to indicate that the Act is law within Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as within England and Wales. The same is true if sections 15(5) and 1 of the Outer Space Act (1985) are contrasted. The former provides, ‘This Act extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.’ But section 1 provides:

‘This Act applies to the following activities whether carried on in the United Kingdom or elsewhere...(including)...(c) and activity in outer space.’

Lord Phillips then appears to have confused the concepts of extent and application, the former being narrower than the latter in terms of scope. That said, the Suicide Act’s provisions are not so obviously framed as those of the Merchant Shipping Act and the Outer Space Act. His Lordship’s misgivings are also only comments made obiter and, given the radical changes implicit in the now enacted CJA (2009), discussions regarding the Act’s scope for application are somewhat academic.
The newly reformed section 2(1) of the Suicide Act reads as follows:

‘(1) A person (‘D’) commits an offence if – 
(a)	D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted suicide or another person, and
(b)	D’s act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide.
(1A) The person referred to in (1)(a) need not be a specific person (or class of persons) known to, or identified by, D.
(1B) D may commit an offence under this section whether or not a suicide, or an attempt at suicide, occurs.’

In terms of the effect this change has on Hirst’s conjectures on jurisdiction, the main one is the substitution of a ‘conduct crime’ (doing an act capable of encouraging or assisting suicide) for a ‘result crime’ (aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the suicide or attempted suicide of another). This is explored in Hirst’s work in the following example:

‘...A cannot be complicit in the suicide or attempted suicide of B unless and until B actually commits or attempts to commit suicide. If this suicide occurs abroad, then under the terminatory principle of jurisdiction...A’s act of complicity is deemed to be located abroad as well; and since the (Suicide) Act contains no provision to give s. 2(1) extraterritorial effect, it does not apply to such a case.’​[643]​

Clearly A would become guilty of an offence under the new section 2(1) merely by encouraging B to commit suicide, or by providing assistance for that purpose, even if no act of suicide or attempted suicide then results. Turning this outcome onto Ms Purdy’s situation makes it clear that, should her husband help her to reach the airport and board the plane for Switzerland, he will at once have committed an offence under the new section 2(1). There is no longer any need to moot matters of jurisdiction because the entire offence is committed in England and Wales. In view of this outcome it would be advisable for Ms Purdy to rely on the Guidelines her case compelled the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to promulgate in planning her future with respect to a possible journey to Dignitas, made possible with her husband’s aid. It would be unlikely however, given the complete lack of prosecutions in cases of AS, that prosecution would follow.​[644]​

5.3.2 The PAS/suicide dichotomy

Using the legality of suicide as a basis for reforming the law on euthanasia and/or PAS must be cautiously approached. To do so, some kind of equivalence would need to be found between two practices that, as noted in section 3.5.2 of chapter 3, Callahan has already distinguished on the basis of the impact the latter has on the general public.​[645]​ The MSB, in the same section, argued that this distinction is only accurate insofar as the person who commits suicide alone is not directly assisted by another member of the public. He is however, like the assistor in a case of PAS or euthanasia, a member of the public, as are the members of his family, and his death would affect them whether he was assisted or not. On this logic the MSB argues that this effect does not provide sufficient reason to maintain PAS’s illegality.​[646]​ 

If the effect PAS has on the public at large can be dismissed, as it is here, as an appropriate argument against reforming the law, and thus make the case for reform that little bit stronger, it remains true that the presence of the assistor and the character of his assistance precipitate numerous considerations regarding the legality of his interactions with the suicidee. That most applicable here is the argument concerning both persons’ autonomy. Proponents of assisted dying note, based on an ascriptive use of the phrase autonomy, that all persons have the freedom to make important choices for themselves, unfettered by social proscriptions.​[647]​ ‘This...sense of autonomy grounds the claim for a ‘right’​[648]​ to assisted suicide by guaranteeing an individual’s freedom to enlist assistance in his suicide.’​[649]​ This understanding applies to both the suicidee and his prospective assistor, and neither, as section 3.5.1 pointed out, is bound to participate in the procurement of the death – the assistor can refuse, and the suicidee can change his mind at any time.​[650]​

Opponents of this point of view, Safranek for example, attack the use of autonomy to try and justify legalised PAS​[651]​ by claiming that proponents who base their support for the practice on autonomy are, in fact, advocating an action that destroys the basis of autonomy entirely. They are, in effect, sanctioning the renunciation of the same fundamental good that they seek to protect, an act which Mill claimed to violate the good itself and thus erase the basis for protecting it in the first place.​[652]​ 

At face value this argument seems logically convincing. Death, as far as it is possible to know, erases all traces of autonomy from the deceased person. As such, advocating a practice which results in the destruction of the very quality one argues is being protected by that practice is an obviously circular argument. The MSB, while recognising this circularity, does not take it as reason enough to discount PAS entirely. As chapter 1 section 1.4.1 of this work made clear, one can autonomously choose to have one’s life ended if one’s methods for procuring death are passive. Since the MSB argues that passive and active procurement are equivalent in their ends and means, it is already the case that a person can request assistance from another in ending his life in the manner that Mill notes would destroy his autonomy. The argument is therefore negated, as it protests a state of affairs that is already accepted as appropriate. Furthermore, the fact that suicide, an act which destroys one’s autonomy just as completely as PAS would, remains legal despite this fact draws the MSB to conclude that there must be some other aspect of the suicide/PAS distinction that perpetuates the latter’s illegality.

Section 3.5.1 of chapter 3 of this work postulated that it is the impingement made on the assistor’s autonomy in being asked to procure another’s death that forms at least part of the reasoning behind why the courts are uncomfortable with respecting a patient’s request for active assistance in dying.​[653]​ This reasoning is based in part on Mill’s harm principle, a philosophical construct which can be applied to the suicide/PAS distinction to explore why the former is legal and the latter not.​[654]​

The harm principle states that a person’s autonomy can only be restricted if the act he wants to perform harms another.​[655]​ Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr expressed this sentiment succinctly when he noted that, ‘The right to swing my fist ends where the other man’s nose begins.’​[656]​ Committing suicide is therefore not prohibited because of the lack of involvement of a third party; in Holmes’ terms there is no nose to hit with one’s punch but one’s own. PAS however, dependant as it is on the assistance of a third party, falls foul of Mill’s principle because the assistor is affected by his becoming involved in procuring the death.

Distinguishing between the practices on this basis however is suspect. While it is clear that instances of PAS can be set apart from personal self-regarding suicide by the presence of the third party, it remains the case that one can receive ‘passive’ assistance in dying, which itself requires the assistance of a third party, without issue if one is competent.​[657]​ As the cases of Re C,​[658]​ Re T​[659]​ and Re JT,​[660]​ discussed in section 3.5.1 made clear, requesting that one’s treatment be either stopped or never begun at all, even if death will occur as a result of the omission, is recognised as proper both legally and medically.​[661]​ This permissiveness implies that requesting an omission does not impinge upon the autonomy of the physician who goes on to effect it. As such, the request and its actuation should not be subject to censure. 

If though, as section 1.4.1 alleges, actions and omissions are equivalent in their ends and means, their impact on the physician’s autonomy would likewise be equivalent.​[662]​ It should be the case, this section concludes, that based on this alleged equivalence, both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ means of procuring death should be dealt with similarly by the courts. The current law, in perpetuating the legality of one form of assistance (allowing the withdrawal of treatment) but labelling the other illegal, is making a key distinction groundlessly and is allowing the impingement of patient autonomy by denying access to perceived ‘active’ modes of assistance while allowing ‘passive’ ones. 

This impingement is all the more contestable when the fact that both the physician and the patient himself are autonomous persons is considered. Neither can rightly impose their views upon the other regarding assisted dying and, as section 3.5.1 of chapter 3 of this work pointed out, both are well within their rights to refuse to be a party to it if they do not wish to be. Thus, given the equivalence of active and passive modes of assistance, and the ability of the physician to refuse his aid if he does not wish to be a party to PAS, maintaining the illegality of ‘active’ assistance in dying on the basis of a foreseen danger to the physician’s autonomy is questionable at best. 

This conclusion however does not lead the MSB to allege that there is a right, implied by the legality of suicide and the permissibility of ‘passive’ assistance in dying, to request that assistance or to have such a request honoured. Indeed the case of R (on the application of Pretty) v. DPP​[663]​ made it clear that there is no legal right to die.

What can be safely implied from the above discussion however is the need, in light of the already highlighted inconsistencies in the active/passive distinction in cases concerning assisted dying, for reform to be effected to the law.​[664]​ This assertion is not one which the MSB makes without jurisprudential support. The coming sections will focus on the case of Purdy v. DPP,​[665]​ the catalyst for likely the most far-reaching judgement in the history of cases concerning end of life decision making and AS. The court, through this case, has heavily implied the need for reform to be effected to the law and began the process by instructing the DPP to promulgate Guidelines on how he approaches cases of alleged AS.​[666]​ These Guidelines were published as the ‘Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide’ on February 25th 2010.

Before approaching the Purdy case however, the context surrounding it and the case which arguably played the biggest role in laying the groundwork upon which Ms Purdy began her campaign, R (on the application of Pretty) v. DPP and Another,​[667]​ must be explored. 


5.4 The backdrop to the Purdy case: Pretty and the right to die

Mrs. Pretty was a victim of motor neurone disease. By the end of her life she would be unable to swallow and would be in a great deal of pain. The right to die group working with her wrote to the DPP asking him to undertake that he would not consent to a prosecution against Mr Pretty if he aided and abetted her death. In refusing to do so the DPP relied on section 3 of the Prosecution of Offences Act (1985) as that which regulates his duties and stated that he could only function under section 2(4) of the Suicide Act once a crime had been committed. 

In the High Court (HC) and House of Lords (HL) hearings Mrs Pretty’s arguments were set out clearly. She alleged, firstly, that the DPP’s refusal to undertake that he would not prosecute her husband for assisting her suicide, and secondly that section 2(1) of the Suicide Act (1961) was incompatible with the ECHR and/or alternatively that applying section 2(1) was a breach of Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the ECHR. As to the first ground, the judges in the HC and the HL felt that, because of the prescriptive nature of the DPP’s role, Mrs Pretty was in effect asking him to promise a pardon or dispensation in advance. Granting either of these was felt to be beyond the DPP’s powers.

The second ground, incompatibility of section 2(1) with Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the ECHR, proposed that the section in question imposed a blanket ban on all assisted suicides. This was argued as incompatible with the ECHR and/or that the DPP, as a public authority which had refused to give the undertaking, had acted incompatibly with a convention right under section 6 of the Human Rights Act (1998). In both the HC and the HL, it was held that section 2(1) was not incompatible with the relevant ECHR provisions and that for the same reasons given in dismissing the first ground, the DPP had not acted incompatibly with section 6(1) in refusing to give his undertaking.

The alternative second ground, that section 2(1) breached articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the ECHR, was equally dismissed by both the HC and the HL. Article 2 was not infringed, according to Lord Bingham in the HL, because it supported a right to life and not death;​[668]​ Article 3 because the DPP’s refusal not to prosecute did not fall within the negative prohibition of the Article.​[669]​ Article 8 was not breached because while it protects the right to autonomy of a living person, it does not extend to the right to choose to shorten life. Similarly Article 9 was not breached because Mrs Pretty’s belief in the virtue of assisted suicide could not require that her husband be absolved from offending.​[670]​ Article 14 was not infringed for three reasons: Firstly because Mrs Pretty’s argument that the Article was discriminatory because it prevented the disabled, but not the able-bodied, from exercising their right to commit suicide, relied on a misconception that the law confers a right to commit suicide, which it does not. Secondly, Article 14 is not ‘free standing’; it has effect only in relation to other Convention rights, so if they are not breached, then neither is Article 14; and thirdly, section 2(1) of the Suicide Act (1961) does not treat people in a discriminatory manner because it applies to all equally.​[671]​

A similar position was taken by the ECtHR as regards the first argument put forward by Mrs Pretty. The DPP’s refusal was held not to be disproportionate, arbitrary or unreasonable bearing in mind the seriousness of what was being proposed.

As to the second argument, like the two UK courts, the European Court held that section 2(1) was not incompatible with and neither infringed nor violated any of the challenged ECHR articles. Article 2 was not breached because the right to life does not include a right to death;​[672]​ Article 3 was not because it imposed no positive obligation on the state to give the undertaking not to prosecute;​[673]​ Article 8 was not because the state’s prohibition on assisted suicide was held to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the protection of the rights of others under Article 8(2).​[674]​ Article 9 was not violated because Mrs Pretty’s belief in assisted suicide did not come within those beliefs protected by the Article.​[675]​ Finally her challenge to Article 14 failed because the court found there was sufficient justification for not distinguishing between those who could and those who could not physically commit suicide. The UK’s blanket ban on AS was therefore held to be a proportionate response with which to satisfy legitimate government interests.

5.4.1 From Pretty to Purdy

Seven years after Dianne Pretty lost her case, Debbie Purdy, a victim of Multiple Sclerosis (MS) began her own. Ms Purdy explained her predicament as follows:

“…My wish is to be able to ask for and receive assistance to end my life, should living it become unbearable for me…My husband has said he would assist me and if necessary face a prison sentence, but I am not prepared to put him in this position for a number of reasons…I want to avoid the situation where I am too unwell to terminate my life. I want to retain as much autonomy as possible…This decision is of my own making…”​[676]​

Ms Purdy knows that eventually she will wish to bring her suffering to an end by committing suicide. However, she wishes to live for as long as possible, and to end it only when it becomes utterly unbearable. Unfortunately, as her condition deteriorates it will become harder and harder for her to end her own life without assistance. By the time she would wish to take her own life it may well be impossible for her to do so. 

Thus, Ms Purdy and her husband Mr Puente face what Lord Judge CJ called ‘an impossible dilemma’.​[677]​ The law on assisted suicide is clear and does not make exceptions, regardless of the motives which may compel Mr Puente’s actions or Ms Purdy’s determination to lead as normal a life as possible for as long as she is able.

As much as the circumstances of the Purdy and Pretty cases are similar, Ms Purdy has taken a different tack. With the support of Dignity in Dying and her solicitors she wrote to the DPP suggesting that it seemed he had a policy not to prosecute and requesting him to publish any such policy. Alternatively (in the event that no such policy existed) they requested that he promulgate a policy setting out criteria for the exercise of his discretion under section 2(4) of the Suicide Act (1961),​[678]​ in particular cases where a relative or friend assists a person to travel abroad to a country where assisting a suicide is not a criminal offence. In his reply dated January 14th 2008 the DPP stated that:

‘There is no such policy; and indeed, as you will be aware from the judgement of the HL in the Dianne Pretty case, any such policy – which would amount to a proleptic grant of immunity – would be unlawful. As Lord Bingham said, ‘It would have been a gross dereliction of the Director’s duty and a gross abuse of his power had he ventured to undertake that a crime yet to be committed would not lead to prosecution.’​[679]​

The letter went on to state that the only policy which the DPP applies is that set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors applicable to the prosecution of all alleged offences, that none of his public policy statements “…sets out circumstances in which a prosecution should never be brought for a given offence…” and that he had no plans to issue further guidance in relation to policy for the offence of assisted suicide.​[680]​ Ms Purdy issued her claim for judicial review challenging the DPP’s refusal to disclose his policy, or alternatively his failure to promulgate such a policy. She sought a mandatory order requiring the DPP to promulgate and/or disclose his policy in relation to the circumstances in which he will or will not consent to a prosecution under s. 2(4) of the Suicide Act (1961). 

5.4.2 The decision of the Divisional Court

The court identified three interconnected issues. The first was whether Ms Purdy’s rights under Article 8(1) of the ECHR were engaged. That question was further broken down into enquiring whether, first, the right to choose the manner of one’s own death fell within the scope of Article 8(1). This involved an analysis of Mrs Pretty’s case in the HL and ECtHR to see whether the decision of the latter was inconsistent with that of the former. Second, if there was an inconsistency, whether the court should follow the European decision or whether it must faithfully follow the HL. And third, if Ms Purdy had an Article 8 right, did the ban on assisted suicide in s. 2(1) of the Suicide Act (1961) constitute an interference with that right?

If Article 8(1) was engaged, the second issue was whether the prohibition on AS met the requirements of Article 8(2) of the Convention requiring it be in accordance with the law. Mrs Purdy’s case was that the obligation could only be fulfilled if the DPP issued a public statement of policy identifying the criteria he would take into account in exercising his discretion to consent to prosecution under section 2(4) of the Act. Scott Baker LJ and Aikens J (as he then was) concluded that the HL in Pretty had held that Mrs Pretty’s rights under Article 8 were not engaged at all because the right to private life related to the manner in which a person conducts his life, not the manner in which he departs from it. There was nothing in Ms Purdy’s case to make it distinguishable in that regard.

The Divisional court reflected on the wording of the ECtHR at paragraph 67 of the Pretty judgement that provided: ‘The court is not prepared to exclude that this constitutes an interference with her right to respect for private life as guaranteed under article 8(1) of the Convention…’ and concluded that this wording was “slightly curious” and “a good deal less firm than holding categorically that it would be an interference”. It felt that it was possible that the decision covered beneath it differing opinions about the ambit of the rights under Article 8(1), and further concluded that:

‘…On the face of it there is some doubt whether the court definitively concluded that article 8(1) was engaged or whether the court decided to proceed on the assumption that it was, but determined the case by its conclusion that there was compliance with article 8(2).’​[681]​

The court declared itself bound by the HL in the face of the uncertainty, and rejected the submission that the facts of the case were sufficiently serious to fall within the exceptional circumstances in which a court is entitled to apply the European Court’s decision rather than that of the HL. As a result of this reasoning it was decided that Article 8(1) was not engaged on the facts of the Purdy case.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the Code of Practice for Crown Prosecutors promulgated by the DPP under s. 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act (1985) was sufficiently clear and precise to provide the minimum degree of protection against arbitrariness. It was also held that the combination of the Code of Practice and the administrative law principles and remedies developed by the Common Law satisfied the required Convention standards of clarity and foreseeability. Regardless of this however, the court gave leave to appeal.

5.4.3 The decision of the Court of Appeal

Lord Pannick QC, counsel for Ms Purdy, identified three issues. Firstly; the question of Article 8(1) being engaged or not; secondly, whether the CA was bound by the decision of the HL or that of the ECtHR in Pretty on the applicability of Article 8(1); and thirdly, in the absence of a published policy by the DPP stipulating criteria by reference to which he will decide whether to consent to a prosecution against an individual who assists a suicide,​[682]​ is s. 2 of the Suicide Act (1961) in accordance with the law?

Ms Purdy’s real objective in bringing her case to court was to gain clarification of the law regarding her husband’s liability were he to assist in her suicide. Since it is his liberty which would be threatened if he did assist her, it may be wondered why focus was placed upon Ms Purdy’s Article 8(1) rights and not Mr Puente’s. The answer may be found in the case of R v. United Kingdom​[683]​ in which the Applicant had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for aiding and abetting a suicide. He complained that his conviction and sentence under s. 2(1) of the Suicide Act (1961) constituted a violation of his right to respect for private life under Article 8. The Commission noted:

“The Commission does not consider that the activity for which the applicant was convicted, namely aiding and abetting suicide, can be described as falling into the sphere of his private life…While it might be thought to touch directly on the private lives of those who sought to commit suicide, it does not follow that the applicant's rights to privacy are involved. On the contrary, the Commission is of the opinion that the acts (of) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring suicide are excluded from the concept of privacy by virtue of their trespass on the public interest of protecting life, as reflected in the criminal provisions of the 1961 Act.”​[684]​

As such, Mr Puente’s rights were not engaged. Pannick QC’s argument for Ms Purdy’s rights under 8(1) being engaged was that she was asserting that her right to autonomy and self-determination permitted her to decide how and when to end her own life so that suffering and indignity could be avoided. The fear of her husband’s prosecution was an impediment to the exercise of that right for it affected her freedom of choice. As a result, this was an interference with her right which needed to be justified under Article 8(2).​[685]​

The CA in Purdy ruled that, through consideration of the discussions in Pretty at both the HL and European levels, the decision of the ECtHR was clearly inconsistent with that of the HL. Furthermore, Lord Judge made it clear at paragraph 54 of the judgement in Purdy that:

“We have come to the conclusion that their Lordships intended to give the CA very limited freedom, only in the most exceptional circumstances, to override what would otherwise be the binding precedent of the decision of the House.”​[686]​

It was concluded that “The decisions of the European Court do not bind us. The decisions of the House of Lords do.”​[687]​ To try to circumvent the HL on the basis of the jurisprudence of the European Court would be “…productive of considerable uncertainty…”​[688]​ Thus confined to the HL’s decision in Pretty, the CA could not but hold that Ms Purdy’s Article 8 rights were not engaged.
5.4.4 The decision of the House of Lords

The HL decision in Purdy was released on the 30th of July 2009. In substance it ran almost completely counter to the ratio of the CA and concluded that the DPP had to promulgate guidance for the court in cases concerning possible AS. In coming to this decision numerous points of argumentation were discussed, one of the main ones being whether a British national could be prosecuted for assisting a suicide outside of the English jurisdiction. Lord Philip’s decision is instructive on this matter. He began by noting:

‘In my view there is a strong presumption that the offence created by section 2(1) of the 1961 Act was intended to ensure that, in those circumstances where committing suicide and the attempt to do so were decriminalised by section 1, assisting suicide remained a criminal offence. It seems unlikely that Parliament intended, in an Act whose primary purpose was to decriminalise suicide and attempted suicide, to widen the scope of the offence of assisting suicide.’​[689]​

From this grounding and having given a nod to Hirst’s theory on extraterritorial culpability,​[690]​ he went on to note that as a general rule English criminal law does not extend to acts committed outside of the jurisdiction except in cases of murder. However, section 3(3) of the Suicide Act effectively muddied the jurisprudential waters. It provides ‘This Act shall extend to England and Wales only.’​[691]​  Discussing the Act’s ambit Lord Philips made the following observations:

‘The ambit of section 2(1) should logically, in my view, be the same as the ambit of section 1. Plainly suicide ceases to be an offence when committed in England and Wales. It follows that assisting suicide, when the act of assisting and the act of suicide take place within England and Wales, is an offence under section 2(1).’​[692]​

Equally section 1 of the Act ‘does not apply to suicide committed outside England and Wales.’​[693]​ If suicide were treated as murder, so that assisting it was also murder under the abovementioned exception, a British subject who:

‘...accompanies a relative, who is also a British subject, to Switzerland and assists in Switzerland the relative to commit suicide with help from Dignitas, who will under English law commit the crime of murder and will be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales in relation to that offence.’​[694]​

That being said however it was held at para 13 that situations like Ms Purdy’s, where assistance is rendered in the UK with the intention of facilitating travel abroad to Switzerland for AS, are a moot point in respect of whether section 2(1) applies to reduce the murder to an AS. “Logically it seems [to Lord Philips] that it should not, but plainly considerations of legislative policy would weigh the other way.”​[695]​

In an attempt to escape this conclusion, the case of R v. Burgess (1862) was cited. Pollock CB in that case made it clear that:

‘...attempting to commit suicide is not attempting to commit murder within that statute. If it were, it would follow that anyone attempting to commit suicide by wounding himself must be indicted for the offence of wounding with intent to commit murder, which until very recently was punishable with death.’​[696]​

This however, according to Lord Philips, only serves to further evince the uncertainty surrounding the current law on the scope and application of the law on AS. He concludes on this issue, ‘The uncertainty is a further reason for the need for a more specific published policy on the part of the Director.’​[697]​

In his judgement Lord Hope came to similar conclusions on the scope of the law on AS. He noted at paragraph 18 of the judgement that the language of section 2(1) is indicative of liability accruing for acts of the types Lord Philips described, done in England and Wales, even if the AS itself occurs in Switzerland. Plainly stating Ms Purdy’s quandary he went on to posit:

‘...All that having been said it is plain, to put the point at its lowest, that there is a substantial risk that the acts which Ms Purdy wishes her husband to perform to help her to travel to Switzerland will give rise to a prosecution in this country...’​[698]​

Although his Lordship’s remarks were obiter, it is prudent here to reiterate the MSB’s position regarding them. It appears that Hirst’s work has been taken a step further than its author intended it to be by Lord Phillips’ judgement. To Hirst, as section 5.3.1 made clear, criminal actions that take place outside of England and Wales are punishable in the jurisdiction they take place within. As such an AS which takes place in Switzerland, as Mrs Purdy’s will, if ever she decides to go to Dignitas, would not be criminally punished in England and Wales because the offence itself took place in a jurisdiction both outside of the ambit of the English criminal law, and in a country where the contested actions are lawful. 

Since the promulgation of the CJA (2009) however, the possible debate surrounding Lord Phillips’ appreciation of Hirst’s thesis will remain purely academic. As section 5.3.1 noted, the Suicide Act section 2(1) has been amended by the CJA with the effect that what was once a result crime (an assisted suicide being committed once the death has occurred) is now a conduct crime (the result of the assistance, death, no longer being required for prosecution). Referring this change’s effects back to Mrs Purdy’s situation, it appears that her husband will commit an offence as soon as he does an action which is capable of encouraging or assisting her suicide. The suicide itself need not take place for the offence to be committed. Applying Hirst’s terminatory principle to the current law no longer saves Mr Puente from prosecution because the offence under section 2(1) will take place in England and Wales, long before Mrs Purdy ends her life in Switzerland.

This somewhat confusing conclusion, while supporting Lord Philips and again making it clear that additional clarity is required, was not the main sticking point in the judgement however. At paragraph 39 Lord Hope conclusively reversed the CA’s ruling on Article 8’s application to the case, and distinguished Purdy from the case of Dianne Pretty, by stating:

‘I would therefore depart from the decision in R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Secretary of State for the Home Department Intervening) [2002] 1 AC 800 and hold that the right to respect for private life in article 8(1) is engaged in this case.’​[699]​

This ruling evidences a lack of clarity in the law, which the Lords felt had grievous enough effects upon people like Ms Purdy to warrant clarification. Paragraphs 43 and 54 make this abundantly clear:

‘This (section 2.4 of the Suicide Act 1961) is where the requirement that the law should be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual, if need be with appropriate advice, to regulate his conduct is brought into focus in this case.’​[700]​

‘The Code will normally provide sufficient guidance to Crown Prosecutors and to the public as to how decisions should or are likely to be taken whether or not, in a given case, it will be in the public interest to prosecute...But that cannot be said of cases where the offence in contemplation is aiding or abetting the suicide of a person who is terminally ill or severely and incurably disabled, who wishes to be helped to travel to a country where assisted suicide is lawful and who, having the capacity to take such a decision, does so freely and with a full understanding of the consequences. There is already an obvious gulf between what section 2(1) says and the way that the subsection is being applied in practice in compassionate cases of that kind.’​[701]​





5.5 The DPP’s Guidelines on Assisted Suicide

The Guidelines on AS were published in February 2010 amidst a flurry of contrasting opinions. The following quotations evidence just a handful, and expose the polarised viewpoints so often characteristic of the euthanasia and AS debate:

‘...I am still overwhelmed and delighted by this victory...Because I know the likely consequences of any decisions I choose to make about my death, I won’t have to make those decisions early.’​[703]​ – Debbie Purdy

‘We do not support any weakening of the protection offered under the law on assisted suicide, which is exactly what these new Guidelines do...Many disabled people are frightened by the consequences of these new Guidelines and with good reason...’​[704]​ – Richard Hawkes, chief executive of disability charity Scope

‘The fundamental problem remains that the law needs to be changed by Parliament. The Law Lords have essentially ruled that our existing law on assisted suicide is far too wide...No guidelines will ever be able to distinguish, with the clarity needed, between compassionate assistance to relieve terminal suffering of competent adults and wicked assisted suicide of the mentally ill...’​[705]​ – Evan Harris, Liberal Democrat MP

‘The new policy effectively decriminalises assisted suicide in a wide range of circumstances...’​[706]​ – Paul Tully, of the anti-euthanasia group SPUC Pro-Life

Turning to these select opinions first, it is curious how Ms Purdy, author of the first quotation feels that the promulgation of the Guidelines was a victory. While it cannot be denied that her cause in seeking a measure of procedural clarity in the law on AS has been successful to a point, there remain a great many areas of confusion and conjecture within the Guidelines themselves, and how the current law will work through them. Indeed as section 5.3.1 mentions, the CJA (2009) has had the effect of making any burgeoning assistance rendered by an ‘assistor’ punishable as AS under section 2(1) of the Suicide Act (1961). Whether or not the changes brought by the CJA will adversely affect the application of the Guidelines has yet to be seen through case law, though its enactment is an interesting legislative happening given its proximity to the Guidelines’ promulgation. The law on AS under the CJA appears to have been widened considerably, the substitution of a result crime for one committed by conduct alone, while the Guidelines provide specific grounds which will be taken into account in negating a prosecution under the Suicide Act (1961). Thus, through the CJA, there is a legislative widening of the bases for culpability concurrent to the publication of policy which restricts the apportionment of culpability for the same crime. If nothing else this state of affairs highlights a possible inconsistency between legislative reform and the DPP's Policy.

Whether or not, in light of this confusion, Mr Hawkes’ views in the second quotation are accurate is again a matter of debate. Paragraph 1 of the Guidelines makes it clear that AS remains a criminal offence, and paragraph 5 notes that the Purdy judgement did not effect a change to the law in that area. That said, the deciding factor in determining culpability under the Guidelines is the presence or absence of ‘compassion’ – a matter of motive which has never explicitly played a role in English criminal law before now. How the courts will handle proclamations of blamelessness from future defendants in AS cases based on such a subjective approximation is unclear. Andrew Copson, a member of the British Humanist Association notes on this issue: 
‘The Guidelines attempt to do in part what Parliament has thus far failed to, and that is to distinguish between where a person has compassionately assisted another to die, and where that was done with malicious intent or murder...’​[707]​

Mr Copson is unclear as to his opinion on whether the Guidelines succeed in their aim, but there are areas of clarity where there was little before that can rightly be gleaned from certain of the sections. The most helpful in this regard is that concerning ‘Public interest factors tending in favour of prosecution’. Using its precepts, it is possible to construct a profile of the ‘perfect’ offender – someone for whom prosecution under the Guidelines is almost assured. This profile will then be contrasted with one for the ‘perfect’ innocent ‘assistor’. The comparison will aid in evaluating the Guidelines in the conclusion of this section.

5.5.1 The ‘perfect’ offender

Under the Guidelines, points 43(1) through (16) and 44 cover the characteristics that will tend towards prosecuting a person for AS as defined by section 2(1) of the Suicide Act (1961). The ‘perfect’ offender will meet some if not all of the following descriptions.​[708]​ 

The offender works in collusion with organisation like Dignitas,​[709]​ which provides a physical environment in which people may commit suicide. He is either a medical doctor, nurse, member of the medical profession, a professional carer (paid or not) or member of another profession, like the prison service, and the victim was in his care at the time of the suicide.​[710]​ He may be little more than a webmaster who provides information on suicide on his website or via some other publication.​[711]​ The victim need not be personally known to him.​[712]​ If he did personally know his victim, the suicidee would likely have been an incompetent minor,​[713]​ who had not expressed any views on or wishes for AS in the past.​[714]​ The offender will have pressured​[715]​ his victim into acceding to AS or committing suicide for reasons that were not wholly compassionate.​[716]​ He will have a history of violence towards the victim​[717]​ and will have assisted him even though the victim was physically able to commit suicide alone.​[718]​ He may have been paid for these services,​[719]​ and may have provided them for more than one person in the past.​[720]​ He may also have known the victim intended to commit suicide in a public place.​[721]​

This description, contradictory in places as it may seem, represents the sum of the criteria under points 43(1) through 43(16) of the Guidelines on AS. A thorough evaluation will take place after the ‘perfect’ innocent assistor is detailed in the next section, but preliminary issues come to light without need for this further exposition. 
The inclusion of the medical profession in the criteria is interesting, especially in light of the MSB’s conclusions regarding the correct descriptions of ‘passive’ activities that result in death and its protestations over the doctrine of double effect. If the MSB is accurate then not only do the Guidelines scrutinise medical practitioners who procure death pursuant to a request for PAS, but by implication they cast doubt on the legality of practices which are currently completely lawful – the practice of ‘passive’ euthanasia for example; the withdrawal of treatment at a patient’s request and the cessation of life sustaining treatment in cases where patients are in PVS. While it is recognised here that these latter practices are not considered PAS, it is not impossible to infer suspicion on the practitioners involved in them, especially given the Guidelines’ explicit mention of their profession in point 14.

Points 43(2) and 43(3) further muddy the waters surrounding common medical practice by highlighting situations where the patient in question is not competent and has made no mention of his or her feelings on suicide in the past. They read:

‘...the victim did not have capacity (as defined by the Mental Capacity Act 2005) to reach an informed decision to commit suicide...’
‘...the victim has not reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit suicide...’

Again it is not insinuated here that common clinical practice, where a patient is incompetent and has reached no settled opinions on how his or her life should end, is intrinsically comparable to cases of PAS. Indeed the concept of best interests operates well in such circumstances. Whether or not this same concept needs to be taken into account under the Guidelines is a moot point. It currently appears nowhere in the text.
It is also clear from points 43(12), 43(13) and 43(16) that there is considerable disdain for organisations like Dignitas being used to procure assistance in dying. Those sections respectively proclaim:

‘...the suspect gave encouragement or assistance to more than one victim who were not known to each other...’
‘...the suspect was paid by the victim or those close to the victim for his or her encouragement or assistance...’
‘...the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a person involved in the management or as an employee (whether for payment or not) of an organisation or group, the purpose of which is to provide a physical environment (whether for payment or not) in which to allow another to commit suicide.’

How such obvious disdain will affect cases like Mr Puente’s, should Ms Purdy ever decide to avail herself of Dignitas’ services in the future, is as yet unclear. Precedent from cases where the 'victim' has availed himself/herself of those services with the assistance of relatives strongly suggests that it is unlikely that a prosecution will occur. That said, it is hoped the factors against Mr Puente's prosecution would far outweigh those in favour should he ever have to face a trial.

5.5.2 The perfect ‘innocent’ assistor

Points 45 through 48 describe the ‘Public interest factors tending against prosecution’. Under them, the ‘perfect innocent assistor’ takes on something like the following appearance. He was wholly motivated by compassion​[722]​ to assist a ‘victim’ who had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to commit suicide.​[723]​ His actions, though enough to come within the definition of the offence, were ‘minor’​[724]​ and ‘reluctant’.​[725]​ He has tried to dissuade the ‘victim’ from committing suicide,​[726]​ and he did so at a sufficiently proximate time to the ‘victim’s’ suicide for his efforts to have had some kind of effect.​[727]​

‘Compassion’, mentioned in points 43(6), 44 and 45(2) of the Guidelines is the fulcrum upon which liability turns. Without a purely compassionate motive the assistor is highly likely to be convicted of AS. Importantly, the concept of ‘compassion’ is not defined in the Guidelines proper, so its meaning and implications for the current law must be gleaned from elsewhere. Arguably the most appropriate, if equally limited, guidance can be found in the Swiss law on AS. Articles 114 and 115 of the Swiss Penal Code, in force since 1942, state: 

'A person who, for decent reasons, especially compassion, kills a person on the basis of his or her serious and insistent request, will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment (Gefängnis).'

‘A person who, for selfish reasons, incites someone to commit suicide or who assists that person in doing so will, if the suicide was carried out or attempted, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment (Zuchthaus) of up to 5 years or a term of imprisonment (Gefängnis).’

The use of the concept of compassion in the Penal Code is curious because it is not explicitly mentioned in the text of Article 115, that which concerns assisted suicide specifically. Indeed it is questionable whether it is 'compassion' that 115 is based upon at all, since one can be non-selfish without being compassionate. It may be simple beneficence or respect for a person's autonomy that leads to non-selfish actions, not compassion itself.

Article 114 on the other hand, that concerned with 'killing on request', uses the phrase 'compassion' in much the same way as the DPP's Guidelines use it, though the latter evinces a greater preoccupation with the concept given its repeated and specific mention. Like the Guidelines however, the concept is no more exhaustively defined than its inclusion in Article 114. It may be the case that this lack of clarity allows 'compassion' to be an umbrella term for beneficence, respect for autonomy and other positive feelings which compel action.

While the connotations of the word may be sufficient to garner enough clarity for the provisions relying on it to be workable, it is still a highly subjective concept and one that, in practice, can only be implied on the basis of the defendant’s evidence. This evidence may have many forms; his relationship with the ‘victim’; his reputation as a ‘good person’ prior to the suicide; his past conduct with the ‘victim’, how he treated him and if he was trusted. The list of possible inference providing exigencies is endless. However, all the inferences in the world cannot mask the fact that, if one so chooses, one can lie with the object of getting into a position of performing a malicious act at a later time. Motive is, after all, a mental state, as are intention and desire.​[728]​ 

Evan Harris, a Liberal Democrat MP, details the problem with compassion-centric phraseology:

‘No guidelines will ever be able to distinguish, with the clarity needed, between compassionate assistance to relieve terminal suffering of competent adults and wicked assisted suicide of the mentally ill – legislation is needed, and Parliament should act.’​[729]​


The MSB agrees completely with his acknowledgement of the need for Parliamentary involvement in assuring the law’s clarity in this area. The Guidelines, helpful as they are, are only policy. They can either be referred to by the conscientious policeman/prosecutor/judge/officials up to and including the DPP himself, or they can be set aside as nothing more than rhetoric and jargon and the law can move on heedless of their existence. Granted this is a highly unlikely turn of events, especially given the weight of the HL’s decision in Purdy that preceded their promulgation, but it would take little in the way of legal ingenuity for a prosecutor bent on a conviction to read them out of his brief. They were after all a product of duress on the DPP’s part – never has his hand been so conclusively forced than in the upshot of the Purdy judgement.

To conclude this section, the creation of the Guidelines on AS was both a boon and a burden for those, like Ms Purdy, who seek clarity in the law on AS and euthanasia. They are a boon in that they provide guidance, if limited guidance, on the circumstances where prosecution is less likely to follow an assisted suicide. In this way Ms Purdy will be able to make plans for her future without feeling completely in the dark about her husband’s prospects of prosecution. 

The burden comes however when concrete guidance on the law’s direction is required. As was noted in section 5.3.1 the promulgation of the Guidelines coincided with the enactment of the CJA (2009) which, amongst innumerate other things, broadened the scope of liability for AS. Interested parties to the AS/euthanasia debate are therefore faced with a paradox. On the one hand the law is widening the scope for prosecutions for AS – indeed if Mr Puente so much as drove his wife to the airport and helped her onto the plane to Zurich he would be liable under the new section 2(1) – and on the other, the DPP has, in the words of Paul Tully (an anti-euthanasia advocate), “...effectively decriminal(ised) assisted suicide in a range of circumstances.”​[730]​ While section 6 of the Guidelines specifically states that no such decriminalisation has occurred and thus renders Mr Tully’s sentiment inaccurate, the MSB suggests that further clarification of Parliament’s assessment of the illegality of AS in light of the Guidelines is necessary to better protect both the ‘innocent’ assistor and the innumerate vulnerable people who may be subject to pressure to agree to AS by a nefarious party under the cloak of (currently) undefined ‘compassion’.

If indeed there is a liberty in terms of assistance in dying afforded by the law on suicide, it is questionable how it should be rightly respected in a legal system like that in England and Wales. There is a noted contrast between the law’s protestations regarding the practices of PAS, ‘mercy killing’ and euthanasia and how defendants brought to court for practicing them are treated once in the dock. Only in singularly unrepentant circumstances will a practitioner be convicted of assisting a patient’s suicide, and as yet there has never been a conviction for ‘mercy killing’ in the medical setting.​[731]​ Indeed it is arguable that the law at present is bent out of shape through trying simultaneously to direct its full weight against the practice of euthanasia and PAS, and yet showing leniency in cases, like the Gilderdale​[732]​ scenario, where it is felt appropriate to do so. This confusion of leniency and zero-tolerance defines the length and breadth of the law’s dealings with PAS and euthanasia. The inherent confusion would be more intelligible, proponents of reform claim, if current practice was codified.​[733]​

Now that the main arguments in favour of reforming the law have been discussed, the chapter will move on and consider the main two against reform – the claim that there are workable, presently accepted alternatives to reforming the law in favour of active assistance in dying, and the slippery slope argument. Other arguments against reform, as section 5 of this chapter noted, will be dealt with in chapter 6, as they are not strictly legalistic in nature and therefore outside the scope of this chapter.

5.6 Legal arguments against reform: A possible presently legal solution?

On the topic of whether a less contentious alternative to PAS or euthanasia might be found, the issues of ‘voluntary passive euthanasia’ and Terminal sedation (TS) require consideration. The former involves the withdrawal of treatment, most often either artificial hydration and nutrition or a ventilator, at the request of a competent patient, in order to bring about that patient’s death. If such withdrawals are effected during the course of routine medical care and the patient dies as a result, this happening is NOT an instance of euthanasia. It becomes one only when the physician omits care with the intention that the patient’s death be hastened.​[734]​

Voluntary passive euthanasia, as defined by the MSB and similarly by Young,​[735]​ is held by opponents of reform to be, by virtue of its methodological distinctions from active euthanasia and PAS, a more morally sound option than either of its abovementioned counterparts.​[736]​ The MSB claims in chapter 1 that in cases where the withdrawal of treatment is concerned, the distinction between activity and passivity falters for the purposes of distinguishing the species of euthanasia. Consequently, relying specifically on voluntary passive euthanasia as an alternative to PAS for the incapacitated is uncomfortable as it is felt by the MSB not to be passive at all. Taking this conclusion at face value it seems to advocate voluntary active euthanasia, since the passive form is argued to be invalid by the MSB, as a workable alternative to PAS for those patients unable to self-administer. The only distinction between these practices is the identity of the ‘administrator’.​[737]​ 

On the other hand, TS works by slowly easing the patient into a chemically induced coma before and until death in order to minimise possible suffering from the protracted death engendered by a withdrawal of treatment. It is often spoken of in tandem with such a withdrawal and has been the subject of fierce debate by Quill and Byock,​[738]​ Hallenbeck​[739]​ and Young.​[740]​ The latter pair feel that TS is a less contentious and valuable alternative to active assistance in dying – Hallenbeck delineating between a terminally ill patient suffering unbearably (TS being permissible here) and a non-terminal sufferer of a spinal cord injury (where it is impermissible) in his discussion – where Young feels it is merely protracting what the patient who requests PAS sees as a useless life. Gert et al​[741]​ are of like minds to Quill, Byock and Hallenbeck in that they feel that there is an obligation to respect un-coerced refusals of artificial hydration and nutrition and see TS as a valuable alternative to PAS or euthanasia.

As to the efficacy of TS as an alternative, it is conceded that in certain circumstances, like those envisioned by Hallenbeck where the patient is in distress and cannot be otherwise adequately palliated, its efficiency is hard to deny. However, easing distress by plunging a patient who may well have asked for active assistance in dying by way of PAS or active euthanasia, into a chemically induced coma can hardly be said to be respecting his expressed wishes or his right to self determination. 

It is also questionable whether TS is a less contentious alternative to active assistance in dying at all, as the result of both courses of action is equivalent. It is simply the case that TS protracts the dying process where PAS by self-administration is almost instant. This distance between means and ends again raises the idea of a ‘moral step back’ being taken from the proximate cause of the patient’s death by those who would otherwise be its cause – by the practitioner in PAS by providing a drug for the patient to use himself, and in TS by simply waiting for the patient to expire through renal failure or some related issue. It is clear then that TS and voluntary passive euthanasia do not provide an alternative to reforming the law, since both falter when subjected to the MSB’s diminishment of the act/omission distinction. This conclusion is linked to the slippery slope argument in that it shows that a feared outcome, the provision of active assistance in dying, is at present available and is, because of its comparative banality when couched in ‘passive’ terms, unregulated. A more thorough examination of this argument is taken up in the coming sections.

5.7 Legal arguments against reform: The slippery slope

Slippery slope or thin edge of the wedge arguments have a distinctly consequentialist flavour. Supporters of such arguments, Schauer,​[742]​ Lamb,​[743]​ Keown,​[744]​ Finnis,​[745]​ Fisher​[746]​ and Foot​[747]​for example, argue that a feared deleterious outcome will result if a certain kind of conduct, in this case euthanasia, is permitted.​[748]​ Consequently even if an individual plea for AS or euthanasia, like that made by Dianne Pretty, seems right, it should not be granted because it will lead inevitably to practices that are unquestionably wrong.​[749]​

There are three main assertions made by proponents of the slippery slope argument. 

1.	Firstly, if voluntary euthanasia or AS is legalised it would be impossible to avoid the legalisation, or at least toleration of non-voluntary euthanasia/AS procured by coercion and pressure. 

2.	Secondly, legalising voluntary euthanasia/AS would signal society’s approval of medically assisted death and would open the floodgates. 

3.	And finally, if voluntary euthanasia/AS were legalised it would result in abuse or neglect of the vulnerable, and mistakes in the treatment and diagnosis of patients.

As a result of the panoply of interrelated problems covered by these three broad points, opponents of reform feel that no matter the possible positive effects on personal autonomy legalisation may bring, the risks will never be commensurate to the costs occasioned by the abuses they feel are inevitable. Smith for example notes, with reference to practices in Holland and Belgium:

‘Dutch doctors have gone from killing the terminally ill who asked for it, to killing the chronically ill who ask for it, to killing the depressed who had no physical illness who ask for it, to killing newborn babies because they have birth defects, even though, by definition, they cannot ask for it.’​[750]​

 This section, in collusion with section 5.7.1, aims to dissect these arguments in an effort to see whether the evidence available on the practice of euthanasia, currently best available from The Netherlands, does or does not support their claims. Conclusions will be drawn as to whether slippery slope arguments lend credence to the opponents’ feelings regarding the dangers of reforming the law at the close of this chapter.

A preliminary point of interest concerns the numerous types of ‘slope’ that can be descended towards the unwelcome consequences in issue; in this context of course these would be the proliferation of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Govier​[751]​ for example distinguishes between four types; the conceptual slope which is associated with issues of vagueness, and raises questions about whether it is possible non-arbitrarily to distinguish between instances in a series where there are no sharp cut-off points between the instances; the precedential slope relating to the requirement for consistent treatment for similar cases; the causal slope concerning the avoidance of actions that will, or likely will, cause undesirable consequences and the mixed slope, a combination of aspects of the other named forms. Walton​[752]​ has created a similar set of definitions to delineate between the ‘sorites’ slope; the precedent slope; the causal slope and the full slope arguments. This chapter lacks the necessary scope for elaboration required to discuss these differing types of slope in depth. However a glance at the workings of each provides an instructive background against which the above noted three assertions can be discussed. 

The impetus of the Conceptual slope argument is that anyone who believes the competent will benefit from the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia or AS is logically committed to believing that non-voluntary euthanasia and AS for the incompetent is sound. Finnis and Keown make such arguments their own; the former proclaiming, in line with the argument in point 1 (above), that ‘on the basis of consistency in judgement’​[753]​ permitting voluntary euthanasia for a competent patient will licence the termination of lives judged not worth living. Both authors believe that there are prevailing moral norms that apply to the medical profession that prohibit assisting a dying patient's death, even if that patient believes he would be better off dead. Such assistance is given, according to Keown, in the light of a decision by the practitioners involved that it is in their patients’ best interests to do so. Voluntary euthanasia is therefore, in Keown’s opinion, not justified on the basis of a dying patient’s request, but as a consequence of ‘the doctor’s judgement that the request is justified because the patient no longer has a life “worth” living.’​[754]​

Neither opinion is immune from critique. Finnis’ thesis, in using the concept of ‘consistency in judgement’, seems to overlook the inherent inconsistency between the practice of voluntary, as opposed to non-voluntary euthanasia. The presence of competence, and often also of a request for assistance in dying, make the concepts different in both form and function; in form because of the request made by the competent patient for aid, and in function because of the reasons behind the assistance. With the competent patient it is most likely his choice to escape suffering that precipitates his request, where with incompetent patients, as Keown points out, it is likely an approximation of his best interests. 

As to Keown’s argument, for all his reliance on the concept of best interests is accurate, he bases his appreciation of the concept on purely medical terms. Thus, while accurate in terms of the extent of the medical practitioner’s ability to judge his patient’s best interests, he overlooks the fact that for the patient himself, there are innumerate factors, separate from his medical condition, which feed into his understanding and feelings about how his interests would be best served. By overlooking this fact Keown’s thesis assumes that both competent and incompetent patients are alike in his assessment of what would be in their best interests. This alone renders his view, in Young’s words ‘fallacious’,​[755]​ and makes his argument in favour of point 1 (above), which is based on the equivalence of voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, a less credible reason for opposing reform to the law.

Precedential slopes are based on the reasoning that if a certain thing is permitted, it will establish a precedent that will justify permitting the same thing in similar subsequent circumstances. This chain of precedents goes on until something unacceptable, in this case non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia, is permitted as acceptable. This form of slope is susceptible to a similar critique as the Conceptual form, as it relies on a concordance in structure between the two practices that it is based upon, voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia in this case. Given the number of key differences between them, competence and consent being the main two, it is highly questionable whether there is a significant enough analogical connection to ground a precedential slope in the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia/uncoerced AS. Due to this lack of logical consistency, there is no room for a ‘slide’ down a precedential slope towards non-voluntary euthanasia because there is simply no precedent set by voluntary euthanasia’s legalisation to allow the slide to happen.

The Causal slope is that most often referred to by opponents of reform and is based on the precept that those who take the first step towards an unacceptable outcome will inevitably be drawn to bring about that outcome. Such an argument underlies points 2 and 3 (above) and has as its basis a set of three psychological factors which are thought to cause the ‘slide’.​[756]​ Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al​[757]​ explain the first of these factors, citing a kind of desensitization to non-voluntary euthanasia occurring if voluntary euthanasia is accepted as normal.​[758]​ Coupled with this is the fear that physicians will, through the practice of euthanasia, become dehumanised to their role as carers. Derbolowsky puts this concern candidly, ‘Those who demand “killing on request” place the physician on the same level as a hangman’.​[759]​ The trust and confidence inherent in the doctor patient relationship, and which plays a central part in defining the Hippocratic physician’s role, would be dissolved completely should the carer become an executioner.​[760]​

The second factor, a product of Foot’s thesis, claims that the ‘social scene’​[761]​ may be affected in ‘very bad ways’​[762]​ if voluntary euthanasia is legalised, as the pressures on people within the most vulnerable demographics to seek assistance in dying irrespective of their want for it will grow exponentially. Campbell expresses a similar concern in noting that the acceptance of voluntary euthanasia will have a dangerous and significant effect on the value to life, especially the lives of those who will come to be seen as prime candidates for assisted dying.​[763]​

The MSB, while acknowledging the possibility of the consequences outlined by the first two factors, questions whether they can be maintained when current medical practice, as understood by the MSB, is considered. Surely if physicians were to be dehumanised by assisting death in an active manner, those who withdraw treatment would be likewise affected because, according to the MSB, withdrawals of the kind which precipitated Anthony Bland’s death are as active as the provision of lethal medication. 

Similar conclusions can be made regarding the argument based on Foot’s work and that raised by Campbell. Simply applying the MSB to the former cannot yield accurate predictions for the effect legalising assisted dying would have on the ‘social scene’. The theory only dictates that active assistance in dying is already covertly available under a cloak of lexical sophistry based on passivity and omissions. What can be pointed out however is the apparent lack of negative effects occasioned by the above noted status quo. If the MSB is correct and currently labelled ‘passive’ actions are actually active ones, then Foot’s worry is groundless. The negative effects she perceives to be likely from active assistance in dying being available do not seem to have occurred, irrespective of its (covert) availability. The same logic undercuts Campbell’s worries about the negative effect readily available active assistance in dying would have on the value of life. If the MSB is correct and that assistance is already, if covertly, available, there has been no appreciable damage to the value of life as a result.

Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al’s​[764]​ third factor states that any exception to the general prohibition on killing, baring self defence,​[765]​ will make it easier to justify further exceptions, which in turn will make non-voluntary euthanasia more palatable should the voluntary form become lawful.​[766]​ Numerous analogies are drawn as proof of this inevitability, the decriminalisation of abortion and subsequent rise in the number of abortions performed being that most often cited by conscientious objectors to any kind of liberalisation of the law on assisted dying.​[767]​ A similar rise in the number of deaths procured through euthanasia is claimed to be the likely result of any kind of liberalisation of the law on assisted dying, and the experience in the Netherlands, where euthanasia is legal in certain circumstances, is posited as proof of this. These claims will be tackled in section 5.7.1.

5.7.1 Evidence of the slippery slope? – The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, legislation exists to permit assisted suicide and euthanasia in certain circumstances. The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act (2002) amends Articles 293 and 294 of the Penal Code of the Netherlands to read respectively:

(1)	A person who terminates the life of another person at that other person’s express and earnest request is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than twelve years or a fine of the fifth category.
(2)	The offence referred to in the first paragraph shall not be punishable if it has been committed by a physician who has met the requirements of due care...and who informs the municipal autopsist of this.
And,
(1)	Any person who intentionally incites another to commit suicide shall, if suicide follows, be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine of the fourth category fine.
(2)	Any person who intentionally assist another to commit suicide or provides him with the means to do shall, if suicide follows, be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fourth-category fine. Article 293, paragraph 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.

The ‘due care’ requirement is defined in Article 2 of the legislation. It stipulates that the patient’s request is voluntary and well considered, that he or she must be suffering in a way which is lasting and unbearable and that there is no reasonable prospect of improvement. The doctor must have consulted an independent physician who agrees with his approximation that there is no other reasonable solution to the patient’s plight. The patient must agree with this also. This consent can be garnered from an advance directive if the patient is no longer capable of expressing his or her wishes.





No. of studied deaths	5197	5146	5617	9965
Practice that possibly hastened death (%)				
Euthanasia	1.7	2.4	2.6	1.7
Assisted suicide	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Ending life without explicit request by the patient	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.4
Intensified alleviation of symptoms	18.8	19.1	20.1	24.7
Withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging treatment	17.9	20.2	20.2	15.6
Continuous deep sedation	N/A	N/A	N/A	8.2

What is most striking about these findings is that, but for the row concerning ‘intensified alleviation of symptoms’, there is an obvious downward trend in instances of death occasioned by any action that could loosely be labelled assisted dying. Even in 2005 where the sample size grew by a third in comparison to that of the 1990 study, the percentage of deaths caused by euthanasia remained 1.7%. Though it may be argued that 1.7% of 5197 (88.3) is a lower figure than 1.7% of 9965 (169.4), this is counterbalanced by the fact that in 2005 all deaths in which the cause of death precluded physician assistance during dying were included, whereas only 1 in 12 of these deaths was included in the other study years. Had the same sampling method been used across the entire period of the study, the number of deaths would likely be more standardised and the discrepancy between 1990 and 2005 less pronounced.
Clearly then, by that preliminary observation alone, the predicted slide along the slippery slope towards involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia does not appear to have begun in any pronounced fashion. van der Heide et al, authors of ‘End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act’ conclude along similar lines. They note that instead of the forecasted increase following the promulgation of the Termination of Life (Review Procedures) Act,

‘The Dutch Euthanasia Act was followed by a modest decrease in the rates of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. The decrease may have resulted from the increased application of other end-of-life care interventions...’​[769]​

Among these palliative measures are what van der Heide et al term the ‘intensified alleviation of symptoms’; the use of morphine, diamorphine and other drugs to alleviate symptoms and keep patients comfortable. Such cases are seen as quite apart from cases of euthanasia, as the following quote from the authors of the 1990 study, van der Maas et al, shows,

 ‘...most of the cases in which life was ended without the patient’s explicit request were more similar to cases involving the use of large doses of opioids than to cases of euthanasia.’​[770]​ 

This observation is a key one, especially when considering the impact of the MSB on the slippery slope argument, because, as Young notes in his text, all opponents of the legalisation of medically assisted death have no moral qualms about giving large doses of opioids to patients so long as they are not given with the intention of hastening death (the doctrine of double effect).​[771]​ In diminishing the distinction between intention and foresight in the context of double effect, the MSB classifies the actions taken by the physician providing opioids as amounting to active euthanasia. Consequently, by relying on the slippery slope argument as one against the legalisation of euthanasia, opponents of reform are perpetuating a double standard which allows them, on the one hand, to laud double effect while on the other decrying active euthanasia on principle.

Furthermore the above-evidenced statistics, while acknowledging the presence of a certain amount of non-voluntary euthanasia, on the whole work to undercut the three main contentions made at the beginning of section 5.7. As to the first (the impossibility of regulation and an inevitable slide towards non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia) the fact that by 2001 the numbers of patients receiving euthanasia had steadied after an initial rise in the 1990 – 1995 study and then drops further in 2005 disproves the presence of a rapid descent into unregulated eugenics-based medical killing, as warned of by Keown,​[772]​ Foot​[773]​ and Verhey.​[774]​ It would therefore appear that the feared ‘slide’ and floodgates effect that could have come from the enactment of the Dutch legislation on euthanasia has not happened, and that Onwuteaka-Philipsen et al’s fears regarding the implied justification on a wide range of exceptions to the prohibition on killing appear unwarranted.​[775]​

The second argument noted at the beginning of section 5.7 can also be addressed by an appeal to the Dutch evidence, as can the third. The second issue, the claim that legalising euthanasia would signal society’s approval of unregulated medically assisted death, can at least be partially refuted with reference to the Chabot​[776]​ case. Dr Chabot was a psychiatrist who, in 1991, supplied one of his patients, a deeply clinically depressed woman (Mrs B), with lethal drugs that she administered to herself in the presence of Chabot, a general practitioner, and one of her friends. She died shortly thereafter and Chabot reported her death to the coroner as an assisted suicide. In making his decision to provide the drugs Dr Chabot, through examining Mrs B, came to the conclusion that her request for suicide was well-considered. He consulted seven other expert psychiatrists, who all largely agreed with his assessment of Mrs B and his proposed course of action, though none of them examined her personally.

When the matter reached the Dutch Supreme Court in 1994, Chabot sought to rely on the defence of necessity. He claimed that he had been faced with a conflict between his duty to relieve his patient’s unbearable suffering by the only effective means available to him, and his duty to preserve her life. He chose to fulfil the former because he considered it the more stringent duty of the two. The Supreme Court found that there was insufficient evidence to justify the necessity of Mrs B’s case, even after ruling that the defence could be used in cases where there was a non-physical illness, as there was no corroborating evidence from a medical expert who had personally examined the patient. 

Despite finding Chabot guilty of assisting a suicide under Article 294 of the Dutch Penal Code, the Court imposed no penalty. While it was not considered that Chabot had done anything seriously wrong, he was only seen at fault procedurally speaking, for not acquiring corroborating evidence. This does not lend credence to the claim that the legal toleration of voluntary medically assisted death will lead to societal approval of the practice. Nor does it imply that significant numbers of people who are not terminally ill are being assisted to die unlawfully.​[777]​ What the case does show is that a person who is suffering psychologically can competently choose to die. It is also clear that when a person’s psychological suffering is intolerable, it is permissible for him to request medical assistance in dying if he is incapable of ending his own life unaided. 

The MSB is wary of concluding that this state of affairs is either overtly positive or distinctly negative. The exercise of autonomous choice is the theory’s crux, and Chabot clearly emphasises the ability of persons who are suffering psychologically to make such choices. However, the MSB’s avowed respect for autonomy is tempered by the requirement that the person in question is competent to make such choices. The patient in the Chabot case was described as being severely clinically depressed. Her competence to make an informed choice to seek death would therefore at best be suspect, and it is posited here that she should not have been allowed to seek Dr Chabot’s assistance in doing so, irrespective of the lacking need for literal competence under the Dutch law on euthanasia.​[778]​ That said, the empirical evidence cited above simply does not provide enough grounding to claim, irrespective of how controversial the Chabot ruling may have been, that the slide along the slippery slope towards widespread acceptance of non-voluntary euthanasia has been stepped upon.

What may cause such a step however is the inclusion of a 'tired of life' clause within a future revision of the Dutch Legislation. There have been numerous recent calls to allow those who are tired of life, much like Chabot's Mrs B, to be able to access lawful assistance in dying,​[779]​ one of which was made by the Citizen’s Initiative, Out of Free Will. The Initiative suggested that people aged over 70 and who feel their lives are accomplished should be able to seek assisted dying because such people, if they feel they have no life left in them, should be able to say so and act upon it.​[780]​ On the subject of including within the Dutch Act provisions for assisted death in cases of existential suffering, Ost and Mullock conclude:

It is crucial to ensure that if it does become accepted medical and legal practice to extend the due care ‘suﬀering’ criterion to existential suﬀering, this practice is transparent so that all concerned can witness the eﬀects of this practice and if it is deemed to be an undesirable slide down the slippery slope, action can be taken.'​[781]​

The MSB agrees with the need for caution expressed in the above quotation. Despite it being predicated on the respect for autonomy, it is argued here that allowing assistance in dying to be sought by people whose suffering is almost impossible to objectively quantify would be a tricky and arguably contentious step to take. At present it does not appear that the Dutch authorities are willing to countenance such a change, but this fact alone cannot be used to discount the fact that calls for reform have been made.
 




In sum, the investigation carried out in this chapter has detailed and evaluated numerous arguments in favour of, and the most prevalent species of argument against reforming the law on euthanasia and PAS.  A dogmatic attitude towards the likelihood of abuse being occasioned by such reform, claiming it definitely will, or definitely will not happen, could not be taken as sound reasoning, for it is impossible to predict every eventuality and set of future circumstances which may or may not affect a practitioner and/or his patient.  On the evidence from the Netherlands however it is clear that legalising voluntary euthanasia has not caused a great slide down the slippery slope towards eugenics-based medical killing. This argument against reform can therefore be set aside in favour of the legal arguments for reform. It is also the case that presently legal ‘alternatives’ to reforming the law do not, when subjected to the MSB’s reasoning on acts and omissions, present workable alternatives at all. They, like the examples discussed in section 1.4.1 of chapter 1 of this work, perpetuate and, in the case of TS even exaggerate the MSB by allowing so called ‘passive’ deaths to be procured through the use of a chemical cosh, yet at the same time disavowing the utility of active assistance in dying. Plainly, it is claimed here, these things are one and the same.








































The preceding chapter outlined the arguments for and against reforming the law on PAS and euthanasia from a legal perspective. Though it was concluded that legally there is no substantive reason to NOT reform the law, especially in the light of the decision of the HL in Purdy,​[786]​ conclusions cannot be drawn as to whether reform would be a positive or negative step to take without first exploring the moral arguments entailed in taking it. 

Munby J in the case of Burke identified what he called ‘the ethical (bases) of the law’:

‘Our belief in the sanctity of life explains why we think it is almost always wrong to cause the death of another human being, even one who is terminally ill or so disabled that we think that if we were in his position we would rather be dead...But the sanctity of life is only one of a cluster of ethical principles which we apply to decisions about how we should live. Another is respect for the individual human being and in particular for his right to choose how he should live his own life. We call this individual autonomy or the right to self-determination. And another principle, closely connected, is respect for the dignity of the individual human being: our belief that quite irrespective of what the person concerned may think about it, it is wrong for someone to be humiliated or treated without respect for his value as a person.’​[787]​

These bases, the sanctity of life, the principle of autonomy and the respect for human dignity, suffuse almost all of the philosophical arguments in favour of reforming the law on AS and euthanasia, and, in part, inform the format of the preliminary sections of this chapter. A discussion of the principles of autonomy and dignity, those central to the arguments in favour of reform, would be incomplete without passing references to the sanctity of life, irrespective of the latter’s use as an argument against reform. Sanctity and numerous other opposing fronts will be dealt with in the chapter’s later sections.

The first argument posited in favour of reform concerns the principle of autonomy directly, and relies on Mill’s harm principle in arguing that both passive and active euthanasia are equally harmful to the ‘euthanised’ person’s autonomy. Given the professed equivalence of these forms of euthanasia under the MSB, it should be the case that either both are illegal, or both are legal. The offence the groundless denial of ‘active’ assistance in dying does to the dignity of the person requesting it is the second of the arguments in favour of reform. The assertion that reforming the law on assisted dying would in and of itself offend the intrinsic dignity of all persons will be rebuked, and the third argument in favour of reform, that respecting human dignity necessitates respect for autonomous choices will be made. The argument that reforming the law to allow assisted dying would make acting mercifully to alleviate suffering follows that on dignity, and is followed by an exploration of public opinion on the practice, before the chapter shifts its focus to the arguments against reform. 





In chapter 4 sections 4.2 and 4.4 of this work, Paterson’s appreciation of autonomy was discussed. According to Paterson the principle of autonomy is a ‘secondary’ or ‘facilitative good’, something that allows people to experience ‘primary goods’ more fully.​[788]​ In Paterson’s opinion, life, the main primary good, when it comes into conflict with a secondary good, prevails because of its status as a primary good. The MSB argued that autonomy and life are equal in terms of their status as goods, and did so by distinguishing the possession of autonomy from the exercise of autonomy. These two concepts, while distinct on the basis that one describes a possessed quality while the other describes the exercise of that quality, are symbiotic in that one cannot be truly autonomous without both.​[789]​ The importance of autonomy in the medical setting is made clear by the following quote from Young:

‘In a health-care setting, when a patient exercises her autonomy she decides which of the options for dealing with her health-care problem (including having no treatment at all) will be best for her, given her particular values, concerns and goals. A patient who makes autonomous choices about her health care is able to opt for what she considers will be best for her, all things considered.’​[790]​

The MSB supports Gillon​[791]​ and Biggs​[792]​ in breaking autonomy down into three interrelated and mutually reliant concepts: autonomy of action (AoA); autonomy of thought (AoT) and autonomy of will, intention or volition (AoW).​[793]​  These different kinds of autonomy are separate from those noted above, and can exist independently of each other. AoA describes the ability people have to control their bodily movements and functions. ‘The patient whose voluntary muscles are paralysed by curariforms but who is conscious because his anaesthetist has forgotten the nitrous oxide and who tries in vain to devise a way of stopping the surgeon cutting him...’​[794]​ has clearly lost his autonomy in this sense since he cannot act at all. Yet, despite this loss he is cognisant and therefore possesses AoT. This also includes intellectual activities like thinking for oneself, making decisions, believing things and making moral assessments. AoW on the other hand is the freedom to decide to do things and to act on the basis of one’s thoughts. These latter kinds of autonomy parallel the concepts of basic and complex intention defined in chapter 1 section 1.3.1a of this work. Basic intention, the deliberations behind action, is equivalent to AoT, and complex intention, the reasons for acting as one decides to, is AoW’s counterpart. 

In relying on the Gillon-Biggs paradigm the MSB makes certain assumptions about autonomy’s workings. It is possible to lack AoA whilst retaining one’s mental competence. Competence itself is measured at law with reference to how well a person can comprehend and retain information,​[795]​ and it is clear that one need not be in control of one’s bodily movements and functions in order to do this to the needed degree.​[796]​ AoT and AoW on the other hand are indispensible in describing autonomy as they concern mental functioning. Indeed it is arguable that without AoT, AoW could not exist because the lack of beliefs or desires, those things AoT allows, would make deciding to act in pursuance of a belief or desire impossible. 

The principle of respect for autonomy​[797]​ describes not autonomy itself, but the moral requirement to respect other people’s autonomy. Though all three kinds of autonomy can be impinged upon in different circumstances, it is AoA that concerns both philosophers and the law most often because of the tangible effects actions can have on others. The need for considered restrictions on the exercise of AoA is obvious. Without it, all deliberate courses of action, no matter how terrible their consequences, would need to be allowed on principle as autonomous acts. How the needed discrimination between actions is made is a matter of much debate. The MSB draws from those of Kant​[798]​ and Mill​[799]​ most predominantly.

Kant’s metaphysics divides what exists into two realms: the intelligible world (the word of reason) and the phenomenal world of sense perception. In both realms everything that exists works according to universal laws. Rational beings can act autonomously according to their understanding of these laws, while non-rational beings are acted upon, their behaviour causally necessitated or determined by outside causes. Respect for the autonomy of the rational person stems from their possession of a will, the equivalent of AoW, and they are seen in true Kantian fashion as ends in and of themselves, not as means to ends as non-rational beings are.

Mill​[800]​ and Hare​[801]​ agree, as the MSB does, with Kant’s premise regarding the existence of a moral obligation to respect people’s autonomy. The maximisation of human welfare, coupled with the avoidance of harm caused by unconstrained exercises of autonomy create the backbone of Millsian philosophy, and lend valuable assistance to the MSB in drawing the necessary lines between exercises of autonomy which must be fettered for the greater good and those which cannot be. To Mill:

‘...the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any moment of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’​[802]​

It was argued in chapter 4 sections 4.2.3 through 4.3 that autonomy should be the principle underlying estimations of the value of life, and that this would not negatively impact others involved with the patient who makes his autonomous choice to die. This supposition built upon sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.5 of chapter 3, which endeavoured to show that the courts already respect people’s autonomy in cases where ‘passive’ euthanasia is in their best interests and, if one takes withdrawing treatment as ‘a passive act’, when it is clear that the requesting patient is competent to request. This respect is arguably misplaced if, as chapter 1 of this work endeavoured to show, passive and active euthanasia are equivalent in all meaningful senses.​[803]​ It is therefore argued, taking Mill’s harm principle as the fulcrum upon which the rightness or wrongness of impinging upon an autonomous person’s exercise of that capacity (autonomy) is based, that equal harm is done in both the passive and active instances of euthanasia. This fact, according to the MSB and Rachel’s Equivalence thesis,​[804]​ dictates that both practices should either be legal or illegal.​[805]​

A number of possible reasons why one’s autonomy is routinely respected in the passive circumstance and not the active one were highlighted in section 3.5.1 of chapter 3 of this work. Of these, the protection of the autonomy of physicians was taken to be the most prominent reason why requests for active steps to be taken to procure death are routinely dismissed by the courts. Further to this observation it was argued that making a determination of such importance, to respect the patient’s autonomy or not to, based upon a semantic difference smacks of arbitrariness and the MSB argues just that in dismissing the act/omission distinction. Indeed Otlowski questions whether it is the involvement of a 3rd party and the impact on that person’s autonomy which makes the difference.​[806]​ She rightly points out that cases where active assistance is required are by their nature different to cases where the patient commits suicide due to pressure caused by the 3rd party’s presence.​[807]​ Whether it could be alleged that the willing assistant’s autonomy is being impacted by the patient’s wish for assistance is questionable though. Indeed, being possessed of autonomy, the assistant can always refuse just as the patient can change his mind.​[808]​

The MSB takes autonomy, explained by Young​[809]​ and Mill​[810]​ and as explored by Gillon​[811]​and Biggs​[812]​, as the principle which underlies almost all of the arguments in favour of reform. It was argued in chapter 4 of this work that allowing euthanasia and AS would not offend this principle, and that choice, a component part of AoW, when exercised by a person who is mentally competent to do so, should be respected. Not doing so would offend the inherent dignity of all persons because autonomy and its exercise are component parts of that quality. Biggs put it best:





In the context of euthanasia and AS a ‘dignified’ death or a death ‘with dignity’ is taken to mean one free of pain and suffering. ​[814]​  One can appear ‘dignified’ through one’s manner of dress or one’s actions but these are simply outward manifestations of the idea itself. It is a human concept, borne out through the person himself rather than his apparel or mannerisms, and also something innate which can be attacked by ‘indignity’, specifically that brought on by disease or desperate injury which may be present during the last days, weeks, months or years of a person’s life. It is manifested, in part, by the ability to think and reason, conceptualise the abstract, learn, empathise and communicate.

The exact meaning of the phrase ‘dignity’ on the other hand is, in Schachter’s opinion, left to ‘intuitive understanding’ rather than being clearly conceptualised.​[815]​ Similarly Gaylin notes that certain concepts, like certain books with cachet, are prominently ‘displayed’ and discussed in intellectual abodes while remaining essentially unexplored. Human dignity is one such concept.​[816]​ That said, there have been cogent attempts at giving the ethereal concept form, both in legal documents and in academic commentary. Kilner for example suggests that there are a number of more specific features associated with appeals to human dignity. He states that the concept is usually called on:

‘…in situations in which the worth of human beings is brought into question when they are used, forced, or injured. Human beings should not be used because their dignity requires that they be treated as having intrinsic, not merely instrumental, worth. They should not usually be forced because their dignity mandates that their wishes be respected. They should not normally be injured because their dignity entails that their well-being be preserved.’​[817]​

Schachter too provides points of definition. Drawing on Kant’s supposition regarding not using people solely as means to ends, he suggests that supporting human dignity requires respecting ‘the will and consent’ of individuals, avoiding coercion and recognising that an individual is ‘entitled to have his or her beliefs, attitudes, ideas and feelings’.​[818]​

Legal definitions of dignity are also abundant, especially throughout international Charters and Treaties concerning human rights. One of the most familiar is contained in the Charter of the United Nations. It highlights the need to support the ‘inherent dignity…of all members of the human family.’​[819]​ The UN also supports the idea of human dignity in its 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights of which Article 1 states:
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity…they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’​[820]​

The background against which this Declaration was created explains its deep commitment to recognising and upholding human rights. In the aftermath of the Second World War a ‘legion of abuses that deprived many of life’​[821]​ were committed under the guise of healthcare. Pence​[822]​ comments on the experiments conducted by many factions; the Japanese physicians who carried out deadly experiments on Chinese prisoners of war and the German physicians, sympathetic to the Nazi ideology  who subjected ‘undesirables’, the mentally ill, homosexuals and the Jewish, to experimentation and ‘euthanasia’. The commitment to protecting human dignity in the wake of such atrocities was and is still clearly intended to prevent its recurrence.​[823]​

More contemporary documents reaffirm the international community’s commitment to preserving human dignity. Take for example the Preamble of the 1997 Oviedo Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention of Human Rights and Biomedicine (OC 1997). The Council of Europe states that signatories of the document state themselves to be ‘…conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human dignity’.​[824]​ Article 1 of the same document states that ‘Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings…’​[825]​

Allusions to dignity are also made in case law. Munby J in the case of Burke v. GMC​[826]​ points out its link with autonomy:​[827]​

‘(A principle) closely connected (to respect for autonomy)...is respect for the dignity of the individual human being: our belief that quite irrespective of what the person concerned may think about it, it is wrong for someone to be humiliated or treated without respect for his value as a person.’​[828]​


Dignity is also referenced specifically in the cases of Pretty​[829]​ and Glass.​[830]​ In the former the Court noted that ‘the very essence of the Convention is the respect for human dignity and human freedom’​[831]​ and in the latter the Court referred explicitly to the OC 1997 in ruling that the provision of diamorphine against a minor patient’s parents wishes breached Article 8 of the ECHR. Indeed in R (A and B) v. East Sussex County Council dignity was described as 

‘...one of the core values – in truth the core value – of our society and, indeed, of all societies which are part of the European family of nations which have embraced the principles of the Convention.’​[832]​

Despite the obvious prevalence of dignity and the lexis surrounding it, it is accurate to point out that the abovementioned documents and case examples do not define the concept exhaustively, if any attempts are made at all. The European Convention on Human Rights does little to add to the clarity of the concept in that it makes no explicit mention of dignity in its provisions at all. The closest approximation within the Articles of the Convention are Article 3, the right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment, and Article 8, the right to privacy, both of which were relied on by Munby J in the Burke case in arguing that the GMC’s Guidelines on the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition did not adequately protect Mr Burke’s rights. 

Dupré, in her article ‘Human Dignity and the Withdrawal of Medical Treatment: A Missed Opportunity?’​[833]​ takes on the ECtHR judgement in Burke and uses its perceived shortcomings to suggest a more holistic, well rounded understanding of human dignity. She contends that the Court’s judgement in that case is flawed in three ways. Firstly, by emphasising the presumption in favour of prolonging life, the Court did not respond to Burke’s concerns. He was not satisfied with this presumption under the GMC Guidelines, and wanted a guarantee that his life would not be shortened by starvation. Secondly, the reference to the Glass​[834]​ case in relation to Article 2 is misplaced because that case’s crux was Article 8 and consent to the administration of diamorphine to a severely mentally and physically disabled child with a respiratory infection. Thirdly, the reference to a doctor’s obligation to take account of the patient’s wishes is ambiguous. While it is true that doctors might consider those wishes, the CA made it clear that the best interests test has to remain objective and the patient’s wishes cannot override medical expertise. At no point in its judgement however did the ECtHR mention dignity, the very crux of Mr Burke’s application in Munby J’s opinion.​[835]​

To Dupré, the Court, by neglecting to investigate the concept of dignity, effectively halted the jurisprudential exploration of the topic for the time being. Furthermore, by dismissing Article 2 as irrelevant to Burke’s case a paradox is created between the state’s duty to respect the right to life and the applicant’s inevitable death should his Artificial Nutrition and Hydration (ANH) be withdrawn as he feared. This dismissal was repeated through the case’s successive appeals. The HC held:

‘Article 2 does not entitle anyone to continue with life-prolonging treatment where to do so would expose the patient to ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ breaching Article 3. On the other hand, a withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment which satisfies the exacting requirements of the Common Law, including a proper application of the intolerability test, and in a manner, which is in all other respects compatible with the patient’s rights under Article 3 and Article 6, will not give rise to any breach of Article 2.’​[836]​

In line with Dupré’s argument, the MSB contends that the Article 2 right to life has been objectively applied and misshapen in the Burke judgement.  It was applied from the point of view of the medical team and their obligation not to force life-prolonging treatment on a patient where this would lead to the breaches of Articles 3 and 8 mentioned in the HC quotation, not from the perspective of the patient himself. The paradox here is that while PVS patients are protected from needless or futile treatment that would prolong their life, Burke could not get a guarantee that his life would not be shortened by the withdrawal of ANH. Mr Burke was asking for a treatment he would need not to be withdrawn, he was not asking for the specific treatment to be given (though this is implied), but a person in no fit state to ask for such maintenance may be granted it on the basis of his Article 2 and 3 rights if such treatment is in his best interests.

Moving away from Burke’s predicament, there are deeply contrary views held by thinkers on the polar ends of the euthanasia debate regarding the effect reforming the law would have on human dignity. On the ‘pro-reform’ pole the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (VES) states ‘…our vision is for everyone to be guaranteed choice and dignity at the end of their life, to help take away the fear of the process of dying.’​[837]​ The human rights group ‘Liberty’ quotes Dianne Pretty as saying that her legal fight to get amnesty for her husband should he assist her in committing suicide was based on her desire to secure ‘…the right to die at the time of my choosing, with dignity…’​[838]​ 

By contrast, the Catholic Church views reform to the law, especially that regarding legalising euthanasia, as an attack on human dignity:

‘…no one is permitted to ask for this act of killing, either for himself or herself or for another person entrusted to his or her care, nor can he or she consent to it, either explicitly or implicitly, nor can any authority legitimately recommend or permit such an action. For it is a question of the violation of the divine law, an offence against the dignity of the human person, a crime against life, and an attack on humanity at the beginning and end of life.’​[839]​

The Church’s objections to reform will be discussed in detail in sections 6.5 through 6.5.1.c of this chapter. For now it is enough to note that the principle of human dignity can be used to argue both for and against legal change. But, regardless of this malleability, concerns have been raised about dignity’s usefulness in the debate on PAS and euthanasia. Horton, for example, notes that human dignity ‘…is a linguistic currency that will buy a basketful of extraordinary meanings.’​[840]​ Macklin expresses an even deeper concern as she notes ‘dignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and can be eliminated without any loss of content.’​[841]​ She feels that ‘…appeals to dignity are either vague restatements of other, more precise, notions or are mere slogans that add nothing to an understanding of the topic…’ and as such, in the context of requests for assistance in dying ‘…dignity seems to be nothing other than respect for autonomy.’​[842]​ 

Such an argument is partially supported by the efforts of those like Schachter​[843]​ and Kilner​[844]​ to explain the content of human dignity by drawing on concepts like rationality, the capacity for choice and personal freedom and again affirms autonomy’s central place in the debate regarding PAS and euthanasia. This notion does not hold however, in McLean’s opinion, in cases where the perceived quality we are seeking to protect is hard to identify.​[845]​  She uses the example of an embryo that by its nature cannot exercise choice or possess autonomy. In such cases the dilemmas do not relate to these non-existent qualities, but to a value or worth (dignity) that is difficult to discern.​[846]​

The question of the intrinsic worth of the human being has been discussed in chapter 4, and the MSB’s position on that worth is clear. Human life is felt to be valuable because of all it facilitates: enjoyment, fulfilment, a sense of worth and so on. This value can be assessed by both objective parties and by the person living the life in question, and it is the subjective value which is felt to be of paramount importance. On this logic, since the embryo itself does not possess the ability to value its existence (indeed until it is separated from its mother after birth it is considered a legal non-person), the valuation would come from its mother. It would be her choice whether or not to continue with her pregnancy and her choice in doing so, much like that of the competent person who seeks assistance in dying, should be respected providing she is competent to make it. 





Another related though tangential argument forming the backbone of the case for reform to the law is the need to alleviate pain and suffering and to prevent cruelty.​[847]​ Advocates of reform, Harris,​[848]​ Rachels​[849]​ and Otlowski​[850]​ for example, argue that maintaining the complete prohibition on euthanasia and PAS amounts to cruel and degrading treatment and that cruelty is an evil which must be avoided as far as possible. They argue that in circumstances where there is no reasonable prospect of recovery, considerations of common sense and compassion dictate that patients should be allowed a merciful release from prolonged and useless suffering. 

In response to a question regarding the role of the physician in the terminal phases of a patient’s illness ‘Doctor 9’ said:

“A lot of colleagues...see a doctor’s role as being to promote life. As a default. I disagree with that view, I don’t think our role is to prolong or promote life. I think we have a duty towards health. The goals of medicine include enabling a peaceful or well palliated death. So indeed if we are saying that we can reasonably omit certain interventions with the clear intention of withholding them because they’re burdensome and futile, specifically because we want to enable comfortable end of life, you can’t escape the euthanasia debate on that...because we’re saying we want to promote a well palliated death.”​[851]​


Though there is no explicit mention of ‘mercy’ in the quotation, there is a clear inclination on the part of Doctor 9 to put the proper palliation of a patient before prolonging his life. The withdrawal of burdensome or futile treatments, something this participant was reticent to call an ‘omission’ of treatment since he felt ‘...that acts and omissions make things happen and that you’re as culpable for your omissions as you are for your acts’,​[852]​ is a necessary and indeed merciful part of proper medical practice. ‘Doctor 13’ recognised this when he spoke of the reasons behind withdrawing or withholding burdensome treatment:

“...there comes a time when the measures being used to hold back the illness are...usually so burdensome that it’s causing the patient distress. Or the treatments aren’t working. Those are the times to think about withdrawing treatment. Now there are areas where there is limited evidence as to whether things are beneficial...things like artificial hydration...And hospice philosophy has always been about not giving people drips. If you go into A&E everyone has a drip as soon as they come through the door. We like to think that we think a bit more about that. The thing I used to really hate as a junior doctor was seeing a patient on a ward, that you knew in your heart of hearts was dying. But nobody would recognise that and you’d be carrying on with this treatment. I’d have to go back and try to canulate them. When people are that ill they’re quite swollen and it’d be difficult to apply the treatment. It distressed me and them.”

It is clear that both Doctors 9 and 13 feel that it is the right, merciful thing to do in the terminal phases of an illness to withdraw treatment which causes distress to a patient. Neither of them however could countenance withdrawing a treatment from a patient which was necessary to keep that patient alive if he was not in that terminal phase.​[853]​ 

An obvious difficulty raised by situations like this is the conflict between the doctor’s duty to save life and the duty to prevent cruelty and relieve suffering. Otlowski argues that this conflict can be resolved by ‘…holding that where a patient has voluntarily requested active euthanasia, the greater duty is to accede to the patient’s request and avoid unnecessary suffering.’​[854]​ While this premise is agreed with here, it appears too sweeping a statement to be justifiable. Were it taken at face value, it would appear to impose a duty upon practitioners who did not wish to assist such a patient, regardless of their own autonomous choice not to. Kohl argues in a similar vein by advocating ‘beneficent euthanasia’.​[855]​ According to this argument active euthanasia is a ‘kind’ treatment, and since society and its members have a prima facie obligation to treat members kindly, it follows that beneficent euthanasia is a prima facie obligation.

It must be noted that Kohl supports both active voluntary euthanasia and non-voluntary euthanasia in some circumstances. This is a position staunchly opposed by the MSB, based as it is on the preservation of personal choice, but nevertheless there is merit in Kohl’s contribution to the debate. It highlights that active euthanasia is a means of minimising suffering and maximising kind and loving treatment of patients. The imposition of a prima facie duty to assist patients is wrongful however, and would be best avoided by giving the physician a choice as to whether or not to assist the patient, and, should he or she not wish to, providing the patient with the means to locate a practitioner who is willing to assist.

Another facet to the ‘prevention of cruelty’ argument is that which concerns the patient’s control over the remaining weeks, months or years of his life. Although reform obviously cannot remove all of the pain and suffering associated with terminal illness, it would significantly reduce the burden on patients by placing the power to end a miserable existence under their full control.​[856]​ This empowerment may improve the quality of life experienced by the patient as he would have the assurance that he could control the time and manner of his death when it came. Such appears to be the case in Oregon, where statistics show that almost all of those patients who receive the lethal prescription under the Death with Dignity Act do not use it.​[857]​ 

Opponents of reforming the law to permit AS or euthanasia, Lavi​[858]​ most vocally, have sought to undermine arguments for it centred on the prevention of cruelty and the need for merciful treatment by suggesting that the underlying concepts, ‘mercy’ and ‘prevention of cruelty’, are flexible and open to abuse and interpretation. This may, with time, result in an ever-increasing category of candidates for active euthanasia.​[859]​ 

These assertions however are equally as challengeable as the issues they contest. Prima facie, Lavi’s claim that the breadth of interpretation allowed by the concepts of mercy and the prevention of cruelty engenders a risk that malefactors will abuse them to carry out their crimes appears accurate. Wider definitions, by their very nature, provide opportunities for issues to come to light which may not have been possible under a more restricted lexis. However, taking this observation and using it to imply that physicians (for active euthanasia by definition is performed by practitioners) would, under the cloak of mercy, engage in widespread active euthanasia against their patient’s consent is unquestionably farfetched. It assumes that there may be a propensity for physicians to use euthanasia simply because it is available as an option, and that it may end up being legitimately employed in questionable circumstances i.e. where a patient either did not or could not consent to its use. 

Evidence against Lavi’s claims was cited in section 5.7.1 of chapter 5 of this work, where the Dutch experience of having legalised active euthanasia was discussed.​[860]​ While it is acknowledged that there was evidence of a small amount of non-voluntary euthanasia being performed, this finding did not represent the ‘slide’ down the slippery slope to eugenics-based mass killing warned of by Lavi and other opponents of reform.​[861]​ Indeed van der Maas et al noted that the situations where non-voluntary euthanasia had occurred were akin to those where the DDE is employed in English law and were therefore not as indicative of malfeasance as the terminology implies.​[862]​ 

Another facet of Lavi’s argument against using mercy as a vehicle for promoting AS or euthanasia is based on the observation that modern society evidences a marked intolerance for pain.​[863]​ Lavi contends that countenancing AS and euthanasia is a kneejerk reaction to this intolerance, an argument also made by Herring, who laments the societal disdain for discomfort in a similar manner and argues that ‘we need to recapture an appreciation for pain.’​[864]​ A more thorough discussion of this issue will take place in section 6.5.1.c. At present it suffices to say that, predicated on an appreciation for personal autonomy as it is, the MSB would leave it to the patient to gauge whether or not he ‘appreciates’ the pain he is in, or if instead he desires relief from it. 

According to Tang, Aarason and Forbes,​[865]​ access to appropriate support and pain control are the key to avoiding assisted dying. They allege that the quality of life of those who consider ending their lives is maximised when they can receive support from a live-in carer or access to in-patient hospice care on a regular basis. This support was found to provide a sense of existential comfort for the people being cared for and lessened the likelihood of their resorting to requesting or seeking assistance in dying.​[866]​ Easy access to palliative care is therefore, according to Tang et al, crucial in stopping the kneejerk reaction to pain Lavi noted and in halting reliance on AS or euthanasia.





Throughout recent history, public support for assisted dying has been steadily increasing, and this fact cannot be ignored when exploring the moral reasons for effecting reform to the law. Public opinion is both an accurate reflection of the importance of debating assisted dying, and also an indispensible source of evidence from which this work can draw in discussing the appropriateness of reforming the law. 

Public opinion is also a deeply necessary facet of the argument proponents of reform make. Since they began in the 1930’s, opinion polls have been drawn together on the topic of euthanasia and PAS and have shown, generally speaking, a trend towards acceptance of the practices.


‘Graph 1’ above evinces this trend with reference to results catalogued in the Gallup Polls. The sample group was asked the following question,

“When a person has a disease that cannot be cured and is living in severe pain, do you think doctors should or should not be allowed by law to assist the patient to commit suicide if the patient requests it?”​[870]​

It is telling that the steady increase in support for PAS only loses pace once, in the 1950 set, before increasing again. This drop is most likely due to a public backlash against the use of euthanasia for eugenic purposes during World War 2 and, though these practices are still cited today by opponents of euthanasia specifically, or any reform to the law regarding it for that matter, the figures in Graph 1 show that publicly the unease has settled.

There were no statistically significant differences between respondents in terms of age, sex or economic class, though religious beliefs, unsurprisingly, accounted for a percentage difference. Though the main groups showed overall support for euthanasia, Catholics were less inclined to be supportive than those in the Church of England or Atheists; 75%, 80% and 93% of those groups respectively.​[871]​

Furthermore it was found that younger respondents appeared to be more in favour of euthanasia than older ones were. Perhaps this can be explained with reference to the perceived distance felt by those younger respondents from the need for euthanasia compared to older people who, even though they may never wish to be ‘euthanised’ themselves, felt it is something of a danger to older people. The ‘distance’ between the younger respondents and the debated topic could necessitate them putting themselves into the shoes of a person who would consider euthanasia in order to best form their opinions on the topic. However, putting on another’s shoes is not the same, quite obviously, as being personally in the situation where euthanasia may be an option. 

It is also highly probable that younger participants have a stricter set of criteria by which they define a ‘life worth living’ as opposed to older ones. That is not to say that either group is more correct that the other, only to point out that opinions can very often change with time. Recall from chapter 4 section 4.2 of this work Doctor 2’s recollection of a discussion he had with Baroness Warnock on this issue:

‘…she said I will not (change my mind about how I wish to die). And the thing that I couldn’t help but say, and I made an apology for saying it…“You’re utterly convinced of that. So were the last 20 people who said it.” But they DID! “You may be the exception. You’re probably the brightest of them.” But interestingly she said something else in another conversation. “When I was 35 I wouldn’t have thought that living at 85, half blind and half deaf would be acceptable. Now I find it’s not so bad.” So, there’s some change in her mind. Clearly I don’t say that for a moment in criticism. It’s the only logical and reasonable position...to be prepared to change your mind in light of changing circumstances (emphasis added).’​[872]​

As ‘Doctor 2’ noted, and indeed Baroness Warnock implied, one cannot say for sure, when one is young and healthy, that one would consider a certain quality of life or mode of living unacceptable, for until one finds oneself in the situation discussed, half blind and half deaf in Baroness Warnock’s case, one cannot rightly assume to know that such a life is not worth living. As chapter 3 made clear, it is up to the person him or herself to decide the quality of his or her life and the value of its continuation.

However, the support the general public have for euthanasia and reform more generally is not, it is often claimed, supported by the medical profession as a whole. The true state of affairs is difficult to ascertain, but to date, during the empirical portion of the research for this PhD, 6 of the 13 practitioners interviewed expressed support for reform. The divided nature of the debate however is well evidenced by the articles published by major newspapers and their affiliate websites. A June 2006 issue of the Daily Mail for example published figures claiming that 65% of doctors polled by the BMA voted in favour of overturning the BMA’s neutral position on assisted dying.​[873]​ Three years later, the issue published on the 14th of July reported that Prime Minister Gordon Brown was ‘totally against’ relaxing the law on assisted suicide.​[874]​ Another issue quoted figures showing a third of nurses were in favour of assisted suicide,​[875]​ and another lamented the dilemma faced by nurses because of a ‘surge’ in requests for assisted suicide.​[876]​ Surge or not, a debate published in the Telegraph online cited the warning given by Ms Barbara Wilding, a senior policewoman who proclaimed: 

‘...relaxation of assisted suicide laws could be exploited by families to kill burdensome elderly relatives...a growing rift between young and old generations, combined with the pressures of an ageing population, is a significant challenge for police.’​[877]​

Exchanges of letters from the public published in the same newspaper expose again the polarity of the debate. Mr John Murray (author of one of the numerous letters) can be quoted in response to the assertion of Professor John Milbank that assisted suicide denies the value of life, as saying:
‘I wonder if Prof Milbank would propound the same views had he nursed his wife through unimaginable pain as she succumbed to terminal cancer. I did that – and I assure him that my view is most definitely not a ‘manipulated view of the majority.’​[878]​
A contrary view was noted by a Dr Trevor Stammers who felt that ‘...if we move towards an NHS where physician-assisted suicide is legal, hospital wards will surely become even more to be feared. Compassion endures, not kills, when it cannot cure.’​[879]​ This fractional representation of the true scale of the public debate gives an idea of how divided opinions are. 

The MSB, in placing itself within this panoply, agrees with Dr Stammers’ opinion to a point. It cannot be denied that compassion is likely the most pervasive of all of the motivations behind the work of conscientious physicians, no matter their specialisation or acquaintance with end of life care. However, on the logic employed by this work regarding the non-distinction between ‘letting die’ passively and ‘causing death’ actively, Dr Stammers’ supposition that physicians do not cause death on occasion when acting compassionately and ensuring their patients are comfortable is fallacious. As section 5.7 of chapter 5 made clear, provided the MSB’s reasoning is sound, the feared ‘bottom’ of the slippery slope has long been reached in England and Wales through the use of supposedly ‘passive’ euthanasia and the doctrine of double effect. That said, the arguments made by Dr Stammers and others like him cannot simply be discounted on account of the MSB’s precepts. The coming sections will take up Dr Stammers’ viewpoint in espousing the moral arguments against reforming the law.

6.5 Moral arguments against reform 

Like the arguments for reform, those against it come from numerous sources. It is not an overestimation however to note that two thirds of them are based at least partially in theological doctrines and the teachings of various religious schools of thought. It was noted earlier in chapter 4 section 4.2.1, and section 6.2 of chapter 6 that the Catholic Church may be quoted as feeling that euthanasia, and by implication any reform to the law concerning euthanasia, are attacks on the inherent dignity possessed by all people. Thus, in 2004, Pope John Paul II could state:

‘Euthanasia is one of those tragedies caused by an ethic that claims to dictate who should live and who should die. Even if it is motivated by sentiments of a misconstrued compassion or of a misunderstood preservation of dignity, euthanasia actually eliminates the person instead of relieving the individual of suffering.’​[880]​

While his Holiness’ point of view is as valid as those expressed in favour of reform, his seeming dismissal of the pro-euthanasia movement on the grounds that proponents of it do not share his understanding of compassion and dignity lacks weight. The dismissal is spurious because, as with personal opinions and ethical beliefs, not all people possess the same understanding of religion, if they chose to be part of one at all. Dismissing a non-Christian belief system simply because it is non-Christian is as unfair as dismissing a Christian belief offhandedly would be. As such, the preliminary sections of this half of the chapter will be focused on analysing and evaluating the main religious arguments opposing reform.

6.5.1 Religious arguments against reform

Religious unease surrounding euthanasia stems from four main beliefs; 

1.	that reform would be against the will of God, 
2.	that it offends the sanctity of life,
3.	that it goes against the prohibition on intentional killing and, 
4.	that there is value in human suffering. 

Each point will be discussed in turn, though the sanctity of life has been discussed at length in section 4.2.1 chapter 4 of this work and therefore needs little in the way of re-explanation here. 


6.5.1a Reform/euthanasia is contrary to the will of God

The will of the Abrahamic God is said to be contained within the Ten Commandments, the 6th of which expressly forbids killing one’s fellow man. Since both euthanasia and PAS entail killing, they, like murder, are expressly forbidden and any attempts to make either permissible would therefore be contrary to God’s will. 

Conclusive as this commandment may sound however, its dictates are subject to interpretation. Huxtable for example has made it clear that the phrase ‘thou shalt not kill’ should be regarded as ‘do not murder’.​[881]​ Arguably then, and while the MSB does not advocate such a thing, a law which makes euthanasia or PAS legal would circumvent ‘God’s’ prohibition without issue. 

Gula also points out that an examination of the biblical texts reveals that it was never understood as an absolute prohibition on the taking of human life.​[882]​ The Judeo-Christian tradition has always recognised that in certain circumstances intentional killing may be permissible. For example, in the context of a just war one may kill one’s enemy; capital punishment can be exacted on a lawfully convicted felon; and one may legitimately kill one’s attacker in self-defence if that attacker caused mortal danger.​[883]​ However, in the context of end-of-life decision making, the Commandment prohibiting killing has been understood to preclude the intentional termination of human life.​[884]​

A testament to how variable the interpretations of ‘God’s will’ can be comes from the work of David Hume,​[885]​ who framed a canny debate between himself and ‘God’, one which is employed in the coming section on the sanctity of life, which exposes the scriptures’ weakness regarding subjective interpretation. His monologue shifts between his argument and ‘God’s’ rejoinders (italicised):

‘…But you are placed by providence, like a sentinel, in a particular station; and when you desert it without being recalled, you are equally guilty of rebellion against your Almighty Sovereign, and have incurred his displeasure. I ask, Why do you conclude that Providence has placed me in this station? For my part, I find that I owe my birth to a long chain of causes, of which many depended upon voluntary actions of men. But Providence guided all these causes, and nothing happens in the universe without its consent and cooperation. If so, neither does my death, however voluntary, happen without its consent; and whenever pain or sorrow so far overcome my patience as to make me tired of life, I may conclude that I am recalled from my station in the clearest and most express terms.’​[886]​

Given how affected by interpretation the implications of scripture can be, it is questionable whether it is just to impose ‘God’s’ will on people who do not subscribe to religion. ‘Doctor 4’ made this point clearly, “One thing I always find difficult is the argument that people have...to ban euthanasia just because people enforce their religious cultural values on others.”​[887]​ 

The MSB, as evidenced in chapter 4 section 4.3, bases its moral stance on ethics derived from opinions like Doctor 4’s. It is for the person who is faced with making choices about his life to make them on the basis of his personal morality. Consequently, stating that a person’s actions are contrary to God’s will is appropriate as an expression of one’s own beliefs, but one must not thrust those beliefs upon the actor in question and seek to influence him on the basis of a belief system he is not a party to.  Thus, the argument that suggesting reform to the law on assisted dying should be stopped because it offends God’s will is inherently wrong, because it discounts the beliefs of those proponents of reform who do not subscribe to a particular religion, or upon those who do, and have no problem reconciling their faith with their views on assisted dying.


6.5.1b The sanctity of life and the prohibition on intentional killing

This section covers both the overarching principle of the sanctity of life and the prohibition on intention killing because, by their nature, the two are inextricably linked. There would likely be no prohibition on intentional killing, or killing of any kind for that matter, if human life was not considered sacred or overwhelmingly important in some sense. The sanctity of life, according to religious teachings, accrues through the fact that God created man in his own image. God is therefore felt to be the true ‘owner’ of human life and it is believed by those who subscribe to religious teachings that He alone may decide when life is to come to an end.​[888]​

Sanctity though is not a purely religious concept, though its terminology is more or less defined by theological thought. As chapter 4 of this work discussed, there are numerous schools of thought on the sanctity and worth of human life, both to society as a whole and to the individual personally.​[889]​ Paterson makes a persuasive argument, discussed in section 4.4 of chapter 4 that life is a primary and therefore overriding ‘good’​[890]​ and Harris,​[891]​ Rachels,​[892]​ Biggs​[893]​ and Brazier​[894]​amongst many other secular writers make compelling cases for life having some inalienable quality to it which set it apart from other aspects of the human condition.

It is unquestionable however, despite the fact that life is considered ‘sacred’ by both religious and non-religious thinkers, that that quality does not preclude all actions which threaten life. As Gula pointed out in the preceding section, there are situations, war, legal punishment and self-defence to list three, where it is quite legitimate to kill.​[895]​ The legitimacy of killing in war is written into the definition of murder, it being the ‘unlawful killing of a human being under the Queen’s peace...(italics added)’.​[896]​ The same is true of legitimate self-defence and capital punishment – the reference to ‘unlawful’ killing presupposing that certain kinds are lawful. 

Arguably the people who die in the above circumstances are not innocent. Two of them, the felon and the aggressor, participated in illegal acts to the detriment of others, and the soldier was acting out his duty in attacking an enemy. While he may not be acting illegally in doing so, the threat of death is operative both on him and the person he is looking to attack. Neither is innocent in that sense, no matter whose side they are on. The patient looking to have his life ended however is likely entirely innocent. Therefore, ending his life irrespective of his desire to have it ended is seen as palpably wrong since he has done nothing to warrant its end. 

Again though it must be questioned on what grounds this prohibition stands. If it is imposed against the backdrop of a purely religious point of view, the argument in section 6.5.1a regarding the will of God and imposing it on those who do not share in the imposer’s beliefs can again be reiterated here. If it is not, and the presumption of innocence is touted as a reason not to allow euthanasia or AS, the MSB tackles the repost thus: if indeed the presumption of innocence is to protect people from having their lives shortened medically, why are passive euthanasia and situations necessitating reliance on the doctrine of double effect looked upon any differently than active euthanasia and AS? They are, this work claims, equivalent in their ends and means, making the distinction between them groundless. 

6.5.1.c The value of suffering

Another ground of religious objection to reforming the law stems from the Christian belief in the value of human suffering. According to Christian teaching, physical suffering is not an absolute evil, devoid of purpose. Rather, it is seen as having a special place in God’s divine plan for the universe, allowing an opportunity for the sufferer’s spiritual growth and a means of redemption.​[897]​ Contemporary writers like Herring and Lavi​[898]​ reiterate this sentiment, the former of the pair having already been quoted in section 6.3 of this work as feeling that modern society needs to reacquaint itself with an appreciation for pain.​[899]​ Furthermore, those who are in contact with a suffering patient are given an opportunity to practice Christian charity.​[900]​

This supposition has been vigorously attacked by numerous commentators, Fletcher,​[901]​ Maguire​[902]​ and Williams​[903]​ most prominently. Fletcher notes, if suffering was indeed part of God’s divine plan which must be respected, we should not be able to give our moral approval to anaesthetics or to provide any medical relief to human suffering. As section 6.3 of this chapter noted however, those who take suffering to be a virtue are in a distinct minority. The MSB too disdains the idea that suffering, if it can be abated with palliative care or other measures, should be needlessly endured (unless the person enduring it wishes to).​[904]​ A mind clouded by pain and a body wracked with it are not appropriate vehicles through which to enjoy the remaining days or weeks of one’s life and it is dangerous to presume otherwise, just as it is dangerous to presume that euthanasia or AS are the only way one may comfortably end life.  

The question of palliative care’s place in medicine is also raised by the belief that pain is a virtue. If it is one, many people are being denied its experience because of their reliance on palliative care. The implications of a dogmatic application of this ideal undermine the entirety of the hospice movement and the advances made in palliative medicine and this is not an implication that sits comfortably with the MSB in any way.  While it advocates personal choice regarding AS and euthanasia, it nowhere implies in doing so that the role of palliative care should be diminished or limited. Indeed it recognises that an increase in the availability of counselling and palliative alternatives to AS and euthanasia will be required if reform to the law that provides avenues to assisted dying in those forms are opened.

The preceding discussion has focused solely upon the possibility that patients may find some kind of worth in suffering at the end of their lives and the implications of this on end of life care. Section 6.6 moves on from this issue to consider the impact reforming the law might have on the physicians involved in end of life care. It will argue that there is an element of psychological assistance lent to physicians by the doctrines the MSB deems discredited, and will explore whether reforming the law will cancel out this assistance, making reform a negative step to take.

6.6 Psychological assistance for the doctor involved

Section 3.5.1 of chapter 3 cited the psychological wellbeing of physicians as being of paramount importance as an example of why the courts disdain acceding to the requests of patients for leave to seek active assistance in dying, and that supposition is an apt place to begin this section.​[905]​ Recall from that section the work of Doctor Kenneth Stevens, Vice-President of Physicians for Compassionate Care and author of a report on the effect performing euthanasia has on physicians. On the issue of providing euthanasia one of his respondents noted,

“My point is that, because doctors find the request so difficult – the most difficult request you can get as a doctor – that, in itself, is the reason why they try to find whatever way they can not to do it.”​[906]​

This opinion, as the quotations in section 3.5.1 made clear, accords with the majority of those given pursuant to Dr Stevens’ study, but not, interestingly, with the findings of Emanuel et al​[907]​ and Meier et al.​[908]​ The former reported, following structured in-depth telephone interviews with randomly selected oncologists from the United States, that 53% of the physicians received comfort from having helped a patient with euthanasia or PAS, 24% regretted having performed either and 16% reported that the emotional burden of euthanasia or PAS adversely affected their medical practice. 

Clearly, while there is a marked unease surrounding assisting death in either manner, Emanuel et al found that it is not so pervasive as to affect every one of the participants asked. In fact the number of physicians who felt comforted by being able to assist is over double the number who regretted doing so. This finding is backed up by the work Meier et al undertook. 81 physicians who had acknowledged performing euthanasia or PAS responded to a mail survey regarding their feelings about having done so (47% were prescriptions, 53% were injections). 18% of the respondents reported feeling somewhat uncomfortable with their role in writing a lethal prescription, compared to less than 1% feeling very uncomfortable with their role in writing one.​[909]​

As with Emanuel et al’s findings, a greater proportion of the participants in the Meier study were not uncomfortable with their actions than were uncomfortable with them. That does not mean of course that the sentiments expressed in the quotations are inaccurate or unrepresentative of those physicians’ personal experiences. However there does not appear, going on this data, to be the marked discomfort with assisted dying that one would expect if the practice itself brutalized or had marked negative effects on those performing it.

Be that as it may, the impact of working in a situation where PAS or euthanasia may be brought up or performed on the psychological wellbeing of the physicians involved cannot be underestimated. The likelihood of practitioners having coping mechanisms to allow them to work to their best capacity in high-stress scenarios is acknowledged by this work, and it is only right that the law, when it and the practice of medicine intersect, provides equal recognition. This recognition, the MSB claims, comes in the form of passive euthanasia and the doctrine of double effect. Both of these doctrines provide physicians with Soma for their consciences by allowing them to distance themselves from the consequences of their actions, as discussed in chapters 1 and 2, by claiming that it was either an omission of treatment that caused the patient’s death, or that they did not intend the death.​[910]​

In dismissing these mechanisms the MSB does not likewise dismiss their psychological importance to physicians. Nowhere in the MSB’s reasoning is the use of passive euthanasia or reliance on the DDE labelled as wrong or immoral. Indeed, if their use facilitates the proper care and management of patients and ensures that practitioners are left with a clear conscience, their presence is undoubtedly a good thing.

This recognition however does not blunt the fact that the MSB claims that the contested distinctions, as well as affording the necessary psychological protection for physicians, allows the truth of the physicians actions to go unacknowledged. They allow for, according to Harris ‘...comprehensive self-delusion’​[911]​ regarding the actuality of those actions (or purported inactions in the case of omitting treatment) and make their practice more easily commensurable to practitioners’ moral stances. 

When asked about the MSB, the distinction it draws between acts and omissions and the reasons that distinction is maintained ‘Doctor 4’ responded:

“I mean I can see that point they’re basically killing somebody one by giving and one by taking away. Er, whether it’s more of a psychological thing, do we feel more psychologically responsible if we, or the nurse we’ve instructed…it probably would end up being us, had our hand on the end of the needle? Perhaps we do whereas things like with…I think the withdrawal of drugs is perhaps slightly different because you’ve given them something and you’ve looked at them to see if it’s improving things, so you perhaps feel that you’ve at least tried...”​[912]​


This is a theme touched upon in chapter 2 section 2.3.2 in relation to dismissing the distinction between intention and foresight in relation to double effect, and has proved decidedly relevant here also. As Baroness Warnock put it, it is: “…a way of letting you out of something without suffering pangs of conscience”,​[913]​ of putting distance between one’s actions and their effect. 

Though the comparison is a tenuous one to make, similar psychology surrounded the inaction of bystanders to the murder of Kitty Genovese. Surrounded by apartment buildings, the place where the victim was stabbed repeatedly was in full view of no less than 70 people. Her cries for aid were heard and drew understandable curiosity, but none of those 70 people called the police. After Ms Genovese was later found dead, police officers questioned the people who had witnessed her murder and asked why none of them saw fit to alert the authorities sooner. Each answered that they believed someone in a neighbouring flat, or neighbouring building would take the responsibility to do so.​[914]​

Now clearly this situation is not that faced by practitioners working with the terminally ill. However, the idea that one shifts some perceived blame, brought by causing another’s death, is not so farfetched an allusion to make. By using ‘passive’ euthanasia the practitioner is not ‘doing’ anything, but taking away some kind of treatment: an action which ‘Doctor 4’ notes is “...something that we do every day in our practice when they’re not working.”​[915]​ As such he is spared from the perceived blame for causing the death personally – it was not his action that took the life, it was either the omission, as in Bland’s case, or the underlying illness which did so.​[916]​

For all the above noted distancing may assist physicians like Doctor 4 in their daily practice, Otlowski roundly disavows maintaining the current legal position on PAS and euthanasia for the sake of the physicians’ mental state. She makes the point that:

‘Under a scheme of legalised active voluntary euthanasia, doctors’ participation in its performance would be entirely voluntary, thereby minimising any risk of trauma or damage...also...active voluntary euthanasia would be an option sought by only a small minority of patients so the occasions on which a doctor would participate in its performance are few and far between.’ ​[917]​

Furthermore, it is difficult justifying reliance on psychological wellbeing being a fetter upon reforming the law since practitioners daily become involved in conduct which hastens death and come away from it without reported psychological harm. ‘Doctor 4’ notes explicitly that the withdrawal of treatment is commonplace, yet noted no ill effects from so doing in personal experience. It is questionable then whether it is the relationship between the patient and the doctor, not the psychological wellbeing of the latter which deserves more weight as an argument against reform.

6.7 Effect on the doctor/patient relationship 

“...my practice has shown me…it’s highlighted perhaps some of the risks involved in such things as euthanasia or PAS. And by that I…well the first thing to say is that it’s something I’ve always been opposed to. I’ve always seen it as just that step too far in the doctor/patient relationship.”​[918]​

“…that depends on the relationship that you have with the patient I think...Some would say it would be a betrayal of that relationship...(but) isn’t at all. Because when you do active euthanasia you do it with the complete consent of the patient and family and…that’s what they want.”​[919]​

The above quotations, from ‘Doctor 4’ and ‘Doctor 3’ respectively, display polar opposite views on the effect reform to the law, particularly reform that would necessitate the legalisation of euthanasia or PAS, would have on the doctor/patient relationship. Opponents, like ‘Doctor 4’, argue that to permit a physician to perform PAS or euthanasia undermines the traditional role assumed by doctors under the Hippocratic Oath, as healers trusted with the responsibility of prolonging and saving life. Allowing either practice therefore undercuts that role by giving physicians the power not only to prolong life, but to end it at their discretion. As a consequence, the trust and confidence necessary for the doctor patient relationship to work would be destroyed.​[920]​ Doctors would be viewed by their patients as killers instead of healers, and patients, who are in any case an already vulnerable group, would feel threatened because of their doctor’s participation in performing PAS or euthanasia.​[921]​ They may feel that they are being labelled as prime candidates for assisted dying simply because of their age, disability or illness. Appleyard points this out in noting, ‘We all repeatedly fall into the trap of identifying people too closely with their circumstances.’​[922]​ As such, opponents argue that the current prohibition on both practices must remain in order to preserve the doctor/patient relationship and ensure that patients never fear their physicians’ motives in treating them to be nefarious.

It can neither be denied nor affirmed whether the explicit nature of the doctor/patient relationship would change if either euthanasia or AS were legalised in England and Wales since, quite obviously, it never has been in the past. There is therefore a lack of appropriate precedent from which to make predictions about future knock-on effects of legalisation. It is possible however to draw inferences from the Netherlands, where assisted dying is permitted, to ascertain whether there has been any appreciable impact on the doctor/patient relationship.

As chapter 5 section 5.7.1 pointed out, there have been a number of studies conducted in the Netherlands over the past two decades to chart the use of euthanasia and PAS. The most recent was conducted in 2005 and published in van der Heide et al’s paper ‘End-of-Life Practices in the Netherlands under the Euthanasia Act’​[923]​ in 2007. Their findings indicate that there has been a decrease in the number of deaths occasioned by euthanasia between 2001 (when 2.6% of all deaths in the Netherlands were caused by euthanasia) and 2005 (compared to 1.7%). Incidences of non-voluntary and/or involuntary euthanasia followed the same downward trend, with 0.7% occurring in 2001 as opposed to 0.4% in 2005.​[924]​

These figures, while self-explanatory in and of themselves, require context to properly represent the rarity of the practices they represent. In 2005 for example the 1.7% incidence of death by euthanasia, while higher than the 0.1% of PAS, is dwarfed by the 24.7% caused by ‘intensified alleviation of symptoms’. This category subsumes ‘...measures used to alleviate pain or other symptoms while taking into account the possible hastening of death or appreciating that possibility...’,​[925]​ situations which, in England and Wales, would often be considered under the doctrine of double effect. 

Similar disparities are evident between instances of euthanasia and those of death occurring as a result of withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging treatment (15.6%), and between euthanasia and what van der Heide et al term ‘Continuous deep sedation’ (8.2%).​[926]​ These figures show that, while assisted dying is available and used, it still very much represents the minority in terms of what causes death. 

While these statistics do not appear to relate directly to the doctor/patient relationship, pertinent conclusions on euthanasia’s effect on it can be extrapolated from them. Firstly, based on its comparative rarity, it can be concluded that physicians do not resort to euthanasia or PAS at every given opportunity. Indeed it is roughly 4.8 times more likely that a patient will die as a result of terminal sedation, and just over 14.5 times more likely that he will die as a result of increased treatment to palliate his symptoms than for him to die as a result of euthanasia.​[927]​ If indeed it is medically procured or medically hastened death that patients dread, they would seem to have more to fear from practices which are part and parcel of common medical practice than they do from euthanasia or PAS. Furthermore, if the likelihood of death following a treatment decision is directly proportionate to the amount of damage caused to the doctor/patient relationship, that relationship would appear to be at greater risk of damage from the more common kinds of procedure that can end in death than it is from PAS and euthanasia. 





Variable	Ending life without Explicit Request by Patient2001	Ending life without Explicit Request by Patient2005
No. of deaths studied	58	24
Discussion of practice (%)		
With patient (or previous wish of patient)	26.5	60.0
With relative of patient	100.0	80.9
With more than 1 other physician	65.2	65.3

These figures, at first glance, appear startling in that they highlight the fact that for all its rarity and despite the safeguards in place in the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act (2002), non-voluntary euthanasia does occur. Indeed it would appear, contrasting the 2001 and 2005 columns, that the Act’s enactment more than doubled instances of non-voluntary euthanasia where a previous request for assisted dying is concerned. Though the other figures in the 2005 column show a modest decrease (from 100% to 80%) and an even more modest increase (from 65.2% to 65.3%) in instances of non-voluntary euthanasia, the fact remains that they do occur and that patients may well worry that they will end up as one of them.

That conclusion though is not without rejoinders. The figures quoted in Table 1 do not show any instances of non-voluntary euthanasia being performed without any kind of consultation, be it with the patient’s past wishes, his family or with another physician. Taking the 2005 column as an example, any of the 24 deaths studied could be included as one of the 60%, 80.9% and 65.3% presented in the ‘variables’ rows. The physician in a case may be working with knowledge of his now incompetent patient’s past wishes, in collusion with the patient’s family and having consulted one or more other physicians about the case before performing euthanasia or PAS without the patient’s presently expressed consent.​[929]​ If this interpretation is accurate, instead of being a cause for patient alarm and fears over non-voluntary euthanasia, it should be a reassurance that one’s care is not dependant on one physician’s thoughts and decisions and that one’s decisions, reached at a point when one is competent, will be respected unless and until sufficient cause is shown to disregard them. Instead of degrading the doctor/patient relationship, the patient’s ability to feel certain that his physician will carry out his wishes would, assumedly, strengthen the bond.

This opinion is not one shared universally however. Doctor 7, for example, when questioned about the possibility of damage being done to the relationship between doctors and their patients by legalising euthanasia, noted that: 

“...I think that to some people anyway, it’s perhaps a very conventional view but...some people...would be a bit confused and maybe a bit upset and...a bit less reluctant to come and see you if they thought that you might be trying to...might want to or thinking about helping them on their way rather than healing them...if it was the same doctor, the same person who was doing that as was trying to cure you...then the patients might get confused about what you were doing at one time or get worried about what you were doing at one time.”​[930]​

Doctor 10, faced with the same question, took a different tack. When asked about the impact assisted dying could have on the doctor/patient relationship, she turned the question around and explained how her relationships with her patients would impact her willingness to use PAS or euthanasia: 

“...I’m sort of sitting here thinking could I do that (perform assisted dying)? If that person becomes a friend could I do that? If I’m personally gaining something from that relationship and then I’m being asked to end it...is that something I could do? But then, if not, am I being selfish? If it’s better for that person and that’s what they want...I don’t have the answers. The more I talk about it the less I have the answers truthfully. Maybe I’m feeling very guilty about...If I lose something I won’t do it. But then, is that right? Am I taking advantage of someone else because of my feelings? I don’t know...I don’t know.”​[931]​

How then is the concern voiced by Doctors 4, 7 and 10 over the damage reform to the law could do to the doctor/patient relationship explained by the MSB? During the course of their careers physicians are involved in situations where death results from their actions or inactions. Take for example the cases of Bland​[932]​ and R v. Adams.​[933]​ In the former the patient died as a result of his treatment being omitted, and in the latter, arguably, because of the morphine the physician administered to ameliorate pain.





Weighing the moral arguments for and against reforming the law on PAS and euthanasia is always subject to one’s own interpretation of the concepts involved. As such, making an objective decision as to the moral rightness or wrongness of reforming the law is incredibly difficult, as one’s objectivism is painted in subjective colours. That is not to say however that conclusions cannot be rightly drawn from the debate; only that they will simply be coloured by the MSB’s overarching moral standpoint: the veneration of personal autonomy. 

The preceding analysis has lent itself to the conclusion that the main arguments against reforming the law, that doing so would be against God’s will; that it would offend the sanctity of life and the prohibition on intentional killing; that there is value in human suffering; that it would disrupt the psychological benefit gleaned by physicians from having ‘passive’ euthanasia and the DDE as shields against prosecution; and that it would damage the doctor patient relationship, are disputable based on the MSB. 






































Now that it has been concluded that reforming the law is a prudent measure, practical guidance is needed regarding how best to bring about the required change. The options and suggestions that exist are both many in number and eclectic in form. A selection of them is listed below:​[940]​

1.	Legalising euthanasia or physician assisted suicide (PAS);​[941]​
2.	Creating a set of regulations on assisted dying with strict requirements of consent;​[942]​
3.	Creating a special defence for those who have committed euthanasia;​[943]​
4.	Providing immunity from prosecution if a physician involved in assisting death follows a set procedure(s);​[944]​
5.	Substituting murder and manslaughter with unlawful homicide;​[945]​
6.	Forming a new category of offence called ‘killing with compassion’;​[946]​
7.	Creating a Permanent Standing Advisory Committee to draw up a code of practice containing guidelines to review developments and form Working Parties;​[947]​
8.	Creating a notification system of an intended assisted death to an independent body who would act on the patient’s behalf;​[948]​
9.	The adoption of a ‘non-prosecution policy where there is no evidence of a ‘victim’’​[949]​ and,
10.	Removing euthanasia from the scope of the criminal law.​[950]​
Certain of these proposals have been more successful than others, and it is arguable, since the use of the Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (2010)​[951]​ could amount to the adoption of a policy of non-prosecution, that the implementation of policy-based regulation per option 9, specifically that based on the non-prosecution where no victim is apparent, has proven itself to be the most prudent approach in dealing with issues like PAS and euthanasia. Given that it is not a legislative instrument and therefore not binding, it is easier for the courts, while referring to the Guidelines, to exercise the latitude they often do in rendering judgement in end-of-life cases. On the possible causes of this latitude Davies notes:

‘...though we profess to be basing our assessments of other people’s actions on our own beliefs about their motives and intentions, it may, in fact, be our antecedent...views about what is and is not permissible that determine how we characterise agents’ motives and intentions, and not vice versa.’​[952]​

As such, as Williams asserts, ‘...the courts...make a decision as to the result they desire before defining the law in whatever way happens to achieve that desired result.’​[953]​ While the ability to achieve the ‘right’​[954]​ result is an aspect of the current law that the MSB both appreciates and lauds, it is clear that the method employed by the courts to do this, ‘...defining the law in whatever way happens to achieve (the) desired result...’,​[955]​ is the prime cause of the inconsistency evidenced in chapters 1, 2 and 3 of this work. It is also the case that, since the DPP’s Guidelines are discretionary, they lack the clout necessary to affect anything more than the clarification of the law on assisted suicide that they propound in paragraphs 4,​[956]​ 5​[957]​ and 6.​[958]​

How then, if not through an encompassing though unbinding policy, should the law be reformed? All of the suggestions in points 1 through 10 (above) have their strengths and weaknesses, the most prevailing of the latter being that each proposal, implemented individually, would not provide enough protection for either physicians or their patients. Points 2, 7 and 8 for example, while all being examples of mechanisms which could enforce the regulation of assisted dying, provide no guidance as to how the wider implications of being assisted to die, the effect it may have on insurance for example, would be dealt with. For these mechanisms to be useful they would need to be clarified and backed up by others which would perform the roles left unfulfilled by such specific bodies/regulations. 

Options 1 and 10 are more closely related than they appear at first glance. One way of removing euthanasia from the scope of the criminal law would be to legalise the practice, as has been done in the Netherlands​[959]​ and Belgium.​[960]​ Indeed, doing this would also seem to be the most appropriate course of action if the MSB is taken to its logical conclusion: if active euthanasia is already practiced under the cloak of ‘passivity’ and death by omission, it is seen as good medical practice in the scenarios it is used in and should therefore be lawfully exercisable. Making an already quasi-legal practice unequivocally legal would provide conscientious physicians with the assurance that they would not be liable for the deaths caused through the exercise of agreed and rightful medical practice. 

On the other hand, legalising such a contentious practice without a single fetter or safeguard would at best be careless, and at worst lead to the erosion of the trust implicit in the doctor/patient relationship​[961]​ and the likelihood of abuses increasing. Doing so would also legitimise a practice that, but for the presence of a compassionate and utterly blameless intent, bears a striking resemblance to culpable homicide. While the MSB, as chapter 1 section 1 made clear, does not imply that physicians act to murder their patients through using passive euthanasia or double effect (DDE), the similarity must be borne in mind and taken account of in deciding how best to reform the law.​[962]​

In this regard option 3 may seem a more appropriate one to implement, as it acknowledges both the inherent badness of taking life, and the blamelessness of the physician who acts to take it in the situations the MSB applies to. The same could be said of option 4, the provision of immunity from prosecution for a physician who procures death and follows a set of procedures in doing so. Neither option would involve any overt legal recognition of the rightness of assisted dying, and both, retroactively through option 3 and proactively through option 4, would provide physicians with the protection the MSB professes them to be in need of.

Regardless of this seeming efficacy however, at present it seems unlikely that a defence specific to an act of euthanasia will be enacted. Despite numerous chances to do so, Parliament has yet to deem such reform necessary. A possible reason for this reticence is the existence of defences like Necessity​[963]​ and Diminished Responsibility which, when a case concerning euthanasia comes to court, can either be granted to defend a morally upright defendant or denied to condemn an undeserving one. While neither is specific to euthanasia, and while both, it has been argued in section 5.1 of chapter 5 of this work, are inadequate for use in cases concerning doctors, precedent evidences jurisprudential favouritism for their use in cases where ‘mercy’ is cited as the motive behind a murder.​[964]​ 

This apparent favouritism is also related to options 5 and 6, which propound new ways of grading the act of murder to reflect its severity as an appropriate way of dealing with euthanasia.​[965]​ Whether or not formal changes to the law will be made to reflect such suggestions is a matter for debate. The Law Commission has already rejected one such proposal on the grounds that grading an offence with reference to the defendant’s motive would be too complex to be effective.​[966]​ That said, an informal kind of gradation is already evidenced through the use of defences in cases where culpability is felt to be lacking or the defendant is seen to be on the moral high ground. ‘The different mental elements required for different offences enable grading of different levels of wrongdoing...’​[967]​ and dictate the rigorousness of punishment.​[968]​ It is also the case that offences themselves are graded in terms of severity; the distinction between murder and manslaughter for example, that between theft and robbery and the differing kinds of offence against the person detailed in section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act (1988) and sections 47, 20 and 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act (1861).

Specifically with reference to option 6, killing with compassion, it has been found in a number of studies – by Mitchell​[969]​ and Pfeifer​[970]​ in particular – that the public perceive compassionate killings differently from the ‘more terrible types of killing’.​[971]​ This difference is implied at law through considerations in sentencing,​[972]​ but it is outwardly unacknowledged; both compassionate and non-compassionate killings are charged as murder no matter the circumstances. Whether or not redefining the remit of culpable homicide to include euthanasia is a prudent way of remedying this situation is, as all of the suggested reforms are, debateable. As was noted with reference to options 2, 7 and 8, simply redefining a portion of an offence to include a new kind of conduct would do nothing to protect either patients or the physicians caring for them from harm or the danger of prosecution. 

A more substantive wide-ranging reform would be necessary to make the required adjustments in a more than perfunctory fashion, and this, it is claimed here, would be best achieved through the use of legislation.​[973]​ In a recent interview pursuant to this work Lord Joffe expressed a similar belief. He posited that implementing an entirely new piece of legislation would be the most appropriate way of achieving the close and detailed regulation of any mechanisms that allow access to assisted dying that both he and the MSB believe to be necessary.​[974]​ During the interview the option of reforming an existing piece of legislation was also discussed, and the Suicide Act (1961) provided an apt example of a candidate for amendment. Lord Joffe felt however, that amending the 1961 Act’s provisions to legalise assisted suicide (AS) would necessitate a similar degree of restructuring as implementing a new piece of legislation would. Take for example a hypothetical reform which repeals the recently amended section 2 prohibition on AS, an unlikely option, both for Parliament’s current stance on AS and because of how wide its scope would be. Guidance would be needed on, amongst other things, what circumstances one could rely on the provision, on who could rely on it and whether the legalisation applied to both laymen and practitioners. Lord Joffe felt that these extraneous considerations could not be adequately dealt with in section 2 itself, and that including them within the Act would require more scope for elaboration than its ambit allows.

While the form the eventual reform will take is now settled, its CONTENT is still undecided. Any and all of the suggestions in options 1 through 10 could be implemented through legislation, but, having noted their shortcomings in the preceding discussion, two will be discussed in this chapter as the most promising possibilities. Selected for their ability to provide the regulation necessitated by the MSB’s conclusion that euthanasia (the illegal active form) is already practiced under the guise of ‘passive’ euthanasia and is unregulated, the options discussed are as follows:
1.	creating a special defence for those who have committed euthanasia;​[975]​
2.	providing immunity from prosecution if a physician involved in assisting death follows a set procedure(s).​[976]​

At first glance this selection may seem ill-advised, especially in light of Parliament’s seeming disinclination to support either option presently. However if Parliamentary reticence alone presented an insurmountable obstacle to suggesting law reform, this thesis would be undermined from its inception since it concerns just that. Furthermore, it is posited here that the fact that the current law can be stretched to accommodate assisted dying does not negate the need for a specialised defence to do the same. The coming sections will explore this possibility with a view to discovering if the creation of a defence specific to physicians who perform assisted dying is a feasible avenue for law reform. 

7.1 A special defence for physicians who ‘commit’ euthanasia

At present, there is no single dedicated defence applicable to physicians who procure the death of their patients by either PAS or euthanasia. Instead they are faced with a confusing and, as section 5.1 of chapter 5 noted, often irrelevant hotchpotch of defences, few of which serve any meaningful purpose in terms of exonerating the physician-defendant. These defences, section 5.1 posited, would be either over-stretched in accommodating euthanasia, or are simply irrelevant to it altogether.​[977]​ There are, however, avenues which remain open to the possibility of reform. Mercy killing, divorced entirely from diminished responsibility, has been mooted extensively as a possible defence for doctors who have practiced assisted dying.​[978]​

The concept of mercy is used by the courts in cases were clemency is felt more appropriate than the mandatory life sentence for murder a defendant would otherwise face. Depending on the circumstances of the case, this abrogation of the harshness of the criminal law can be brought about in a number of ways. For instance, in decades past when England and Wales still imposed capital punishment for murder, the Home Secretary has on occasion stepped in to commute the death penalty in cases where the circumstances implied the presence of mercy.​[979]​ Sentencing discretion is another tool which has often been used to reflect what the courts feel to be the appropriate measure of censure for a merciful murder,​[980]​ and the defence of diminished responsibility (DR) is often applied in cases where the defendant is allegedly suffering from a mental problem brought on through the stress of caring for an ailing relative.​[981]​

While the availability of these methods may imply judicial leniency in cases where mercy is the alleged motive for a killing, there is no actual standardised defence of ‘mercy killing’ available at law. Mercy killing has been mooted extensively as a possible defence for doctors who have practiced assisted dying. The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment between 1949 and 1953,​[982]​ and more recently the Law Commission have made serious proposals for its inclusion as an optional defence to a charge of murder where ‘a severely depressed husband...has given in to his wife’s demands that he “put her out of her misery”...’​[983]​ Indeed at paragraph 1.114 in its 2005 Report ‘A new Homicide Act for England and Wales?’​[984]​ the Commission recommended that mercy, recognised in section 269 and Schedule 21 of the Criminal Justice Act (2003) as a mitigating factor in murder cases, ought to be considered ‘...outside the scope of murder...and into manslaughter instead.’​[985]​ Murphy’s commentary is in keeping with the Law Commission’s conclusions and describes mercy killing as a species of: 

‘... manslaughter...where the dilemma which has caused the accused to kill can be said to have given rise to depression or some other medically recognised disorder which can be said to be the cause of some abnormality of mind.’​[986]​





In 1973 the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) found it ‘...odious that a life sentence should have to be imposed in cases...’​[987]​ where mercy clearly underpinned the defendant’s actions in killing another. It felt that it ought to be possible for a judge to make a hospital order under section 60 of the Mental Health Act (1959),​[988]​ or a probation order, or to grant a conditional discharge in cases were justice did not require the defendant be imprisoned. Three years after the Report on the Penalty for Murder​[989]​ was released, the CLRC circulated a Working Paper​[990]​ which suggested a ‘dramatically original way’​[991]​ of formalising the use of mercy in cases where ‘mercy killings’ occurred. It proposed an offence applicable where a person unlawfully kills another for compassionate reasons. For the offence to apply the victim would either need to have been, or have been believed by the defendant to be:

(1) permanently subject to great bodily pain or suffering, or 
(2) permanently helpless from bodily or mental incapacity, or 
(3) subject to rapid and incurable bodily or mental degeneration.

Added to these stipulations, the CLRC pointed out that the accused must have had reasonable cause for his belief that the victim was suffering in one of the above three ways, but did not specify whether the reasonableness requirement was to be assessed objectively or subjectively. He (the accused) must also have either had the consent of his victim prior to the killing, or at least have been aware that the victim would not dissent to it being carried out. The difficulties posed by uncommunicative victims, the very young or mentally incompetent for example, were said to be overcome if it could be proved that the accused did not believe, or did not have reasonable cause to believe, that his victim wished to continue living. 

The problems with the CLRC’s proposal are, from the above description, readily apparent. Each aspect of the offence is taken from the point of view of the defendant. What would concern the court if this proposal became law would be what the defendant reasonably believed to be the case, not what was the case in actuality. It could even be alleged that, by including within its proposal a mechanism for dealing with the situation ‘where the deceased is too ill or too young to communicate his wishes...’​[992]​ non-voluntary euthanasia is silently deemed appropriate in certain situations. While this is highly unlikely to be the case in reality, it is questionable precisely who the CLRC had in mind as potential victims for the mercy killer, and who, by implication, they felt would be the mercy killer himself. Two examples were highlighted in the British Medical Journal,​[993]​ which, curiously, did not concern medical killing. Rather, it was felt that ‘...a mother (who) killed her deformed child or a husband who terminated the agonies of his dying wife’ best represented cases of mercy killing. 

Irrespective of the fact that mercy may be a component of the motive a practitioner has in practicing euthanasia, the MSB supports the implications of the CLRC’s examples in noting that mercy killing, even though it is not recognised as a defence proper, has chiefly been applied in cases concerning laymen. Take for example the cases of Sawyer,​[994]​ King,​[995]​ Ambrose​[996]​ and McShane.​[997]​ The prevailing theme through these cases is judicial disdain for the entire subject of mercy killing where violence is used to procure the death. Kay J presiding over the case of Sawyer proclaimed in passing sentence ‘...the court does not and will not sanction any form of mercy killing.’​[998]​ Sawyer had killed his terminally ill partner in a distinctly violent manner. He had hit, strangled and then drowned the victim and, even though it was alleged that his partner had asked for his assistance in dying, this consent could not vitiate the fact that ‘...no one could view this as a mercy killing because of the substantial physical violence.’​[999]​ He was sentenced to 30 months in prison. 

A comparable sentiment was expressed by the judge in the King case, where he hoped that ‘no one will think that I am lending countenance to what is sometimes loosely called mercy killing.’​[1000]​Ambrose, the defendant in a case like Sawyer and King, was also imprisoned after he bludgeoned his mother to death with a hammer after she requested he help her die.​[1001]​ The case of McShane is another example of how the courts disdain mercy killing. The defendant in this case wanted both to end her ailing mother’s suffering and gain access to a sizeable inheritance on her death. This duality made relying on the apparently merciful aspect of her actions impossible. Her two, two year sentences were subsequently upheld on appeal.​[1002]​ The case of R v. Cocker​[1003]​serves as another example of judicial disdain for the concept of mercy killing. After the defendant’s wife Esther, a Multiple Sclerosis sufferer, persistently requested his assistance in dying over many months he smothered her with a pillow. At trial he tried to use the defence of provocation but failed and was convicted of murder. He was released after 4 years.

Despite this seemingly negative precedent, there is a distinct trend amongst court decisions implying that the presence of mercy in certain circumstances will afford a defendant leniency he may not have received in its absence. Take the case of Mrs Brownhill for example, who killed her 30 year old son in an effort to spare him having to suffer through a life she described as ‘a living death’.​[1004]​ Originally charged with murder and sentenced to death, the Home Secretary recommended that she be pardoned, and a year after her arrest she was indeed released. A similar circumstance faced Mr Long, who was convicted of the murder of his 7 year old ‘imbecile’ daughter.​[1005]​ He, like Mrs Brownhill, had his sentence commuted, though he still faced life imprisonment. Mrs Marshall too found herself with a comparatively minor sentence for the mercy killing of her 90 year old, bedridden mother. She crushed sleeping pills into her food in desperation at the quality of her life, and pleaded guilty to a charge of attempted murder. Unlike Mr Long, her 12 month sentence was suspended for two years, Rodwell QC reflecting what he perceived to be the exceptional circumstances of the case in the sentence.​[1006]​ Similar leniency was shown to Mrs Wise, who, according to Jones J, ‘acted, although wrongly, in what you considered your child’s best interests. This is an extreme case among exceptional ones. You have suffered enough.’​[1007]​ She was placed on probation for 12 months. 

This trend has also been recognised legislatively in the Criminal Justice Act (2003) which proclaims that the presence of mercy may be a mitigating circumstance that warrants a lower term.​[1008]​ Be that as it may, the alleged presence of a merciful motive does not guarantee a defendant leniency by any means. Compare for example the cases of Gilderdale​[1009]​ and Inglis.​[1010]​ 

Frances Inglis gave her paralyzed son a heroin overdose as he lay in bed in the nursing home where he was cared for. She was subsequently convicted of his murder, though her life sentence has recently been reviewed and she will now be eligible for parole in 5 years.​[1011]​ Mrs. Inglis had tried once before her successful attempt to end the young man’s life, as she felt he would not wish to persist in a condition she felt he would have found unbearable. Nowhere in the reported circumstances was it clear that her son had ever indicated a desire for euthanasia or AS, and given her previous attempt on his life the court felt imprisonment was the only just recourse it had.​[1012]​

Mrs. Inglis’ case can be juxtaposed against that of Kay Gilderdale, the ‘devoted mother’​[1013]​ of Lynn Gilderdale, a sufferer of ME who described her existence, in the months preceding her death as ‘unimaginably wretched’.​[1014]​ Mrs. Gilderdale, at her daughter’s behest, assisted her suicide by providing both morphine, which Lynn self-administered through the syringe-driver her everyday doses were given through, and also by crushing up Diazepam, Temazepam and Zopiclone tablets and feeding them through her daughter’s naso-gastric tube. Hours later, Mrs. Gilderdale administered a further two doses of morphine through the syringe-driver. Lynn died some 30 hours after she asked her mother to help her die.

Mrs. Gilderdale would have faced a change of murder, but evidential inconsistencies surrounding the precise cause of her daughter’s death precluded this course of action. It was not clear from the toxicology reports whether Miss Gilderdale died as a result of the morphine she self-administered or if the acute morphine intoxication which eventually killed her resulted from her mother’s actions.

While there are clear parities between the Inglis and Gilderdale cases, most strikingly the assertion of both women that they were acting ‘mercifully’,​[1015]​ it is quite clear on the facts why their results differed. Not only had Miss Gilderdale repeatedly stated her wish to end her life, both personally to her parents and later on the blogs she maintained, she was able, unlike Mrs. Inglis’ son, to self-administer the preliminary doses of morphine. As well as adding to the evidential uncertainty regarding the cause of death, this willingness to act to pursue a course of action that would likely prove lethal alludes strongly to both her wish to die, and to her consent to assistance in dying. This consent would by no means exonerate Mrs. Gilderdale, but when compared to the Inglis scenario, where the defendant’s son had never expressed any desire for death, it appears to be the less questionable of the two cases. 

All of these cases are instructive in settling on a tentative definition of what a mercy killing and a mercy killer amount to. A mercy killing is undertaken, as its name suggests, with a merciful motive in the mind of the defendant. Judges are more likely to exercise their own mercy in sentencing when evidence of such a motive is readily apparent, and are less likely to do so when one is not. The cases of Sawyer and Ambrose, both of which concerned massively violent deaths for the victims involved, are testament to this. The defendants in those cases, as was noted above, received custodial sentences in spite of their apparently merciful motives, remorse and familial relations with their victims.

It also seems that judges are more comfortable referring to a case as a mercy killing and ruling accordingly if the victim died as a result of suffocation or an overdose.​[1016]​ The latter preference may be explainable with reference to the Gilderdale judgement and the evidential inconsistency as to the precise cause of death which assisted the defendant’s exoneration. Any kind of gentle death is preferred to the Ambrose and Sawyer examples of horrific violence in procuring a victim’s ‘merciful’ end, as it is much easier to imply mercy and convince a jury of its existence if the death in question was easeful.​[1017]​ Furthermore, clemency is more likely in cases where the victim was terminally or chronically and somatically ill,​[1018]​and less likely where he was not suffering at all. Suffering however is not only considered indicative of the need for clemency when it is the victim who was suffering as a result of an illness. The ‘overwhelming emotional stress’​[1019]​ suffered by the relatives of chronically and terminally ill people in caring for them is often cited in cases where a mercy killing has taken place as a basis on which to ground the defence of diminished responsibility. The case of Heginbotham is an example of this. 

The defendant in the Heginbotham case was the oldest man to be brought to court charged with murder. He was 100 years old when he slit his wife’s throat after she was taken into a home following a fall. After he had done this he returned home and attempted to commit suicide. Mrs Heginbotham had never expressed any desire for assistance in dying, nor was there evidence of a suicide pact between them, but this fact did not stop a successful plea of manslaughter based on DR being made on the defendant’s behalf. Heginbotham received a 12 month community rehabilitation order and was released into the care of his family after Leveson J ruled:

‘The killing of your wife, to whom you had been married joyously for some 67 years, followed by your attempt to take your own life, was an act of desperation carried out in an attempt to end her suffering while you were under intolerable pressure. It was, in truth, an act of love and I have no doubt that you suffered a mental disorder at the time and the responsibility which you bear is substantially reduced. It was, as you well know, a terrible thing to do but I entirely accept the circumstances in which you did it, and your feelings of guilt and remorse have been truly overwhelming.’​[1020]​

There are interesting parities between Heginbotham’s case and that of Mr Cocker, detailed above. Both of the men in question murdered a loved one. Both, though Mr Heginbotham is arguably the more violent of the two, did so in a manner that likely distressed the victim, or would have if she was aware. Both had been happily married to their eventual victim for a great many years. The only disparity was the defence employed by counsel in their trials. Huxtable feels, and the MSB concurs,​[1021]​ that Mr Cocker’s counsel did him a disservice by pleading provocation on the basis of repeated requests for assistance in suicide.​[1022]​ Whether those requests were violent at times or not, they alone could not provoke the needed sudden and temporary loss of self-control needed to utilise the Homicide Act’s now repealed section 3 defence. Had Cocker alleged that he was suffering from a ‘mental disorder’, as Leveson J felt Heginbotham was, and used that as a basis for a plea of DR, he may have been treated with more leniency. DR was again used by the court in the case of Andrew Wragg. Mr. Wragg killed his severely disabled young son because he felt unable to care for him, and that his quality of life was negligible. Mr. Wragg was not given a custodial sentence for the killing. He was convicted of manslaughter by DR and received a 2 year suspended sentence.​[1023]​

In situations like those facing Heginbotham and Wragg, where stress overrides their better judgement and prompts them, in Mr Heginbotham’s words to ‘go berserk’​[1024]​ and kill the person in their care as a final expression of ‘familial love’,​[1025]​ the defence of DR serves its purpose in mitigating a charge of murder admirably. However, if applied to a mercy killing which has taken place in the medical setting, the effectiveness of DR is greatly reduced. As section 5.1 of chapter 5 of this work notes, the lack of a close familial bond, and the availability of the DDE make recourse to a defence which hinges upon mental incapacity both unnecessary and, if indeed it was used, inaccurate. It is improbable that a professional carer or physician would come under the overwhelming stress which can cause family members like Heginbotham or Wragg to act in the ways they did.

If DR is taken from the equation then, could it be possible, in upholding the MSB’s conclusion that reform is necessary, to provide a defence of mercy killing tailored to the needs of physicians and divorced from the idea of mental incapacity entirely?  Section 7.1.2 explores this possibility.

7.1.2 Mercy Killing as a doctor’s defence? 

Mercy killing, as the preceding section noted, appears to be a defence geared towards the lay-person. None of the defendants mentioned: Heginbotham,​[1026]​ Cocker,​[1027]​ Sawyer,​[1028]​ Ambrose​[1029]​ or McShane​[1030]​ were physicians, nor did they commit their crimes in a medical setting. Indeed the most recent reform attempt proposed by the Law Commission concerned laymen exclusively.​[1031]​ As section 7.1.1 made clear, fitting a physician into the current mould used to define a mercy killer would be extremely difficult, irrespective of the presence or absence of a merciful motive for acting. Consequently, the applicability of the legal frameworks currently surrounding the ‘defence’ for physicians and physician assisted death is questionable.

However, the courts’ appreciation of mercy killing is not based upon the presence of a mental abnormality alone. Section 7.1.1 implied certain criteria with which the courts distinguish between mercy killings and non-mercy killings, and these will go some way to informing the possible content of a defence:

1.	The defendant had a ‘merciful’ motive;
2.	A ‘gentle’ death, preferably brought through an overdose;​[1032]​
3.	A complete lack of violence of any kind​[1033]​, and;
4.	The victim was suffering from a somatic illness that was either chronic or terminal.​[1034]​

The CLRC’s 1976 Working Paper​[1035]​ provides supplementary criteria which are equally necessary, regardless of the identity and vocation of the defendant:

5.	The accused must have had an objectively verifiable reasonable cause for his belief that his victim was suffering from an illness of a kind noted in point 4, above, and;
6.	The accused must have had the consent of his victim prior to the killing.

There are, of course, problems with all six of these criteria. Quantifying precisely what constitutes a ‘gentle’ death for example is fraught with obstacles, particularly because there are those who would argue that ANY action that results in a death, however objectively gentle it seems, inflicts violence on the recipient. 

Requiring that the ‘victim’s’ illness be terminal would also pose problems definitionally. Terminal illnesses are known to be ‘incurable’,​[1036]​ yet not all incurable illnesses are terminal. They can also be somatic, yet, again, not all somatic illnesses are terminal.  While it may be easy enough for a physician to form an objectively verifiable reason for his belief that the victim was suffering from such an illness, precisely what this belief concerns is unclear. It could imply either than the physician has reason to believe the patient has a terminal illness, or that he has reason to believe that the patient is actually suffering while having that illness.

The most pressing of the problems encountered in using the above noted criteria however is the reliance on a barely objectively provable criterion, a merciful motive, as the issue upon which liability rests. The only real evidence of mercy’s presence, but for that which can be implied from the facts surrounding the case, would be the testimony of the physician himself. That is not to imply however that referencing mercy would be an impossible task. The Swiss law on homicide and AS is based on the defendant’s good motives. Articles 114 and 115 read as follows:

‘Art 114: Killing on request (Tötung auf Verlangen) A person who, for decent reasons, especially compassion, kills a person on the basis of his or her serious and insistent request, will be sentenced to a term of imprisonment (Gefängnis).’
‘Art 115: Inciting and assisting someone to commit suicide (Verleitung und Beihilfe zum Selbstmord) A person who, for selfish reasons, incites someone to commit suicide or who assists that person in doing so will, if the suicide was carried out or attempted, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment (Zuchthaus) of up to 5 years or a term of imprisonment (Gefängnis).’

As the quotations clearly show, there is a total prohibition of AS and euthanasia in Article 114. Article 115 however only criminalises the act of inciting and assisting suicide if the person performing the criminal act does so for ‘selfish reasons’. As such, if compassion could be said to have been motivating a person’s actions, and he/she could prove that to the court, no criminal liability would accrue regardless of that person being a layman or a medical practitioner. While the Swiss law is explicit in its requirement for non-selfish reasons however, it is silent on precisely how such a motive should be ascertained. The same is true of the Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide (2010), though it goes further than most in clarifying what is NOT a merciful or compassionate motive:

‘...the suspect was motivated by the prospect that he or she or a person closely connected to him or her stood to gain in some way from the death of the victim.’​[1037]​

In exploring, if briefly, the idea of what a non-compassionate motive entails, the DPP’s Policy sets an instructive example of how it may be possible to implement a defence of mercy killing. Paragraph 43(6), quoted above, is added to by paragraphs 44 through 48 of the Policy, which detail the public interest factors tending towards and against prosecution. By making explicit reference to situations and scenarios which add to or detract from the strength of a defendant’s case, it is possible, as section 5.5.2 of chapter 5 of this work does in relation to AS, to put together a composite of the ‘perfect innocent defendant’. A set of factors akin to those in paragraphs 43 through 48, tailored to the situation and needs of the practitioner mercy killer, would make quantifying a truly merciful act more straightforward. They would not though, on the same token, remove the issue of relying on the physician’s word as to the mercifulness of his motives entirely, nor should they. They would simply provide a codified list of factors from which the courts could guide juries in weighing the need for prosecution in individual cases. 

The clarity afforded by the creation of such a list as part of a defence would likely be welcomed by the courts, but it is questionable whether this method of reform would properly effect the change the MSB states is necessary. While it would protect a physician who took a patient’s life with merciful motives, it is uncertain whether it would work to facilitate the competent patient’s autonomous choice in seeking assisted dying appropriately. The focus of the defence would, by its nature, be on the defendant physician, not on patients who have decided to seek assisted dying. The MSB, in claiming that patients should be able to make such a choice,​[1038]​ looks to defend their interests and ensure proper protection is in place before it deals with creating mechanisms through which the morally blameless physician can be defended.





The defence of necessity has been a source of jurisprudential consternation for a number of years. A Common Law defence first referenced in the case of R v. Dudley and Stephens,​[1041]​ it applies in circumstances where the defendant was forced to make a choice between two negative outcomes, and seeks, once the lesser of those two evils is accomplished, to justify that outcome as the product of necessity. Necessity’s boundaries and distinguishing features have been defined and re-defined through case law and its application to cases concerning PAS and euthanasia has long been mooted. Ost for example, in her paper Euthanasia and the Defence of Necessity: Advocating a More Appropriate Legal Response​[1042]​ argues that the availability of the defence of diminished responsibility to lay mercy killers would make denying practitioners access to necessity unfair, as doing so ‘may place (them) at greater risk of conviction for murder than the layperson.’​[1043]​ 

The Law Commission, unlike Ost’s quite clear support for necessity’s usefulness to practitioners, has been of two minds on the issue. In its 1974 Working Paper ‘Codification of the criminal law: General principles and defences of general application’​[1044]​ the Commission was of the opinion that the defence was a viable option, yet in its 1977 Report ‘Criminal law Report on defences of general application’​[1045]​ it expressed the opposite view and called for its abolition. Neither suggestion was implemented, and in its 1985 Report the Commission proposed the current, compromised position found at law today.​[1046]​ Necessity therefore remains a Common Law defence over which the courts retain the power to develop and clarify as needed. 

In order to explore whether or not necessity would be an appropriate defence for a physician who has assisted a patient to die, it is necessary first to look at how the courts have dealt with its application in cases concerning the prospective charge of murder, since this is what a physician-defendant would face if brought to trial. The seminal case of Re A (children)​[1047]​ is both the beginning and the end of this exposition, since no case before or since has relied so heavily on the defence. The facts of Re A are set out in Jenny McEwen’s article ‘Murder By Design: The 'Feel-Good Factor' And The Criminal Law’ as follows;

‘The twins Jodie and Mary were joined at the lower abdomen. They had a common artery and shared a bladder… Mary had very weak cardiac performance and no useful lung function. Jodie's heart was pumping blood around the bodies of both babies… if the twins were not separated, Jodie would die, although not immediately. The proposed treatment…would inevitably lead to Mary's death, because…her own heart could not supply her with sufficient oxygen.’​[1048]​

With these circumstances in mind the judges found themselves in a position where choosing the lesser of two evils, saving one twin instead of neither, would involve an action on the part of the physicians involved in their care that would be tantamount to murder.​[1049]​ Conviction would be certain unless a mechanism was found to relieve those involved of culpability, and each judge involved favoured a different approach. Ward L.J. argued for the application of the defence of self defence, Walker L.J. focused on the idea of bodily integrity and Brooke L.J. favoured using necessity. Though it was concluded that necessity was the most fitting option, there were underlying logistical problems to overcome in applying the defence to the case, not least the fact that the ratio in the case of Dudley and Stevens precluded the offence of murder from necessity’s ambit.​[1050]​ 

In answer to this quandary Brooke L.J. pointed out that important policy considerations behind the decision in the Dudley case did not exist in Re A, and that it was only in cases where these policy considerations did exist that the defence would not be accessible. His Lordship outlined these considerations succinctly:

‘The first objection was evident in the court's questions: who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured? The second objection was that to permit such a defence would mark an absolute divorce of law from morality.’​[1051]​

Brooke L.J felt that the first consideration did not apply in the present case, because it was the doctors and the courts that were making the decision to save the stronger twin's life by separating the weaker twin from her, rather than a defendant making the choice to sacrifice another's life to save her own. It was also impressed throughout the judgement in Re A that the doctors and the courts were not valuing J’s life over M’s, but instead giving the stronger twin the best chance of survival. On this understanding it was concluded that it was not the court but circumstances, or nature that selected M for death. In Brooke L.J’s words, 

‘...In my judgement, neither of these objections are dispositive of the present case. Mary is, sadly, self-designated for a very early death. Nobody can extend her life beyond a very short span...’​[1052]​

As to the second consideration outlined above, there was simply no choice, on the facts, but to accept that either choice the court could make – allowing the surgical intervention to save J’s life at the cost of her sister’s, or debarring the physicians from acting and allowing both twins to die – would result in the death of an innocent. Regarding the feared divorce of law and morality Brooke L.J noted:

‘...all that a court can say is that it is not at all obvious that this is the sort of clear-cut case, marking an absolute divorce from law and morality, which was of such concern to Lord Coleridge CJ and his fellow judges.’​[1053]​

Distinguishing Re A on its facts from other cases concerning the defence of necessity allowed the CA to render justifiable a positive act, the physicians separating the twins, which resulted in the weaker twin’s almost immediate death, an act which, without the defence, would have been treated as murder.​[1054]​ The court was quick to defend its judgement and vehement in its assurances that the case did not create a precedent, though how literally that assurance can be assumed to be is unclear.​[1055]​ Evidently, giving physicians carte blanche to cause ‘necessary’ deaths was never the CA’s intention in affording the physicians in Re A a defence, and the MSB approves of this caution entirely. 

Clearly, based on how the court dealt with Re A, in order for necessity to be applicable to cases concerning assisted dying it must be shown that the policy considerations used by Brooke L.J. do not manifest in the circumstances facing a physician who has acceded to a patient’s request for assistance. If they do, the prohibition on using necessity as a defence to murder imposed in the Dudley case​[1056]​ will still be operative, and the defence will fail.

Regarding the first of the policy considerations, performing euthanasia does not require the physician to value his life over his patient’s. He is working to assist a person who has valued their own life and who, on the basis of that valuation, is acting to pursue his desired end. This supposition supports and is supported by the MSB, which claims in chapter 4 of this work that the subjective value of a competent patient’s life should be seen to override the objective value imposed upon all human life by society.​[1057]​ The applicability of Brooke L.J’s first policy consideration to a case concerning assisted dying, and therefore the availability of the defence of necessity, is at best suspect, since the circumstances do not force a choice to be made between one life, the physician’s, and another, the patient’s.

As to the second consideration, the feared divorce of law from morality, Ost argues the physician in a case concerning assisted dying is faced with circumstances where, morally, he may feel compelled to end his patient’s life in order to achieve a greater good, i.e. the relief of pain, when all other preventative measures have failed. His actions are therefore motivated by his appreciation of morality, much as the actions of the physicians in Re A were, not divorced from it.​[1058]​

While this argument is a compelling one, and one which the MSB countenances as plausible, a more appropriate one, this work contends, is based on the precepts espoused in section 1.4.1 of this work on the equivalence between ‘passive’ acts and active ones. The case of Re A, from its outset, was based upon the need to excuse the physicians involved in separating the twins from culpability for an action, the severing of the arteries keeping the weaker twin alive, that would cause a death. While it may have occupied a moral grey area, the separation was permitted and the court allowed the defence of necessity to be applied in the case. 

The MSB’s nod to the equivalence of passive acts and active ones allows this work to extrapolate from Re A thus. Since ‘passive’ modes of procuring death are already permitted and cause no divorce between law and morality, active ones, like those performed by a physician involved in assisted dying, should be likewise permitted and should likewise cause no divorce between law and morality.​[1059]​ Brooke L.J’s second policy consideration, it is opined here, is also conspicuously absent under the MSB’s reasoning. The absence of both considerations appears to make necessity as applicable to a physician accused of ‘committing’ euthanasia as it was to the physicians involved in the case of Re A.

The applicability of necessity however does not rid its implementation of difficulties when it is used as a physician’s defence to a charge of euthanasia. First and foremost, the judgement in Re A involved the intention to preserve life, not the intention to end it based on an appreciation of the lesser of two competing evils.​[1060]​ Added to this, while its status as a Common Law defence lends it the malleability to be applied in difficult cases like Re A, does little to provide concrete guidelines for physicians faced with an appeal for assistance in dying on whether or not they will face prosecution if they accede to the request. A similar conclusion was reached by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of HL v. UK.​[1061]​ The ECtHR overturned the House of Lords decision in R v. Bournewood Community Mental Hospital​[1062]​ which propounded that necessity could be used to authorise the detention of a mentally incompetent autistic man (HL) against the will of his carers. It was concluded that the doctrine of necessity did not contain sufficient safeguards to protect HL from arbitrary or mistaken detention, and that consequently he had been denied his liberty in breach of Articles 5(1) and 5(4) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

In light of the uncertainty highlighted in HL’s case, legislative codification would be required, much as it would be if mercy killing was ever brought into the open as a defence in its own right, to make the intricacies required of a law dealing with euthanasia clear to all those affected by it.​[1063]​ This approach has already been taken in five of the six jurisdictions studied pursuant to this PhD.​[1064]​ Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Oregon and England and Wales (through Lord Joffe’s proposals) have either taken, or suggested taking, legislative steps in codifying their respective laws on assisted dying. Section 7.2 will focus on the predominant method employed by these jurisdictions to regulate the practice – the provision of immunity from prosecution provided that certain specified criteria are adhered to. Although this method may seem much akin to the provision of a defence, defences like those discussed in sections 7.1 through 7.1.3 are retroactive, requiring the person who wishes to use them to have performed an illegal act. The provision of immunity however is proactive, requiring compliance with the criteria set down in the Act in order for the protection it offers to be applicable. 

7.2 Immunity from prosecution if certain criteria are met

‘...We have considered that it is desired to include a ground for exemption from criminal liability for the physician who with due observance of the requirements of due care...terminates a life on request or assists in a suicide of another person...’​[1065]​

‘No person shall be subject to civil or criminal liability or professional disciplinary action for participating in good faith compliance with ORS 127.800 to 127.897. This includes being present when a qualified patient takes the prescribed medication to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.’​[1066]​

‘Subject to the provisions of this Act, it shall be lawful for a physician to assist a patient who is a qualifying patient, and who has made a declaration in accordance with this Act that is for the time being in force, to die.’​[1067]​


As the above quotations show, the Netherlands, Oregon and Lord Joffe’s never implemented Bill each seek to provide a conscientious medical practitioner with immunity from prosecution if, and only if, he acts in accordance with a set of specified criteria. Though the exact content of these criteria vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there are themes evidenced across all six of those under consideration by this work which appear to be almost universal. In all but the Swiss Criminal Code, for example, it must be a physician who provides the assistance allowed under the legislation,​[1068]​ and he must seek a second opinion from a ‘consulting’ or ‘secondary physician’ on the patient’s case.​[1069]​ Any instance of assisted death must be reported in a prescribed manner,​[1070]​ and all but the Swiss Code specify a person or body that oversees the practice.​[1071]​

The patient himself must meet certain criteria also. His request must be voluntary;​[1072]​ he must be suffering to a degree judged enough to warrant assisted dying;​[1073]​ the Australian,​[1074]​ Belgian,​[1075]​ Oregon​[1076]​ and English​[1077]​ pieces of legislation require him to have attained the age of majority and, but for the Dutch law and the Swiss Code, he must be terminally ill.​[1078]​ Each of these specifications requires individual consideration that would be out of place in a section geared towards a more general discussion of this mode of reform. Section 8.3.3 of chapter 8 will explore them in the context of evaluating the draft Bill contained in appendix 1.

What then can be said of the efficacy of providing immunity from prosecution as a method of dealing with assisted dying at law? Section 7 of this chapter has already pointed out that it would both impose the necessary censure on an act that, barring compassionate motives, looks suspiciously like murder, and imply that this act can be legitimately performed in certain circumstances. This duality is arguably already present in the law now, passive euthanasia and the defences specific to murder being notable examples, but it is not as clearly expressed, or as well regulated, as it has been in the Australian and Dutch Acts and in Lord Joffe’s Bill. The importance of creating a piece of legislation to provide the presently absent regulation should not, therefore, be underestimated.

It is also the case that, unlike the enactment of a defence such as those considered in sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3, the provision of immunity from prosecution would work proactively. This seemingly innocuous point has appreciable ramifications on the perception of the rightness of assisted dying. Using a defence implies that an illegal act has been committed, but that the conduct is excusable because of certain circumstances.​[1079]​ The provision of immunity from prosecution on the other hand requires no offence to have been committed at all, and could be seen as a result to imply that assisted dying should not be punished at law. This implication is not one that is in any way supported by the MSB, which has at its core the recognition that assisted dying requires regulation, not legalisation or a legal mandate. The criteria that may allow its practice, should immunity from prosecution be the substance of this work’s eventual reform, would not make it any less illegal than it rightly is at present.

Clearly and without question there are arguments against taking this seemingly moderate approach to reform. Those on both the pro and anti-euthanasia fronts could argue that it is simply a stop-gap measure before a full legalisation of active euthanasia is effected. Members of the former group, Otlowski for example, whilst identifying problems inherent in legalising the practice, would conclude that outright legalisation is the most appropriate method of changing the law.​[1080]​ Anti-euthanasia advocates on the other hand would note that the same moderation is a step too far along the slippery slope to outright legalisation, and would oppose it with reference to the danger they perceive legalised assisted dying poses to the vulnerable.​[1081]​ Chapters 5 and 6 have already detailed this work’s opinions regarding the efficacy of these arguments and the necessity for law reform, so these issues need not be extensively revisited here. 

It is important to note however that there is very little difference between the pieces of legislation that legalise some form of assisted dying and those that do not. The safeguards present in the Oregon Death with Dignity Act and the UK’s Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill are no less stringent than those of the now repealed Australian Rights of the Terminally Ill Act and the Belgian Act on Euthanasia because the former pair ‘only’ provide immunity from prosecution, where the latter openly legalise PAS and euthanasia. Compare, for example, the requirement of a ‘waiting period’ between the Australian and Dutch Acts:

‘A medical practitioner may assist a patient to end his or her life only if all of the following conditions are met...the patient, or a person acting on the patient’s behalf...has, not earlier than 7 days after the patient has indicated to his or her medical practitioner (that he or she wishes to be assisted to die...’​[1082]​

‘No less than fifteen (15) days shall elapse between the patient’s initial oral request and the writing of a prescription under ORS 127.800 to 127.897...’​[1083]​

Strikingly it appears that the Act which legalises PAS requires less time to elapse than that which provides immunity from prosecution. The notoriously difficult to define phrase ‘terminally ill’ is another example of how an Act which provides immunity is worded more stringently than one which seeks to legalise PAS and/or euthanasia:

‘...the patient is in a medically futile condition or constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that cannot be alleviated, resulting from a serious and incurable disorder cause by illness or accident.’​[1084]​

‘terminal illness’ means an illness which in the opinion of the consulting physician is inevitably progressive, the effects of which cannot be reversed by treatment (although treatment may be successful in relieving symptoms temporarily) and which will be likely to result in the patient’s death within a few months at most...’​[1085]​





During the course of this chapter numerous conclusions have been reached regarding the most appropriate way of reforming the law. Section 7 posited legislative reform, as opposed to the enactment of a policy or other similarly perfunctory method, as the most prudent vehicle with which to effect reform for two reasons; 

1.	firstly, because not reforming the law at all has, by virtue of the moral step back’s reasoning, been discounted as a possibility;​[1086]​ 
2.	and secondly, because reforming an existing defence in a manner that would allow a patient to seek assistance in dying would necessitate the creation of a separate set of safeguards to ensure that the possibility of abuse was minimised. 

For these reasons the reform this work presents in appendix 1 takes the form of a draft Bill entitled The Assistance In Dying Bill (AID). It will not aim to change any aspects of the laws of homicide or assisted suicide, nor will it, as opponents of reform often claim, effectively legalise either practice. Given the weight of academic commentary, judicial disdain for and the dangers inherent in legalising assisted dying, doing so would be jurisprudentially imprudent. Furthermore the absence of overt censure engendered by legalisation would neither accurately reflect the opinions of the medical community, nor cast the admittedly contentious practices in the correct light.

In view of these considerations, the Bill is written as a standalone piece of legislation that provides physicians with immunity from prosecution on the condition that they comply with a prescribed set of criteria. The decision to frame the proposed reform in this manner was based heavily on the precedent set by pre-existing legislation from Oregon,​[1087]​ the Netherlands​[1088]​ and also upon Lord Joffe’s most recent attempt at reforming English law in 2006.​[1089]​ The fifth row of Table 3 in section 8.1.3 of chapter 8 displays how the various methods by which the legislation studied pursuant to writing the Bill affect the legal systems they exist within, and there is a clear trend evidenced towards what this work terms the compliance-innocence method of regulation. As its name suggests, this method promises innocence to those people who comply with a set of criteria that impose checks and balances on the conduct in question. The Dutch Act for example works in this manner, stating in its preamble that, 
‘...We have considered that it is desired to include a ground for exemption from criminal liability for the physician who with due observance of the requirements of due care to be laid down by law terminates a life on request or assists in a suicide...’​[1090]​

Furthermore, while this work acknowledges the danger noted in section 7 of this chapter regarding overly wide-ranging reforms, the Bill will include both PAS and euthanasia within its ambit. At first sight this may seem counterintuitive, especially since Lord Joffe’s first draft of his Bill in 2004, which encompassed both forms of assistance, was rejected by the House of Lords for being too wide in scope. The Bill created pursuant to this work however is not similarly bound by a need to be thoroughly palatable to the legislature. Although the outlandishness of certain actions, writing in a covert legalisation of any form of assisted dying for example, is inherently acknowledged here and has informed the structure of the Bill, inclusions that the MSB necessitates to properly reflect its premises have not been missed out.



































The coming sections present the main themes within the pieces of legislation/Code set out in three separate tables to ease analysis and comparison. It should be noted that it is Lord Joffe's Bill, not the law surrounding assisted dying in England and Wales as a whole, that used to evaluate the AID Bill.

8.1.1 Table 1: Doctor related issues

	Australia	Belgium	Netherlands	Oregon	Switzerland	England and Wales
Doctor personally assists?	Yes: s.4 	Yes: s.3(1)	Yes: art.2(1)	Yes: s.1.01 (2); s.3.01.	No: Criminal Code does not specify.	Yes: s.2(1)
Conscientious objection?	Yes: s.5	Yes: s.14	No explicit mention.	Yes: s.4.01(4)	N/A	Yes: s.7(1)
Compelled to transfer patient to another doctor if unwilling to assist?	No: s.29	Yes: s.14	No explicit mention.	No: but see s.4.01(4)	N/A	Yes: s.7(2); s.7(3)
Second opinion?	Yes: s.7.1(c)	Yes: s.2(3); s.3(1)	Yes: art.2(1)(e)	Yes: s.1.01(4); s.3.02	N/A	Yes: s.2(3)
Reporting?	Yes: s. 13; s.14	Yes: s.5; s.6-s.13	Yes: art.3-art.19	Yes: s.3.11	As any criminal case would be.	Yes: s.14


8.1.2 Table 2: Patient related issues

	Australia	Belgium	Netherlands	Oregon	Switzerland	England and Wales
Terminally ill?	Yes: s.3; s.4; s.7(1)(b)(i)	Questionable: s.3(1) ‘medically futile’	No clear indication.	Yes: s.1.01(12); s.2.01	Nothing in the Criminal Code.	Yes: s.2(2)(c)
Voluntary?	Yes: s.4; s.7(1)(j)	Yes: s.3(1)	Yes: art.2(1)(a)	Yes: s.1.01(7); s.2.01	Art. 114 details the offence of ‘killing on request’.	Yes: s.2(2)(f); s.2(3)(f)
Suffering-objective/subjective?	Subjective: s.4	Objective: s.3(1)	Objective: art.2(1)(b)	Objective: s.2.01	N/A	Subjective: s.2(2)(d)
Age of majority?	Yes: s.7(1)(a)	Yes: s.3(1)	No: art. 2(2); 2(3); 2(4)	Yes: s.1.01(1)	N/A	Yes: s.1(2)


8.1.3 Table 3: Miscellaneous sections
	Australia	Belgium	Netherlands	Oregon	Switzerland	England and Wales
PAS or Euthanasia?	(P)AS: s.7(1)(p)	Euthanasia: s.2	Both PAS and euthanasia: art.2(1)(f)	PAS: s.2.01	Art.114 and 115 concern (P)AS	PAS: s. 1(2)
Waiting period?	Yes: s.7(1)(i) 7 days minimum	One month: s.3(3)(2)	No explicit mention	Yes: s.3.08 15 days minimum in repeating oral request	N/A	Yes: s.1(2)
Psychological assessment?	Yes: 7(1)(c)	Yes: s.3(3)(1)	No explicit mention	Non-compulsory: s.3.03	N/A	Non-compulsory: s.8
Certificate of request?	Yes: s.7(1)(i),(j),(k),(l)	The request must be in writing: s.3(4)	No explicit mention	Yes: s.2.02	N/A	Yes: s.4; s.6
How the Act/section changes the law.	Legalises PAS in accordance with the Act.	Legalises euthanasia in accordance with the Act.	Provides immunity from prosecution so long as the due care criteria are followed	Immunity from prosecution if Act is followed in good faith	Compassionate motives render unlawful assistance in suicide permissible	Assisted suicide still illegal-immunity granted if Act followed
Governing body?	The coroner: s.14; s.15	s.6(1) creates the Federal Control and Evaluation Commission.	Regional review Committees: art.3-art.19	The Department of Human Services: s.3.11	N/A	Monitoring commission: s.14




8.2 Evidence from interviews

The table in this section displays the thoughts of the interviewees regarding the key elements of this thesis’ arguments on acts and omissions; intention and foresight in respect of double effect; the participants’ views on euthanasia and assisted suicide as a whole; the reasons behind those views; their feelings on the possibility of reforming the law and, lastly, their reasons for feeling as they do about reform. 


8.2.1 Table 4: Participant opinions

	Acts/Omissions?	Intention/Foresight?	Pro/Anti reform?	As to column 3, why?	Is reform an option?
D1	Recognises the distinction.	N/A	Pro	The law is years out of date. Each individual has the right to decide about AS/EU.	The law needs ‘turning upside down’.​[1091]​
D2	Recognises the distinction.	Recognises the distinction.	Anti	It would be impossible to regulate the practice.	Reform would not make the law clearer.​[1092]​
D3	Was a little confused by the distinction and cited Dignitas, Daniel James and Dianne Pretty.	Recognises the distinction.	Pro	Experience in the Netherlands shows that a workable system is possible.	We should follow the example of the Netherlands.​[1093]​
D4	Recognises the distinction. Concedes the MSB has a point, but it is not D4’s point of view.	Recognises the distinction.	Anti	The danger posed by a slide into eugenics is too great to risk.	N/A​[1094]​
D5	Recognises the distinction. D5 is not against withdrawing treatment but will not administer treatments to end life.	Recognises the distinction.	Anti	Religious objections given to reform.	No chance of reform. Diametrically opposed to it.​[1095]​
D6	Passive euthanasia does happen in D6’s opinion and active euthanasia has a place in the future.	Recognises the distinction.	Pro	AS/EU ‘...has a place in the future’.	Change is necessary, but the participant felt unqualified to postulate on possible types.​[1096]​
D7	Didn’t see much of a distinction between acts and omissions.	Recognises the distinction.	Pro	Pro with qualifications: uncomfortable with the effect on the doctor’s role.	Felt that a separate branch of medicine should deal with AS/EU.​[1097]​
D8	Recognises the distinction.	The distinction is tantamount to ‘dancing on the end of a pin.’​[1098]​	Anti	Pro with qualifications: uncomfortable with the effect on the doctor’s role.	Greater clarity would be welcomed – legislative or otherwise.​[1099]​
D9	Recognises the distinction though spoke in terms of intention, not actions and omissions, in making the distinction.	Recognises the distinction.	Anti	It would be impossible to regulate. It is the doctor’s role to promote health.	Legislative reform is not the only change needed if society is to accept AS/EU.​[1100]​
D10	Recognises the distinction but is more comfortable with omitting treatment.	Recognises the distinction.	Pro	It is the doctor’s job to promote health and treat illness, not prolong life.	N/A​[1101]​
D11	Recognises the distinction.	Recognises the distinction.	Anti	There is a clear difference between AS/EU and therapeutic treatments.	It would be incredibly difficult to regulate the practice were it legislated for.​[1102]​
D12	Recognises the distinction.	Recognises the distinction.	Agnostic	There are benefits and burdens on both sides.	Perceived an inequality between patient demographics and access to AS/EU that reform could solve.​[1103]​
D13	Recognises the distinction.	Recognises the distinction.	Anti	It is not the ethos of the palliative care movement to promote AS/EU.	N/A​[1104]​

8.3 Deconstructing the Bill – preliminary considerations

The AID Bill is based on the MSB’s conclusion that active assistance in dying is already available under a cloak of sophistry surrounding the doctrine of double effect (DDE) and so called ‘passive’ euthanasia. Because of its covert nature this assistance is arguably regulated by little more than the practitioner’s conscience, a state of affairs which engenders confusion, sends a severely mixed message regarding the morality of assisted dying, and makes the possibility of abuse, if limited, far too great for comfort. This lack of regulation is what the Bill aims to remedy. It works both as a shield for physicians who find themselves dealing with a patient who seeks assisted dying, and as a mechanism for the patient to seek the assistance he desires in a formal, controlled manner. The coming sections explore the workings of the AID Bill’s reform in detail.

8.3.1 ‘Part A’ of the AID Bill (2011)

Part ‘A’ of the AID Bill (2011) contains clause three and its three sub-clauses. It works in tandem with the authorisations in clause 1 sub-clauses 1 and 2 which detail the Bill’s effect. Clauses 1(1), 1(2) and 1(3) contain references to numerous issues which are repeated throughout the Bill, all of which will be explored in greater depth in later sections of this chapter. Those pertinent to the present section are, firstly, the Bill’s effect, secondly, its extent and thirdly, the types of assistance in dying within its ambit. These will be discussed in turn.

The AID Bill’s effect has already been referenced on numerous occasions through the preceding sections and in section 7.3 of the preceding chapter, and needs little in the way of elaboration here. The Bill was written pursuant to what this work terms the ‘compliance-innocence’ model of regulation. That is it provides immunity from prosecution for those who seek it, providing they comply with a prescribed set of criteria set out in the Bill. This format is similar to that adopted in Oregon,​[1105]​ the Netherlands​[1106]​ and by Lord Joffe in his revisions of his Bill,​[1107]​ and, as row 5 of Table 3 in section 8.1.3 shows, it is the most common kind of regulation among the jurisdictions this work has focussed on for inspiration. This model is preferable to the approach that was adopted under the now repealed Australian Act​[1108]​ and to that which is still enforced in Belgium,​[1109]​ as both jurisdictions legalise a form of assisted dying. As sections 7 and 7.3 of the preceding chapter point out, legalising PAS or euthanasia discounts both jurisprudential and professional disdain for the practices.

But for Swiss law, the legislation this chapter is exploring stipulates that only a physician may end the life of his or her patient lawfully, and the AID Bill follows this trend in defining its extent. This restrictiveness implies that, while the decriminalisation of some form of medically assisted death is desirable, there is a need to maintain a prohibition on suicides assisted by non-physicians. As section 7 of the preceding chapter noted, there are numerous possible explanations for the restriction, the most obvious of which is that a physician has the requisite training needed to properly care for his dying patient, and to assist him with all due care,  where a non-physician does not.

The need to enforce the law’s negative view of assisted dying in general would be another reason for the restriction, as would the fact that creating barriers to who may legally assist a patient’s suicide reduces the risk of the provisions being abused. An example of one such barrier is provided by the Australian Act, which sets out the need for the assisting practitioner to remain free from outside influences in section 6(1); 

‘A person must not give or promise any reward or advantage (other than a reasonable payment for medical services), or by any means cause or threaten to cause any disadvantage, to a medical practitioner or other person for assisting or refusing to assist, or for the purpose of compelling or persuading the medical practitioner or other person to assist or refuse to assist, in the termination of a patient's life under this Act.’

This is the only piece of legislation that states these prohibitions so early in the text and in such clear terms. In fact, but for the provisions in the Oregon Act,​[1110]​ no other piece of legislation prohibits external influences expressly. In recognition of both the danger of biased judgements and of the need to maintain the impartiality of practitioners, clause 8(10) of the AID Bill emulates the Australian Act in noting that:

‘No person may give or promise to give the primary or secondary medical practitioner any reward or advantage for either assisting, or refusing to assist a patient to die. Furthermore, any physician who accepts such a reward or advantage has no legal right or capacity to receive or retain it…’

This provision adds to the earlier clauses of the Bill which are predicated upon ensuring that the patient is free from coercion.​[1111]​ This freedom is especially important because the AID Bill, as Lord Joffe’s did prior to the amendments prompted by the House of Lords Select Committee (HLSC), applies to instances of both euthanasia and PAS – clauses 1(1) and 1(2) respectively.

The decision to include both forms of assisted dying in the AID Bill was influenced by numerous factors, the most prominent of which was the MSB’s conclusions regarding the ability of a competent person to decide when and how his life should end. These conclusions are discussed at length in section 3.5.2 of chapter 3 and section 4.5.1 of chapter 4 of this work, and need not be extensively detailed here. It is pertinent only to note that, while it is recognised that there is no legal right to either end or have one’s life ended, the patient’s possession of competence and his personal approximation of his life’s worth should be the determining factors in how his request for assisted dying is treated. The ability to choose engendered by the possession of competence is best respected by allowing the patient the choice between either form of assisted dying covered by the Bill.

Further inspiration for the inclusion of both forms of assisted dying was drawn from the Australian, Belgian and Dutch legislation, and, as noted above, from Lord Joffe’s 2004 Bill. The preamble of the Australian Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 2001 states that:
‘(The) Act establish(es) and confirm(s) the right of a person who is terminally ill to request assistance from a medically qualified person to voluntarily terminate his or her life in a humane manner…’ 

The manner of the assistance, which is explained in the section, makes it clear that (like the AID Bill) both active euthanasia and PAS are included in the Bill’s ambit:

‘Assist… includes the prescribing of a substance, the preparation of a substance and the giving of a substance to the patient for self-administration, and the administration of a substance to the patient.’

Though it can only be speculated at this point why the Australian legislature settled on allowing both voluntary active euthanasia and PAS under the Bill, the reasons behind the AID Bill’s emulation of the format are clear. PAS, as can be seen in the Australian definition of ‘assist’, is indicative of the prescription of a substance which a patient then ingests. Similarly, the Oregon legislation is couched in terms of ‘written and oral requests for medication’ which are made by the patient ‘for the purpose of ending his own life in a humane and dignified manner…’​[1112]​ Both definitions presuppose the patient’s physical capacity to administer the lethal dosage without aid. 

Restricting an Act in this way has its advantages. As was noted above, the provisions regarding active euthanasia in Lord Joffe’s 2004 Bill were written out in an attempt to mollify critics who claimed that its scope was too wide.​[1113]​ Furthermore, including only PAS would shift the onus from the physician’s actions in actively procuring death, to the patient’s act of ‘self deliverance’ through ingesting the lethal medication provided under the Act. 

This shift however, while arguably providing physicians with a measure of psychological distance​[1114]​ from being the cause of a patient’s death, puts pressure on patients to ‘self deliver’, a task many would find too daunting to face. Lord Joffe pointed out on this issue that many attempts at suicide fail, leaving the patient in a worse state than that he wished to escape in the first place.​[1115]​ With that fear in mind, patients who may otherwise wish for assistance in dying could be deterred from requesting it under a ‘PAS only’ Act. This reticence raises the question whether those who thought to apply but did not due to the nature of the aid they would receive really wished for assistance in the first place, and whether, with this consideration in mind, it would not be safer to predicate the AID Bill on PAS alone. 

This dilemma raises two separate issues surrounding the efficacy of the AID Bill’s ambit. The first draws directly from the MSB’s assertions regarding the availability of active assistance in dying under the guise of purported omissions of treatment, and the second involves the physical condition of the patient himself. As to the first, the MSB claims, as chapter 1 section 1.4.1 made clear, that actions and omission are, but for in very specific circumstances, equivalent in their ends and means. This implies that it is already possible, by framing his request as one for an omission of treatment, for a patient to seek his own death through active means. This practice is, at present, unregulated and for this reason alone, the AID Bill provides an equivalent regulated option to that already available.

The second issue is raised not by the MSB or by the need for regulation, but in recognition of the fact that not all patients, regardless of their preferences as to the manner their death is procured, will be physically able to self-administer as PAS demands. While a more restrictive approach may safeguard against possible abuse by restricting the demographic of patients with access to the legislation, such a restriction would discriminate against patients who, regardless of their physical incapacity, desire assistance in dying. It would also force people with degenerative conditions like that afflicting Debbie Purdy​[1116]​ to avail themselves of that assistance earlier than they would be comfortable with. 

This argument is the same as that deployed by Ms Purdy in her case before the House of Lords, and it was compelling enough then to have the DPP ordered to promulgate a policy detailing his strategy for convicting persons accused of assisting suicide. While this move was criticised in section 5.4.2 of chapter 5 of this work, the weight of Ms Purdy’s argument should not be misjudged. Her worry about being rushed into a decision that is quite obviously pivotal in her life because she must make it while she is physically able to travel was clearly well-founded, and is one likely shared by others in her position.  Limiting the AID Bill’s ambit is therefore out of the question because doing so would have the same effect as the lack of concrete guidance on assisted suicide did in Ms Purdy’s case – it would force those who wish to be assisted to die and who have diminishing physical capacity to seek that assistance much sooner than they wish to. 

For these reasons the Bill offers immunity from prosecution for physicians, but not laymen, who assist a qualifying patient to die in the manner prescribed in the provisions contained in ‘Part B’ of the Bill. Precisely what makes a qualifying patient a qualifying patient and what his doctor must do to comply with the provisions of the Bill will be discussed next.

8.3.2 ‘Part B’ – Defining the ‘qualifying patient’

Before any assistance is given under any of the pieces of legislation detailed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in sections 8.1.1 through 8.1.3, the patient must ‘qualify’ under the Act in question. This section is devoted to discussing the inclusion criteria set out under the AID Bill, and will begin by quoting them clearly to aid evaluation. Clause 4 defines the qualifying patient in the following manner: 

‘(1) Before the primary physician can assist the qualifying patient’s suicide the conditions set out in the following clause must be met;
(a) The patient must be suffering from untreatable pain as a result of an intractable illness;
(b) The patient may, by virtue of his/her intractable illness or other physical incapacity, be unable to take his/her own life;
(c) The patient must have reached the age of 18 years;	
(d) Subject to the provisions in clauses 5(1), 5(2), 6(2) and 6(3), the patient must be deemed to have capacity to consent to treatment.’

Each of these requirements will be discussed in turn.

8.3.2(a) An ‘Intractable’ illness

‘...“intractable illness” means a physical illness which, in the reasonable medical judgement of the primary and secondary physicians, is inevitably progressive, the effects of which cannot be reversed by any treatment acceptable to the patient, although temporary relief may be possible.’​[1117]​

Clause 2(1) of the AID Bill, quoted above, requires that the patient who has been assisted under its provisions was suffering from an ‘intractable’ physical illness at the time of the assistance. The requirement that the illness be ‘physical’ is better suited to exploration in section 8.3.2(b), as its inclusion is tied directly in to the subject of that section. This section will focus on ‘intractability’.
 
The phrase ‘intractable’ and not ‘terminal’ was inspired by the definitional uncertainty rife amid both legal and professional writing concerning the latter. To better explicate the differences of jurisprudential opinion regarding the definition of ‘terminal’ and the nature of the illness required that the patient may ‘qualify’, those employed by the legislation of Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Oregon will be detailed and discussed below, grouped depending on the breadth their respective definitions employ. 

The Australian and Oregon legislation are the only pieces under scrutiny which refer directly to the illness as ‘terminal’:

‘…terminal illness, in relation to a patient, means an illness which in reasonable medical judgment will, in the normal course, without the application of extraordinary measures or of treatment unacceptable to the patient, result in the death of the patient.’​[1118]​

‘...‘terminal disease’ means an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months.’​[1119]​

These definitions have common components; the need for the disease to result in death and for reasonable medical judgement to determine the course of the illness.  The legislatures of Australia and Oregon have taken slightly different approaches to their definitions. 

The Australian legislation predicates its determination of what constitutes a ‘terminal illness’ on the illness’s ‘normal course’, if ‘no extraordinary measures’ are provided. Conversely the Oregon legislation emphasises the ‘incurable, irreversible’ quality of the disease and denotes the life expectancy of the patient as the chief determinant of what constitutes a terminal illness, 6 months being the allotted time limit. The inclusion of this criterion is troubling, as determining a person’s life expectancy is an inexact science at best. A person may be terminally ill, with Parkinson’s disease for example, but have a life expectancy of a number of years. This group of patients would therefore be excluded from the legislation’s ambit, a decision made to safeguard their interests perhaps since a limited scope allows fewer opportunities for abuse. 

Under the Belgian Act the patient must be in a ‘medically futile condition of constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering that cannot be alleviated, resulting from a serious and incurable disorder caused by illness or accident.’​[1120]​ This definition takes a different approach than those discussed above, no mention being made of the condition needing to be terminal. Instead, the phrases ‘medically futile’ and ‘serious and incurable’ are used. Whilst some may suggest that these criteria allude to the terminal character of the condition, the devil’s advocate would suggest that, strictly speaking, both fall far short of that mark. The same is true in the Dutch legislation. As Dr Legemaate of the KNMG (the Royal Dutch Medical Association) put it ‘the main basis is hopeless and unbearable suffering; it has nothing to do with your life expectancy…’​[1121]​ That being said however Dr Legemaate noted later that ‘…in actual practice I think that our law is very close to the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, in the sense that 95% or 98% of the cases…are patients within the last days or weeks of their life…’​[1122]​

A condition which is ‘medically futile’ need not be terminal, simply chronic, long term and whilst treatable, incurable. Arthritis in its worst cases could be seen as medically futile, the pain unrelenting regardless of the various treatments available for it. The same could be said about conditions such as severe asthma, certain types of heart disease and severe clinical depression; none are terminal in the direct sense of the definition, yet all are long term regardless of their treatability. Furthermore ‘they can become fatal: over the next 10 years almost five million people in the UK will die from a chronic condition.’​[1123]​

As noted above, the Dutch legislation and the Swiss Penal Code make even less reference to the terminal character of the illness required before their provisions may be relied upon.​[1124]​ The former in article 2(1)(b) states, much like the Belgian Act, that ‘…the patient’s suffering was lasting and unbearable’ and in article 2(1)(d) that ‘(the physician) and the patient hold the conviction that there was no other reasonable solution to the situation he was in’ but is otherwise lacking in definitional clarity. The Swiss law is even more vague, sections 111-115 of the Penal Code making no mention at all of the need for the ‘victim’ to be ill at all; only that the accused acted with an unselfish motive.

A further disparity noted when the definitions are compared is the need, or the lack of need for the disease to cause the patient to suffer to a degree he or she finds unbearable. As was shown above, the Australian and Oregonian definitions make no mention of suffering at all and the Swiss code is similarly silent. The Belgian legislation on the other hand closely links the patient’s suffering to the definition of ‘terminal illness’: ‘…constant and unbearable physical or mental suffering…resulting from a serious and incurable disorder …’​[1125]​ The same is true of the Dutch legislation which states: ‘…the patient’s suffering is lasting and unbearable…’,​[1126]​ though the former refers to both physical and mental suffering and the latter does not specify the type of suffering required.​[1127]​ The AID Bill is somewhat conservative on this issue, the need for the pain and suffering being corporeal is impressed to reduce the risk of the system covering too wide a patient group i.e. those who are clinically depressed and seeking assistance in dying. 

On this matter the scope of the Belgian legislation is further broadened by the provision in section 3, which deals with the situation where ‘…the physician believes that the patient is clearly not expected to die in the near future…’ The character of this provision, like those above which loosely define the form of illnesses covered, would meet considerable problems if introduced into the traditionally conservative English courts​[1128]​ and is therefore notably absent in the AID Bill. 

Both the Australian and Belgian legislation mention the need for ‘reasonable medical judgement’ to be exercised when diagnosing the patient’s condition as terminal. This parallels the need within English and Welsh law for medical decisions to be made in a manner concordant with those of a reasonable body of medical expertise; the Bolam​[1129]​ and Bolitho​[1130]​ principles. 





In each of the jurisdictions where legislation has been adopted to regulate assisted dying, suffering, in some form, is mentioned within the text. Its presence is even more pervasive than the need for its cause to be a terminal illness, and it is used as a kind of yardstick regarding the applicability of assisted dying to a patient’s case. The appropriate way to gauge this important facet of the ‘qualification’ criteria is a matter of considerable confusion. When debating Lord Joffe’s Bill, the HLSC noted that suffering – ‘unbearable suffering’ as the Bill stipulated in clause 2(2)(d) – was measured in two ways; from the patient’s subjective assessment of his or her suffering, backed up with the primary and secondary physicians’ objective conclusions.

 When presenting evidence to the HLSC regarding this method, Dr Tate of the National Council for Hospices and Specialist Palliative Care Services (NCHSPCS) noted:

‘…whilst it may be possible for the attending physician, based on a longer relationship with the patient, to assess changes in his level of suffering, such an assessment cannot be made during the course of a single visit to a consulting physician that the Bill envisages…’​[1131]​ 

A proper assessment, according to Dr Tate ‘may take a week or more of knowing the patient and the situation.’​[1132]​ While this conclusion is not disputed by the MSB, the AID Bill has sought to address it through including in clauses 5, 6 and most prominently in clause 7, a requirement that both physicians conduct a minimum of four sessions​[1133]​ with the patient. While this requirement could be critiqued as unwieldy, especially given the likelihood that a patient using the Bill would be very ill, it is recognised, on balance between paternalistic caution and respect for the patient’s autonomous choice to seek assisted dying, as necessary. As a result of this repeated contact with the patient, spread over a time period tailored to his specific needs, there are a minimum of eight chances for the physicians, working together as they are required to under the Bill, to assess the patient’s condition and make a judgement on whether he or she is or is not suffering to a degree ‘which cannot be adequately alleviated to the patient’s satisfaction by palliative care.’​[1134]​

The AID Bill’s stance on the need for ‘untreatable pain’ was based on the idea that ‘unbearable suffering’ was too subjective a criterion to be reliably assessed by the primary and secondary physicians. This formulation could, depending on how it is read, be seen as either objective or subjective. Objectively, the physician is aware of whether any of the treatments he proscribes reduce the patient’s pain by examining him. Subjectively, individual patients may react differently to the same medication, one finding relief, another finding none through the same dosages. One man’s untreatable pain may not be another’s.

Semantically however an intractable pain is more objective than an unbearable one. Something which is intractable cannot be cured by an outside agent, in this case the doctor and his treatments. Something which is unbearable on the other hand cannot be borne by the person who is afflicted by it, in spite of the continued hope of remission or cure. On this level one can understand the recommendation of the HLSC​[1135]​ to replace the latter with the former; the vagueness being replaced by some modicum of measureable effect, or in this case the lack of measureable effect on the patient’s suffering.

The use of ‘unbearableness’ has its supporters however. Dr Wilks of the NCHSPCS states that ‘it is necessarily vague…the important point is that it is what the patient feels is unbearable…’​[1136]​ Further support for the patient having the final say on what he or she considers ‘unbearable’ was given by Baroness Greengross. She felt that: 

‘...with all the safeguards and all the expertise being available…it is that person in the end whose view should prevail, because it is about the quality of that person’s life.’​[1137]​

The difficulty in adopting this phraseology is that not all conditions that are unbearable, are terminal. Dr Gilbert, also of the NCHSPCS points out that ‘...there are people with arthritis who find it unbearable that their lives are restricted by the pain that they have to endure chronically, perhaps for many years.’​[1138]​ 

On the strength of the HLSC’s recommendations regarding Lord Joffe’s Bill, and the earlier discussion regarding untreatable pain as both objectively and subjectively comprehensible, the AID Bill states in clause 2(1) that ‘...“untreatable pain” means corporeal, bodily pain and/or mental anguish, which cannot be adequately alleviated to the patient’s satisfaction by palliative care.’ The subjectivism i.e. the patient’s feeling that the pain is unremitting regardless of treatment, apparent in the definition, is balanced with an objective assessment made by the primary and secondary physicians (clauses 5(4)(c) and 6(5)(d) respectively) who, in their clinical judgement, must also conclude that the patient is in ‘untreatable’ pain.

The definition seen in clause 2(1), that the pain can be corporeal ‘and/or mental’, is mildly contentious, particularly with regard to the discussion of the Chabot​[1139]​ case in section 5.7.1 of chapter 5 of this work. Concern was voiced in that section that the patient in Chabot, Mrs B, was actually mentally incompetent as a result of wracking depression at the time of her suicide. She had expressed a wish to die after years of battling with her depression, citing untreatable mental suffering as her justification to Chabot.​[1140]​ In light of this it would seem that making allowances for mental anguish in the AID Bill is counterintuitive, especially if the evidence presented by Emanuel et al​[1141]​ and Meier et al​[1142]​ on physicians’ inability to diagnose clinical depression is accurate.​[1143]​

However, the danger of the Bill becoming a poison pill for the untreatably depressed is diminished by a number of clauses, clause 1(1) in particular which, while outlining the Bill’s extent, states that the untreatable pain must be caused by the patient’s intractable physical illness. Clinical depression, though it can be progressive and in certain cases untreatable, is without question an illness of the mind, and clause 2(1) excludes such illnesses from the AID Bill’s purview. Clause 5(2) adds a further safeguard against the infiltration of clinical depression into the AID Bill’s ambit by providing that a physician who feels that a patient is suffering from some kind of psychological or psychiatric problem must refer that patient to a qualified psychiatrist for evaluation and treatment.​[1144]​

The MSB’s respect for patient autonomy is only fettered by its need to ensure that the patients it affects are competent. Clause 2(1), in recognition of both this fact, and of the difficulty inherent in distinguishing between mental suffering caused by a depressive illness, and the depressive illness itself, seeks to exclude patients like Mrs B from its ambit.

8.3.2(c) The patient may be unable to take his own life

Clause 4(1)(b) of the AID Bill states that, ‘The patient may, by virtue of his/her intractable illness or other physical incapacity, be unable to take his/her own life.’ This condition puts into practice the statement in clauses 1(1) and 1(2), which extend the Bill’s remit to include active euthanasia and PAS. The former is included in clause 1(1) and the latter in clause 1(2);

‘The provisions of this Bill provide immunity from prosecution to doctors who perform active euthanasia as defined under clause 2(1) of this Bill on a person who has an intractable illness which: a) is causing him/her untreatable pain which cannot be adequately alleviated by palliative care and b) may have caused him/her to be physically incapable of taking his/her own life.’

	‘Or, who provide a person who is suffering from untreatable pain as a consequence of an intractable illness, which cannot be adequately relieved by palliative care, with a means to end his/her own life with dignity at a time of his/her choosing.’

As section 8.3.1 explained, this decision was based on the MSB’s claims regarding the current availability of unregulated active assistance in dying, and in recognition of the fact that not all patients who competently seek assisted dying will be able to avail themselves of PAS because of a physical handicap such as that which faced Dianne Pretty. 

This decision is not an uncontroversial one by any means. Mayo and Gunderson​[1145]​ point out that certain disability activist groups, ‘Not Dead Yet’ (NDY) being a notably vocal one, maintain that it is impossible to provide adequate protection for the disabled from abuses of any form of leniency in the prohibition on assisted dying. They feel that the disabled are subject to negative social conditioning, both within their demographic and outside it in the able population, to feel, and to be seen, as more apt candidates for PAS or euthanasia.​[1146]​

The New York State Task Force on Life and the Law​[1147]​ was of a similar opinion and proclaimed that the ‘social risks’ of legalising assisted dying were too great, and that even those people for whom further treatment was not an option should not be allowed access to it. Even Velleman, who acknowledges the argument in favour of assisted dying with reference to autonomy and self determination, feels that legalisation would be an unwise legislative move. It would expose, in his view, vulnerable sub-groups in the population to a further source of pressure to end their lives. His view is that ‘...this is one occasion where it is better not to have more choice.’​[1148]​

The MSB, while acknowledging these dangers, respectfully disagrees with the supposition upon which they appear to be based.  It appears, going on the evidence noted above, that NDY and the New York State Task Force are of the opinion that at present assisted dying is not available. They are correct inasmuch as active euthanasia and PAS are illegal, but both disregard the availability of ‘passive’ means of procuring death by choice entirely. At present, the law does not discriminate between the physically able patient and his disabled counterpart in terms of allowing one to have his treatment withdrawn and not the other. Since withdrawal is understood to constitute action by the MSB, both the able and the disabled can presently access active assistance in dying, and the AID Bill mirrors this.
8.3.2(d) The age of majority

Clause 4(1)(c) of the AID Bill, sets out the requirement that, ‘The patient must have reached the age of 18 years.’ Explaining this stipulation Brazier points out ‘Once a person reaches 18, the age of majority, no one else, be he next of kin or a professional carer such as a social worker, can consent to treatment on his behalf.’​[1149]​ In legislation concerning PAS or euthanasia the ‘majority’ requirement is used as a measure of competence to consent to treatment. Being that treatment without consent is a criminal act,​[1150]​ the inclusion of this tariff appears essential. 

The Australian Act, for example, states in section 7(a) that ‘the patient (must have) attained the age of 18 years’. The same is true of the Oregon Act which, in section 127.800 s.1.01(1) provides, ‘…’Adult’ means an individual who is 18 years of age or older.’ Excluding minor-patients in this way acts as a possible fetter on how wide a range of prospective patients can legally apply to end their lives.

The Dutch and Belgian legislation go against this trend however.​[1151]​ Both Acts, under certain circumstances, allow minors to seek assistance and the Dutch provisions go furthest in allowing this. Under section 2(2) of the Dutch Act:

‘If the patient aged sixteen years or older is no longer capable of expressing his will, but prior to reaching this condition was deemed to have a reasonable understanding of his interests and has made a written statement containing a request for termination of life, the physician may carry out this request…’

Note here, unlike the later sections, that the patient’s parent or guardian is not mentioned as being involved with the decision making processes regarding the cessation of treatment or assistance in suicide. An allusion is made in the phrase ‘…made a written statement containing a request for termination…’ to an advance directive being sufficient for assistance to be rendered, though the phrase (advanced directive) itself is never expressly mentioned in the text of the Act. It is also clear in this section that, to qualify under it, the patient must be presently unable to express his will i.e. he is incompetent in the legal sense.

The Dutch legislation goes on to break down prospective patients into age categories; subsection 3 applying to competent 16 to 18 year olds​[1152]​ and subsection 4 to competent 12 to 16 year olds,​[1153]​ In order to qualify the patient must be deemed to have a ‘reasonable understanding of his interests…’ a similar criterion as that used in England and Wales to establish competence in children under the Gillick​[1154]​ principle.
Despite the possibility of erecting safeguards to doubly protect minor patients from the risks of mistaken beliefs, misinformation and even possible abuse – as imposed by the Dutch legislation i.e. the need for parental consent for the PAS or euthanasia is performed – the AID Bill does not include provisions allowing minors to be assisted to die. While doing so may acknowledge their inherent right and ability to exercise their autonomy, it would also render the demographic of patients who ‘qualify’ under the Bill far too encompassing for comfort. 

Linked to the issue of being ‘of age’ to be able to consent to treatment is the voluntariness of the provision of that consent. Both issues are addressed by the legislation on PAS and euthanasia and the AID Bill is no exception. Section 8.3.2(e) discusses this requirement.

8.3.2(e) Capacity and the voluntary character of the patient’s request

From its inception the MSB has made the case that a competent patient should be able to make a fully informed and voluntary decision to end or have his life ended in a regulated manner. The words ‘competence’, ‘competent’ and capacity are commonly understood to denote different concepts. ‘Competence’ and ‘competent’ describe the state of being possessed of the ‘capacity’ to make informed choices, where ‘capacity’ itself is what a person possessed of ‘competence’ has. Thus, provided that the patient is competent when he decides to pursue assistance under the Bill, his request for it can be granted. 

The need for voluntariness is mirrored in each of the pieces of legislation utilised by this work in constructing the AID Bill, as the following quotations show;


‘...the medical practitioner is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that the patient is of sound mind and that the patient’s decision to end his or her life has been made freely, voluntarily and after due consideration.’​[1155]​

‘…the request is voluntary, well considered and repeated and is not the result of any external pressure…’​[1156]​ 

‘...the physician...holds the conviction that the request by the patient is voluntary and well-considered...’​[1157]​

‘...if the patient persists with his request to be assisted to die, (the physician must satisfy) himself that the request is made voluntarily and that the patient has made an informed decision...’​[1158]​

‘...’Informed decision’ means a decision by a qualified patient, to request and obtain a prescription to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner, that is based on an appreciation of the relevant facts...’​[1159]​

In recognition both of the above-evidenced trend and of the MSB’s conclusions regarding the competent patient’s ability to make decisions as to how his life should end, the Bill is predicated on providing a framework in which those decisions can be made safely. Many of its provisions are in place to ensure that the patient looking to use the legislation is making his decisions free from coercion, and that the doctor looking to be protected by the clause 3 immunity is equally so.

Not only must the patient’s request be voluntary, it must, per the Dutch legislation, be well considered.​[1160]​ Despite its importance however, The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act goes no further in defining what constitutes a ‘well considered’ decision, leaving it up to the discretion of the physician attending the patient. The Oregon Act goes into greater depth and states: 

‘(7) Informed decision means a decision by a qualified patient, to request and obtain a prescription to end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner, which is based on an appreciation of the relevant facts and after being fully informed by the attending physician of:
(a) His or her medical diagnosis;
(b) His or her prognosis;
(c) The potential risks associated with taking the medication to be prescribed;
(d) The probable result of taking the medication to be prescribed; and
(e) The feasible alternatives, including, but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care and pain control.’

Without this informed decision the patient cannot be given the prescription promised under the Act.​[1161]​ Similar provisions are included in the AID Bill, specifically in clauses 5(4)(a), 6(2)(a) and 6(2)(b) which detail the primary and secondary physician’s duties. These duties are supplemented with the requirement that, if the patient’s capacity to consent is in doubt, he must be referred to an independent psychiatrist for evaluation. This psychiatrist is tasked with discovering and treating clinical depression or any other psychological condition affecting the patient’s ability to consent. 

Referral was at first going to be mandatory under the AID Bill irrespective of the patient’s competence, an issue which could rightly incite criticism from opponents of reform due to the impairment any form of mandatory care imposes upon the patient’s personal autonomy. Lord Joffe, when asked about the inclusion of such a stipulation, regarded it as, whilst wise, impractical, the availability of psychiatrists being limited.​[1162]​ He also pointed out that the diagnosis of depression or any other psychological condition would take more than a single consultation, by which time the patient may either be too ill to continue with them or have passed away in the interim. This latter issue is likely dampened by the AID Bill’s lack of the ‘terminally ill’ criterion in Joffe’s own work, but the idea of mandatory psychiatric referral remains thorny. 

Its inclusion here was based on an appreciation of the dangers posed to vulnerable patients by undiagnosed mental illness. This is an all too common phenomena according to Emanuel who, in his work The Practice of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States, cites statistics regarding how patients are slipping through the net when it comes to proper psychiatric observation prior to euthanasia being performed;

‘…less than 10% (of the patients studied) received psychiatric evaluations for depression, and at least one depressed patient who was given euthanasia refused psychiatric care. How many depressed patients were not diagnosed or not given proper treatment but were given euthanasia or PAS we could not determine.’​[1163]​

Meier, Emmons, Wallenstein, Quill, Morrison, and Cassel further establish this worrying trend by providing evidence that in 39% of cases patients who received euthanasia were depressed. A lower, though equally worrying 19% of PAS patients were also depressed.​[1164]​ Emanuel concludes that ‘These data suggest a lack of adequate palliative care for psychological symptoms prior to use of euthanasia and PAS.’​[1165]​ In light of this evidence the question of mandatory referral is clearly raised. Is the cost to a possibly depressed patient’s autonomy low enough that he should be mandatorily referred to a psychiatrist if his physician suspects a mental issue? 


8.3.2(e)(i) Should psychiatric referral be mandatory?

The Australian legislation makes a consultation with a ‘qualified psychiatrist’​[1166]​ mandatory in section 7(c)(ii): 

‘…two other persons, neither of whom is a relative or employee of, or a member of the same medical practice as, the first medical practitioner or each other …the other who is a qualified psychiatrist, have examined the patient…’

This psychiatrist confirms that the patient is not suffering from clinical depression, the same function listed in the AID Bill.​[1167]​ The Oregon legislation is markedly different. It, like Lord Joffe’s Bill, leaves the referral at the discretion of the attending and consulting physicians:

‘If in the opinion of the attending physician or the consulting physician a patient may be suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment, either physician shall refer the patient for counselling. No medication to end a patient’s life in a humane and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing the counselling determines that the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing impaired judgment.’​[1168]​

This issue has been mentioned in Keown’s critique of Lord Joffe’s Bill.​[1169]​ It was pointed out that few physicians could effectively diagnose clinical depression, the underlying reason for the mandatory referral in the AID Bill. On the other end of the spectrum, the Dutch Act makes no mention at all of psychiatric referral and in Belgium, one need only be consulted:

‘...If the physician believes the patient is clearly not expected to die in the near future, he/she must also: consult a second physician, who is a psychiatrist or a specialist in the disorder in question…’​[1170]​

The balance struck between personal autonomy and paternalism is a tenuous one. On the one hand, forcing a patient to undergo psychiatric appraisal as part of the qualification procedure under the AID Bill seems almost immoral, considering the state of his health and life expectancy – an unnecessary hurdle presented to further ensure that the patient really is sure of his decision. Furthermore, it goes against the MSB’s overriding tenet, the preservation of the patient’s autonomy. On the other, without it, Emanuel​[1171]​and Meier et al’s​[1172]​ evidence will have gone unheeded and may indeed be added to in terms of patients slipping through undiagnosed and untreated.

In recognition of the above arguments the AID Bill leaves referral to the physician’s discretion, much as the Oregon Act does. The argument that such discretion could be misused by malefactors falls to another of Lord Joffe’s astute observations: a physician looking to repeat the actions of Harold Shipman would not act within the confines of a piece of legislation, desperately looking for loopholes or loosely worded phrases so his crimes would go unpunished.​[1173]​ He would simply act without regard for the law. Furthermore, the physician would not need to diagnose a mental problem himself, he would only need to suspect one. This negates the effect of Emanuel and Meier et al’s critiques regarding the inability of physicians to diagnose depression because this task is delegated to an appropriately trained party. 

A final point of note on this topic requires a brief look at the precise wording of clause 5(2) of the AID Bill,

‘Psychiatric referral is not mandatory under this Bill. However if, in his opinion, the patient is suffering from a psychological or psychiatric problem the primary physician must refer him to a qualified psychiatrist.’

The use of the word ‘must’ in the final line of the clause would appear, at first glance, to undercut the above noted latitude physicians have in referring patients for psychiatric assessment. However, it is only when the physician suspects the patient is psychologically troubled that he must make the referral. This stipulation was included to ensure that patients receive the care and counselling they need, and to ensure that a physician who suspects that a patient is having problems has access to an appropriately qualified second opinion.

8.3.2(f) The Waiting Period

Of the four legislation-bound jurisdictions explored in this chapter, three, Australia, Belgium and Oregon, refer explicitly to a waiting period in the text;

‘...the patient, or a person acting on the patient’s behalf...has, not earlier than 7 days after the patient has indicated to his or her medical practitioner (that he or she wishes to end his or her life)...’​[1174]​

‘Allow at least one month to pass between the patient’s written request and the act of euthanasia.’​[1175]​

‘Waiting periods. No less than fifteen (15) days shall elapse between the patient’s initial oral request and the writing of a prescription under ORS 127.800 to 127.897. No less than 48 hours shall elapse between the patient’s written request and the writing of a prescription under ORS 127.800 to 127.897.’ ​[1176]​

Waiting periods serve many purposes. They allow the administrative tasks required under the Act in question to be fulfilled, give the patient time to consider his/her request for assistance, allow any palliative care or other treatments the patient is undergoing time to take effect, allow the patient’s physicians to distinguish a reasoned request from a cry for help​[1177]​ and so on. It is less the overall importance of the waiting period that is under scrutiny here and more the necessary length of that to be imposed upon the patient before his/her request can be granted. If the time between initial request and actual assistance is too long, the patient may die before it elapses. On the other hand, if the period is too short the administrative processes may end up being rushed through, the patient may not consider his/her request fully or make a misinformed decision as the time runs down. 

The Australian Act is at the shorter end of the time scale, leaving a minimum of 7 days between initial request and assistance being rendered. On the other end of the scale, the Belgian Act requires a month to pass. The Oregon Act falls midway between the two, 15 days being the minimum time elapsed between request and the issuance of the prescription. Lord Joffe​[1178]​ recommended a period of no less than 14 days, in his Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill (2004).​[1179]​ The AID Bill was initially vague with regards to this tenuous area. The only mention of the waiting period being the definitional clause 2(1): ‘...’waiting period’ means the period of time that must elapse between the patient’s initial request for assisted suicide and the administration of drugs to cause death…’

Pinpointing the requisite period requires an appreciation of the length of time the processes under the AID Bill will likely cover, especially with there being a required minimum number of ‘sessions’ between the patient and his physicians stipulated in clause 7. A minimum of 4 of these meetings are needed with both the primary and secondary physicians before the patient qualifies under the Bill. These eight meetings could be spread with ease over the Belgian month between request and assistance, one with each physician being conducted in each week. 

This however raises two issues with regard to the untreatably ill; the first is that of life expectancy, and the second concerns weighing in the balance the need for protecting the patient’s interests by giving him time to consider his decision and lengthening his discomfort by having him wait for an extended period of time. 

While the AID Bill lacks both the phrase ‘terminally ill’ and omits any reference to time periods as measures of the ‘intractable’ quality of the patient’s illness, it is still a foreseeable possibility that, were it enacted, the Bill would be applied in cases where a patient is terminally ill. Furthermore, while the MSB recognises and supports the need for a person seeking assisted dying to be extensively counselled and availed of all available palliative care, this recognition is bordered by the need to protect that person’s autonomy. The waiting period must therefore strike an appropriate balance between the protection of the patient’s interests in being allowed to rethink his decision and change his mind, and protecting the choice he has made, if indeed he does not change his mind and goes ahead with seeking assistance. 

As such the Bill falls to the midway point between the two extremes presented by the Australian and Belgian legislation and stipulates, as the Oregon Act does, a minimum of 14 days needing to have elapsed between request and assistance.​[1180]​ With 14 days as the minimum requirement, each individual case can be afforded the time best suited to the patient’s circumstances and character. This allows his interests to be protected, while not being so restrictive on his autonomy as to stifle his ability to pursue assisted dying altogether.

8.3.3 ‘Part B’ – the roles and characteristics of the doctor under the AID Bill (2011)

As sections 7.3 and 8.3.1 noted, the AID Bill is based upon the same compliance-innocence model of enforcement that the Oregon and Dutch legislation and Lord Joffe’s Bill are. In order to use the mechanisms provided in the Bill, the physician(s) in charge of caring for the patient must fulfil certain criteria in order to be availed of the immunity detailed in clauses 1, 3 and their respective subsections. 

Tables 1 and 2 in sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 make it clear that there are certain criteria shared across the compliance-innocence based legislation, perhaps the most common being the need for more than one physician to be involved in the patient’s case. Take for example the Oregon Act, which describes the roles of each physician in its ‘definitions’ section:

 ‘...‘Attending physician’ means the physician who has primary responsibility for the care of the patient and treatment of the patient’s terminal disease.’​[1181]​
‘...‘Consulting physician’ means a physician who is qualified by specialty or experience to make a professional diagnosis and prognosis regarding the patient’s disease.’​[1182]​

The reason for the requirement that two physicians work in tandem on a patient’s case is best exposed by considering the effect that having one work alone would have. Without a mandatory referral to a ‘consulting’ or ‘secondary’ physician, the opinions of the ‘attending’ or ‘primary’ one would be the sole medical basis required by the Act before the patient could receive the assistance he has sought in ending his life. While it would not be the case that the ‘primary’ physician would be without recourse to his colleagues for a second opinion should he need one, the lack of a legislative mandate requiring one before a patient could be assisted under the Act leaves the dangers of misdiagnosis and malfeasance unanswered.

Two physicians working together allows a second opinion to be sought by the primary physician from a colleague who is as involved with the patient’s case as he is, reducing the risk of misdiagnosis. It also allows a kind of internal regulation to take place, each physician being the most prudently placed individual to notice irregularities in his counterpart’s handling of a given case. For these reasons the AID Bill contains provisions requiring two physicians to work closely on the patient’s case. 

Much as it has in stipulating the necessity for at least two physicians, the AID Bill has been influenced by the legislation of other jurisdictions in defining the physicians’ functions. Clauses 5(4)(a) through 5(4)(e) detail the primary physician’s duties once he has determined his patient is competent:

‘(a) He must thoroughly examine the patient and conclude to the best of his ability that his/her prognosis and diagnosis are accurate.
(b) He must conclude on the basis of the psychiatrist’s evaluation...and his own examination of the patient that he/she is competent to consent to treatment and that he/she is free of coercion.
(c) He must conclude on the basis of his diagnosis/prognosis that the patient is in untreatable corporeal pain.
(d) He must, (in collusion with the psychiatrist if one was consulted in pursuance of clause 5(2)) counsel the patient repeatedly about his/her options regarding further treatment, further palliative care and pain control. The minimum number of these sessions is four.
(e) If, after the minimum number of the sessions referred to in clause 5(4)(d)  has passed, the patient repeats his/her request for euthanasia/PAS the primary physician and the psychiatrist...must talk him/her through the process of euthanasia/PAS to ensure full comprehension before making the referral to the secondary physician.’

Many of these provisions are straightforward and require little in the way of clarification. One which stands out however is that within clause 5(4)(d) which specifies, ‘The minimum number of...sessions is four.’ The same number is required of the secondary physician in clauses 6(5)(a) through 6(5)(f), which detail the content of the sessions he has with the patient. Specifics are included here to both ensure that the patient has (at least) semi-constant access to a knowledgeable point of contact who knows his case well, and to facilitate the best possible monitoring of the patient’s case. The repeated contact will also allow the physicians involved to garner a fuller appreciation of the patient’s home circumstances than fewer meetings would allow, and will make spotting coercion and undue influence exerted upon the patient by his or her family or associates easier.

The primary physician’s role is very similar to that of the secondary physician, the latter of which is detailed in clause 6(1) through 6(5) of the AID Bill. It is the primary physician, not the secondary, who seeks the protection offered under the Bill, as it is he who provides the assistance the patient requests. Despite the difference however, neither can be rightly compelled to assist any given patient. The right to conscientious objection is as pervasive in legislation concerning assisted dying as the role of the secondary physician is, and is the subject of section 8.3.3(a).


8.3.3(a) The Quandary of Conscientious Objection

The AID Bill, like Lord Joffe’s Bill and the legislation in Australia,​[1183]​ Belgium​[1184]​ and Oregon​[1185]​ provides an ‘exemption for persons with conscientious objections to taking any of the actions which (they) authorise’​[1186]​ in sections 10(1)-10(3). The right of the physician to refuse to assist a patient in his/her suicide is as vital a component in legislation regarding PAS and euthanasia as the right of the patient to rescind his/her request for assistance. It recognises that autonomy is not only the right of the competent patient, but of his/her physician as well. 

 There is a quandary presented by providing this exemption however. If it was not provided, physicians who wanted no part in overseeing PAS or performing active euthanasia would be forced into acting against their will. Providing the discretion allows those who are unwilling to opt out, but there is an accompanying danger in providing it that the HLSC identified, ‘...if it (Joffe’s Bill) were to become law, (it) might well be unworkable because of the conscientious objections of many of those who would be called upon to put it into practice.’​[1187]​ 

How then could the practical necessity of providing a conscientious objection clause be met while at the same time avoiding the problems warned of by the Select Committee, above? In an interview in 2007 Lord Joffe insisted that a Bill ‘cannot impose a duty on the doctor; it must be entirely up to him’​[1188]​ whether he gets involved or not. He suggested phraseology such as ‘the doctor may help…’ instead of ‘the doctor must, or shall help…’ as one method of ensuring the choice remained with the physician. 

Clauses 5 and 6 of the AID Bill, which detail the extent of the primary and secondary physician’s duties, follow the latter of the above examples. For example clause 5(1) states: ‘Once the patient has requested assisted suicide the primary physician must make a preliminary diagnosis and prognosis…’ This clause was drafted on the assumption that a practitioner who was approached by a patient for assistance would have assented to giving that assistance prior to following the procedure provided in the Bill. As such it makes no express mention of the practitioner’s right to refuse that assistance – rather relying on the conscientious objection paragraphs in clauses 10(1)-10(3) to make that right clear. It is for this reason also that the provisions were drafted so defiantly i.e. instructing the practitioner on what he or she ‘must’ do once proceedings are getting underway instead of what he or she ‘may’ do. Furthermore, writing in terms of what a practitioner ‘may’ do is liable to attract criticism in that the Bill’s safeguards could be overlooked or circumvented by malefactors, or loosely interpreted by a practitioner who wants to end a patient’s suffering quickly and misses out a couple of steps in order to speed the process along.

In further recognition of the physician’s intrinsic right to refuse to assist a patient who is seeking PAS or active euthanasia, clause 1(3) states ‘No physician is under any obligation to assist a patient under this Bill.’ This outright recognition of the abovementioned right adds credence to the conscientious objection section in clauses 10(1)-10(3) and is also an accurate statement of the Bill’s stance on the right to autonomy; both for the patient who seeks assistance and the doctor, who is free to give or refuse to give it as he or she sees fit. The coming section tackles the question of whether the doctor who makes use of clause 10(1) has an obligation to pass on his patient’s case to a physician who is willing to assist him.


8.3.3(a)(i) Must an objecting physician refer his patient’s case to a willing colleague?

If a piece of legislation is to allow a practitioner the scope to refuse to assist a patient, should it not also allow him discretion as to whether he wishes to pass the patient’s case on to another physician who is willing to assist that patient’s suicide? Some would argue that doing so, that passing on the patient’s case, is tantamount to rendering the assistance personally.

The Australian Act supplements its conscientious objection clause in the following manner;
 ‘If a health care provider is unable or unwilling to carry out a direction of a medical practitioner for the purpose of the medical practitioner assisting a patient under this Act and the patient transfers his or her care to another health care provider, the former health care provider must, on request, transfer a copy of the patient's relevant medical records to the new health care provider…’​[1189]​

This section puts a positive obligation on the practitioner who refuses to assist a patient, though it does not go as far as to impose upon him the duty to find a willing alternate physician and transfer the patient to him personally. A similar, though more encompassing, requirement was considered for inclusion during the drafting of the AID Bill. In a previous version of the Bill, clauses 10(2) through 10(4), 14(1) and 14(5) read as follows:

‘10(2) The Commission, later detailed, will have as one of its duties the maintenance of a non-exhaustive list of practitioners who do not object to assisting patients in the manner outlined in this Bill.

10(3) Whilst the primary physician has no obligation to refer the patient to a specific doctor who will assist him/her under this Bill, he is obliged to refer the patient to the list mentioned in clause 10(2).

10(4) Whilst the secondary physician has no obligation to refer the patient to a specific doctor who will assist him/her under this Bill, he is obliged to refer the patient to the list mentioned in clause 10(2).

14(1) There shall be established such number of Monitoring Commissions covering countries or regions forming part of Great Britain as the Secretary of State may determine, to review the operation of this Bill, to maintain a non-exhaustive list of practitioners who do not object to assisting patients in the manner outlined in this Bill, and to hold and monitor records maintained pursuant to this Bill.

14(5) Pursuant to clause 14(1) there shall be collated and circulated between the Monitoring Commissions a non-exhaustive list of practitioners who do not object to assisting patients in the manner outlined in this Bill. This list is confidential, inclusion upon it is completely voluntary and a physician may have his or her name removed from it at any time, for any reason.’

The ethos behind the inclusion of a list of practitioners who would register their willingness to work under the Bill was based on the want to provide patients seeking assistance in dying with a point of reference, should their physician be disinclined to assist them personally. Since the physicians involved in the patient’s case would not be granted anonymity in the reports and files sent to the Monitoring Commissions under the procedure set out in clauses 13 and 14 of the Bill, it was concluded that providing the list would not offend the physicians’ privacy. Inclusion on it was not mandatory, the list was to be kept confidential and as clause 14(5) shows, it could be absented from at any time, for any reason.

This idea however is fraught with potential problems. For a start, without any kind of impetus to put one’s name to the list, it would almost impossible to convince a physician of the worth of doing so. The potential harm that could come from identifying oneself as, if not an advocate of assisted dying then at least as someone willing to entertain the idea of it, would far outweigh the potential assistance such identification would give to a patient in terms of clarity. Added to this, the risk of the list somehow entering the public domain would, even with the assurances of confidentiality written into the Bill, be too great to warrant its creation. With the current highly polarised views the press take on euthanasia and PAS, those who entered their names on the list would risk being demonised should it ever be made public. The risk of irreparable damage to one’s career and practice would be much too great for the use of the list to be workable.

Presently the AID Bill is framed in much more conservative terms. The physician’s right to refuse to assist a patient under the Bill is recognised in clause 10(1): ‘This clause recognises the right of medical practitioners to object to giving either assisted suicide or euthanasia.’ Furthermore, nowhere in the Bill is the physician required to personally refer a patient to a colleague he or she knows to be willing to assist him. Clauses 10(2) and 10(3), amended following the earlier draft quoted above, recognise this specifically,

‘(2) The primary physician has no obligation to refer the patient to a specific doctor who will assist him/her under this Bill. (3) The secondary physician has no obligation to refer the patient to a specific doctor who will assist him/her under this Bill.’
        
8.3.3(b) The AID Bill and palliative care

As was the case with compulsory psychiatric assessment, in an earlier draft the AID Bill required the patient to have undergone an unsuccessful course of palliative treatment before he could be availed of the assistance therein. Emanuel states in support of this supposition, ‘Properly utilised, euthanasia and PAS are ‘last ditch’ interventions, interventions that can be justified only after appropriate palliative options are attempted.’​[1190]​ This stipulation was set as another safeguard for the patient, to ensure that he had a real need for the assistance offered by the Bill before seeking it. 

In hindsight however the provision was flawed on three counts: 

1.	it caused an unacceptable impingement on the patient’s autonomy; 
2.	it did not recognise the lacking availability of palliative care services, and; 
3.	it disregarded the fact that most courses of palliative treatment only begin to have effects when sustained for an extended period. 

By the time the patient finds that a treatment is not sufficient to alleviate his or her pain and suffering, his illness may be so far progressed that proceedings under the Bill would take too long to be of use.

The difficulty of imposing mandatory palliative care on patients is further explained by the HLSC, which pointed out, ‘…palliative care in the United Kingdom is of a very high quality but inadequately resourced and unevenly spread…’​[1191]​ Evidence was then adduced to the effect that ‘there is…something of a postcode lottery (in respect of the availability of palliative care)…there are…237 palliative care consultants in England and Wales, with 100 posts unfilled; and 3195 palliative care beds in the United Kingdom, of which 2522 are in the voluntary sector.’​[1192]​ The HL went on to quote Professor Mike Richard, National Cancer Director at the Department of Heath. ‘Geographical provision’ he said ‘is uneven and does not always match need.’​[1193]​ This evidence alone is enough to discredit the idea of imposing mandatory palliative care on patients looking to use the AID Bill. Doing so is simply impractical in the current medical climate.

In recognition of this difficulty, the requirement that a patient must have received a course of palliative care that did not work effectively before being considered eligible for assistance is notably absent from clause 11 of the AID Bill – that which deals with the provision of palliative care. That clause in full states:

‘11(1) The primary and secondary physicians must not assist a patient under this Bill if, in his or her opinion there are palliative care options reasonably available to the patient to alleviate the patient’s pain and suffering to a level that is acceptable to the patient.

11(2) If a patient has been offered assistance under this Bill, and his/her palliative care brings about the remission of his/her suffering to a level acceptable to him, the physician must not, in pursuance of the patient’s original request for assistance, assist him or her under the Bill.

11(3) If the palliative care ceases to alleviate the patient’s pain and suffering to an acceptable level, the physician may continue to assist the patient under the Bill only if the patient indicates to him or her that the patient’s wish is to pursue the original request.’

In recognition of the fact that assisted dying should be ‘last ditch’,​[1194]​ available only once all feasible alternatives have failed, the sub-clauses are framed as restrictions on the availability of assistance under the Bill. They fulfil the same function that the now absent requirement of a failed course of palliative care once served, but do so in a manner which more appropriately respects both the patient’s autonomy and the limited availability of palliative medicine.

Sub-clause 11(1) is based heavily on section 8(1) of the now repealed Australian Act, in that it references both the physician’s objective opinion and the patient’s subjective appreciation of how well a given treatment works for him.​[1195]​ It is the patient’s opinion, not the physician’s, which carries more weight in this section, as it is he who decides how well the treatment options presented to him are impacting or will impact upon his condition. This emphasis leaves the choice of whether or not to pursue assistance under the Bill in the patient’s hands, and allows him to decline further unwanted interventions, instead of being subject to a perhaps overzealous but well meaning physician’s wish to carry on with them in an effort to, if not prolong his life, facilitate its continuation until his natural death.

Sub-clauses 11(2) and 11(3) apply, chronologically speaking, after sub-clause 11(1), and deal with the possible outcomes of a course of palliative care received by the patient after his initial request for assistance under the Bill. Like 11(1), they implement restrictions on the ability of the physician to assist the patient, and act as safeguards for the patient’s wellbeing as his circumstances change. 
                                       
8.3.4 ‘Part C’ An introduction to monitoring practices under the AID Bill

Unlike parts A and B of the AID Bill, Part C does not facilitate the compliance-innocence mode of regulation described in sections 7.3 of chapter 7 and 8.3.1 of the present chapter. It is instead concerned with describing the effect using the Bill has on the patient’s insurance and on creating a mechanism for regulating the practices the Bill makes excusable. This section will be split into two parts to facilitate a proper discussion of Part C of the AID Bill. The first will examine clause 12, which concerns the patient’s insurance, and the second those which regulate the practices made excusable under the Bill.

8.3.4(a) The AID Bill’s effect on the patient’s insurance

The fact that suicide negates numerous forms of insurance is one which has an obvious and important impact on patients seeking assistance in dying. But for the Swiss Criminal Code,​[1196]​ this issue is recognised explicitly by all of the pieces of legislation this work draws inspiration from, and is dealt with, broadly speaking, in two ways. The Belgian Act takes the more radical of the approaches, and dictates that the people who use the provisions within them are considered to have died of natural causes;
‘Any person who dies as a result of euthanasia performed in accordance with the conditions established by this Act is deemed to have died of natural causes for the purposes of contracts he/she had entered into, especially insurance contracts…’​[1197]​

This method, while workable inasmuch as it neatly sidesteps the above noted negation of insurance by suicide, employs questionable logic in meeting its ends. The wording itself presents the problem, since it is quite obvious that ‘...any person who dies as a result of euthanasia...’ does not ‘...(die) of natural causes...’. While it is understood that the section 15 statement does not literally mean that euthanasia and death by natural causes are equivalent, and while the comparison shows euthanasia in a positive light, to include such an inaccurate description within a Bill which is the product of a thesis based on semantic clarity would not be prudent. 

As such the second approach to dealing with insurance, that preferred by the majority of the jurisdictions under scrutiny, is that adopted by the AID Bill. This approach sees the focus shift from re-describing the nature of the patient’s death to the effect a request for assistance would have on an insurance policy. The Australian Act does this in section 19,

‘The sale, procurement or issuing of any life, health or accident insurance or annuity policy or the rate charged for such a policy is not to be conditioned on or affected by the making or rescinding of, or failure to make, a request for assistance under this Act or the giving of that assistance.’

The above example refers to two issues within the paragraph; the effect that asking for assistance under the legislation has on insurance, and the effect that actually receiving that assistance will have if it is successful and the patient dies.​[1198]​ The AID Bill addresses both issues also, but does so in two separate paragraphs for added clarity:

‘12(1) No policy of insurance which has been in force for 12 months as at the date of the patient’s death shall be invalidated by reason of a doctor having assisted a qualifying patient to die under the provisions of this Bill.

12(2) The issuance of life, health or accident insurance or annuity policy, or the rate charged for any policy, cannot be altered due to a request for assistance in suicide or euthanasia under this Bill.’

8.3.4(b) ‘Part C’ and regulation under the AID Bill 

The practice of PAS and euthanasia is regulated under statute in three ways; the imposition of criminal liability for breaching the terms of the Acts; the creation of review or governance committees​[1199]​ to whom the practitioner’s cases are sent for assessment, or provision is made for an existing body i.e. the Attorney General​[1200]​ or a Health Commission​[1201]​ to review to cases referred to them under the Act. The depth each piece of legislation gives the exigencies of the ‘governing bodies’ varies depending on which form of regulation is used. The Dutch legislation for example creates a new commission to deal specifically with claims under it and therefore sets out this body’s functions in great depth. The Australian legislation on the other hand and the Oregon Act give existing public officials and bodies the power to produce reports and review the workings of the legislation; the detail is therefore comparatively limited.

The AID Bill creates a series of region bound review commissions, much like those under the Dutch legislation. The composition of these commissions, detailed in clauses 14(2)(a) through 14(2)(e), was influenced by that of those in the Dutch Act and in Lord Joffe’s 2004 Bill, the former’s being comprised of:  

‘...an uneven number of members, including at any rate one legal specialist, also chairman, one physician and one expert on ethical or philosophical issues...’

Neither the Dutch legislation nor the AID Bill set a maximum number of members, though going on the characteristics listed under clause 14(2) and the reference to ‘three of its members’ being required for a majority vote in clause 14(3), the minimum number would be five.

The requirement that these members have expertise in certain areas is a characteristic shared by both pieces of legislation; medical doctors and lawyers being two common professions. Unlike the Dutch Act, the Belgian legislation also requires that, ‘Four members are drawn from groups that deal with the problem of incurably ill patients’.​[1202]​ This is a characteristic shared by the AID Bill and one that is necessary for the proper evaluation of a patient’s case.​[1203]​

As well as the identity of the members of the commissions, the uneven number of members was imported from the Dutch legislation into the AID Bill, though their 6 year term of office was not. Uneven numbers allow for a majority vote to be cast either way on a case brought before the commission, and the lack of a set term allows existing members the chance to retire their post if their professional circumstances change. Sub-clause 14(6) provides the Secretary of State the power to deal with such an eventuality by granting him the ability to, ‘...dismiss any of the members of the commissions both at their own request, and for reasons of unsuitability or incompetence.’





As section 8.3.4(b) noted, the imposition of criminal offences is another way through which the acts made excusable under legislation like the AID Bill can be regulated. Clause 15 and its four sub-clauses contain the offences committable under the Bill’s ambit;

‘15(1) Excluding witnesses as defined in clauses 8(3), 8(4), 8(5) and 8(6) of this Bill, a person commits an offence if he wilfully falsifies or forges a declaration made under clause 8 of this Bill with the intent or effect of causing the patient’s death. A person guilty of an offence under this sub-clause shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.

15(2) A witness commits an offence if he wilfully puts his name to a statement he knows to be false. A person guilty of an offence under this sub-clause shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

15(3) A person commits an offence if he wilfully conceals or destroys a declaration made under clause 8. A person guilty of an offence under this sub-clause shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.

15(4) A physician, psychiatrist, or witness commits an offence if he puts his name to a declaration in the knowledge that he will gain financially from the patient’s death. A person guilty of an offence under this sub-clause shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.’

But for the Common Law offences of murder and assisted suicide, which would be committed by a physician who did NOT comply with Parts A and B of AID Bill, the Clause 15(1) offence is the most serious under its ambit. The penalty, which like all those mentioned in clause 15 was influenced by those in section 11 of Lord Joffe’s Bill, reflects this, but is discretionary, as all of those under clause 15 are. This discretion was afforded to reflect the need for sensitivity regarding the circumstances possible defendants have found themselves in surrounding a patient’s death. 

Clause 15(3) by comparison details the least serious of the offences covered by the Bill. Unlike those covered in clauses 15(1), 15(2) and 15(4) which, if committed, could speed the patient’s death, the offence under clause 15(3) would have the opposite effect. Without the declaration, the patient cannot avail himself of the assistance permitted under the AID Bill. It is not his physical integrity that is threatened then, but his autonomy and likely also his emotional wellbeing given how stressful such a thing could be to both the patient and his family. It could be questioned therefore, since no physical harm results from the concealment or destruction of a declaration, whether there can truly be a case for penalising such conduct section 15(3) does.

The decision to criminalise the concealment or destruction of a declaration was made on the basis of the MSB's respect for autonomy and its argument that the exercise of autonomy is a primary good - comparable to the value of life in terms of importance.​[1204]​ By acting in the matter described in section 15(3), a person interferes with the patient's ability to exercise his autonomy. The effect of this offence  on the patient is considered by the MSB to be less deleterious than that conferred by the offences in sections 15(1), 15(2) and 15(4), hence the lower penalty, but still worthy of criminal sanctions.

Clauses 15(2) and 15(4) are tailored to enforce the need for impartiality between witnesses, physicians and other specialists when dealing with a patient’s case, and work in tandem with clause 8 and its sub-clauses in pursuit of this aim. Although complete impartiality is almost impossible to ensure,​[1205]​ it is important to minimise the risk of malfeasance as far as possible and the AID Bill does this by removing, as far as possible, the advantages one might gain from misusing it. Clause 8 goes furthest in pursuit of this goal, stipulating who may and may not witness the declaration the patient must sign before being assisted under the Bill;

‘The solicitor may only witness the declaration if...he has nothing to gain from the patient’s death.’​[1206]​

‘The second witness may only witness the declaration if...he has nothing to gain, pecuniary or otherwise, from the patient’s death.’​[1207]​

Coupled with this, there are five restrictions placed upon those who may act as the first and second witnesses to the patient’s declaration. These categories were informed by their subject’s relative proximity to the patient, their ability to exercise influence over his decision to end his life and the likelihood of their gaining some kind of advantage from his death;

‘Those people who cannot witness the declaration: (a) any person with a pecuniary interest in the patient’s death. (b) the primary physician. (c) the secondary physician, (d) the psychiatrist’.​[1208]​

And finally, to negate the chance of some kind of pecuniary benefit being the reason why a person would put their signature to the declaration entirely; 





In conclusion, the AID Bill aims to promote the autonomy of patients by allowing them the opportunity to choose to receive some form of assisted dying, and provides a mechanism through which this assistance is available. That having been said, the Bill does not legalise any kind of assisted dying, and while this fact may not save it, and other statutory instruments of its ilk, from the stigma often attached to them, it is concluded here that the Bill does not achieve any greater a step down the slippery slope than those already taken by the DDE and the use of passive euthanasia. These constructs, as chapters 1 and 2 showed, allow active assistance in dying to occur without regulation. The AID Bill, by contrast, is in and of itself a form of regulation. It does not overwrite either of the constructs questioned by the MSB, but rather regulates the practice both allow but neither acknowledges – the procurement of death by active means.

It is not the case however that the AID Bill follows all of the MSB's conclusions to the letter. Because the Bill is taken to be a hypothetical submission to Parliament in an attempt to change the law, including clauses that would clearly derail this process - legalising active euthanasia for example, or including minors under the Bill's ambit - would have been counterintuitive.





This thesis has aimed to prove that the current law on assisted dying, specifically that dealing with passive euthanasia and the doctrine of double effect (DDE), is based on flawed logic and requires urgent reform. It has sought, in exploring why this is the case, to answer the following question: ‘Why does the law on euthanasia need to be reformed, and how should that reform be effected?’ 

Answering this question prompted the creation of a theoretical construct called the Moral Step Back (MSB), which both names and provides an explanation for the effect that relying on passive euthanasia and the DDE has. They allow physicians, in circumstances where a death results from an omission of treatment or the provision of pain relief, to take a moral step back from the results of their actions, freeing them from both moral and legal culpability. While this freedom is recognised as a positive thing by the MSB, it maintains that passive euthanasia and the DDE excuse an otherwise illegal thing – procuring death by active means – without any logical basis for granting that excuse. Because of this, active assistance in dying is currently available, and is not regulated by anything more than the physician’s conscience.

Chapters 1 and 2 set the ground work for this contention, showing, respectively, that the distinction between acts and omissions in the context of passive euthanasia and that between intention and foresight in the DDE are, in certain circumstances, questionable to the point of non-existence. This theory was put to the interviewees who got involved in the empirical aspect of this work, and their opinions on these and numerous other questions are referred to throughout this work, and are listed in section 8.2.1 of chapter 8 of this work. 

On the act/omission distinction 11 of the 13 interviewees concurred that the distinction did exist, and in this sense disagreed with the MSB’s premise to the contrary. This is an understandable position for them to take however, as in their everyday practice they had all been involved in withdrawing treatment in one scenario or other. A supposition like the MSB that labels such omissions as actions, particularly in a scenario where a death results, is understandably unwelcome. 

The interviewees had a similar reaction to the MSB’s avowed disdain for the distinction between intention and foresight in the DDE. Of the 13 practitioners involved, 11 felt that the distinction is a valid one and therefore disagreed with chapter 2’s attempts to diminish it. As with the act/omission distinction, their reasons for wishing to maintain the DDE and its central distinction were based on their reliance or possible future reliance on them.​[1210]​ Both allow necessary and morally correct actions to be legally taken in extremely difficult situations, and give the physicians involved a way to justify their actions to themselves, and to the courts, should they need to.​[1211]​

Be that as it may, 7 of the 11 interviewees who agreed that the act/omission distinction was accurate felt that reforming the law on assisted dying would be a positive step, as did 5 of the 11 who believed the intention/foresight distinction is sound.  They reached the same conclusion the MSB did, but through different means. One felt that the law needs ‘turning upside down’ because at present it made no sense to him.​[1212]​ Another, ‘Doctor 8’, felt that reform of some kind could render greater clarity on an area of law and policy that is confusing.​[1213]​ ‘Doctor 12’ felt that it is the disparity between patient demographics and fairness that are the main reasons the law should be reformed.​[1214]​  

These formative chapters concluded that relying on the contested distinctions perpetuates illogical reasoning and double standards at law, and chapter 3 aimed to prove this assertion by exposing how the principle of autonomy is routinely respected in cases where a patient dies as a result of a requested omission of treatment but not following an active request. It was shown that, based on nothing more than the erroneous distinction between omission and action, a perfectly competent patient can, in the former instance, precipitate a course of action that will result in his death, where in the latter he is unable to do so. Since the MSB argues that both actions and omissions, as discussed in section 1.4 of chapter 1 of this work, are equivalent in their ends and means, the patient should be as able in one situation as he is in the other because there is simply no distinction to base stopping him on.​[1215]​

These flaws are tolerated, chapter 3 claimed, because they allow physicians to do in their practice what the drug Soma does in Huxley’s Brave New World; they allow the unpalatable truths of one’s situation to be glossed over in favour of more socially and personally acceptable ‘truths’ which are in actuality, while psychologically comforting, not true at all.​[1216]​ Thus, a physician who withdraws treatment is said to ‘only’ omit it, and a physician who acts intentionally is said not to intend the death his actions cause, when in reality the former is acting, not omitting, and the latter intends the consequences the DDE claims he only foresees. 

The Soma-like effect of passive euthanasia and the DDE could be implied from the empirical findings of this work. The overwhelming majority of the interviewees concurred that they supported maintaining the distinctions that the MSB disputes for the reasons outlined in the above paragraphs. This inference is tempered however, by the fact that only two of them, ‘Doctor 3’​[1217]​ and ‘Doctor 4’,​[1218]​ expressly mentioned some kind of psychological assistance or distancing that comes from using either construct. The majority in fact cited the comfort of the patient as opposed to that of the doctor as the most pressing reason why it is appropriate to maintain the distinctions passive euthanasia and the DDE use. They felt that not doing so could cause patients to fear that their doctors are out to do them harm instead of always seeking to cure or assist them in positive ways.​[1219]​ This issue, while acknowledged and explored by this work in section 6.7 of chapter 6, was not given a great deal of attention during the interviews because they were focused on the physicians’ experiences as opposed to those of their patients. 

Also, the use of these distinctions as Soma for the conscience is not, in and of itself, the matter the MSB takes issue with. Indeed, if they allow the proper and fair practice of medicine, they are to be lauded. Rather, it is the implication that assisted dying is both available and unregulated under the guises of passivity and foreseen but unintended deaths under the DDE which spurred this work to claim that reform to the law is not only desirable but necessary. 

In grounding this claim, chapter 4 dismissed one of the most predominant counterarguments against using the protection of autonomy as a basis for needing legal change. Proponents of this argument, Patterson,​[1220]​ Keown​[1221]​ and Gormally​[1222]​ to name three, argue that the value of life outweighs the value of preserving a person’s autonomy in all circumstances.  The MSB on the other hand makes a case for the exercise of autonomy being of comparable value to life, for without it one would not be able to interact with one’s world and gain the innumerate positive effects from doing so.

Chapters 5 and 6 expanded on chapter 4’s conclusion and explored the wider debate on whether or not reform would be either legally or morally sound. The interviews conducted pursuant to this work also touched upon this area, with 7 of the 13 practitioners interviewed agreeing that some kind of reform could be implemented without offending the overarching moral principles prevalent in modern medicine.​[1223]​ All but one of those who supported reform however felt that legalising assisted dying in any form would be ill advised, and the AID Bill’s format reflects this. 

Chapter 6 section 6.7 also exposed a shortcoming of the empirical element of this work; namely the lack of data on how patients perceive their physicians as a result of the use of the DDE and passive euthanasia. While such an investigation is outside the remit of this work, it is an interesting area for further study.

Chapter 7 explored the numerous possible avenues through which reform could be affected to the law, and chapter 8 built on the conclusion that legislative reform would best serve the MSB’s purposes and set about introducing and deconstructing the AID Bill. The Bill’s strengths and weaknesses were discussed and its format dissected, and it was concluded that, though imperfect, and unlikely to spur Parliament to reconsider the law on euthanasia, it nevertheless adds an important new point of view to the debate on assisted dying. 






















(1)	The provisions of this Bill provide immunity from prosecution to doctors who perform active euthanasia as defined under clause 2(1) of this Bill on a person who has an intractable illness which: a) is causing him/her untreatable pain which cannot be adequately alleviated by palliative care and b) may have caused him/her to be physically incapable of taking his/her own life.

(2)	Or, who provide a person who is suffering from untreatable pain as a consequence of an intractable illness, which cannot be adequately relieved by palliative care, with a means to end his/her own life with dignity at a time of his/her choosing.







	(1)	     For the purposes of this Bill-

“active euthanasia” means the intentional procurement of a patient’s death by way of either withdrawing or removing life-sustaining treatment, or by administering a lethal agent.
“adequately” the adequacy of a treatment is to be measured by the patient’s subjective experience of its effects.
“capacity” is assessed under the provisions of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005 part 1, sections 1, 2 and 3 and means that the qualifying patient is legally able to consent to treatment. If this element is not established no treatment can be given.
“competent” means having the capacity to make a considered and rational choice concerning treatment.
“declaration” means a witnessed declaration made in writing by the qualifying patient in the form set out in Schedule 1 of this Bill.
“family doctor” means the qualifying patient’s doctor. This person can also fulfil the role of ‘primary physician’ but is not obliged to in any way.
“incapacity” means the inability to legally consent to treatment. The phrase incompetent is to be construed in the same manner.
“independent” means to be free from outside influences. To be independent a person must have nothing to gain from the situation and their involvement must not be influenced by relationships with those involved i.e. a family member cannot witness the declaration made by the qualifying patient as he/she may benefit from his/her death.
“informed decision” means a decision made by the qualifying patient who, in possession of all of the material facts i.e. his/her  prognosis, possible alternative treatments, further palliative care, decides he/she wishes to end his/her life under the provisions of the Bill.
“intractable illness” means a physical illness which, in the reasonable medical judgement of the primary and secondary physicians, is inevitably progressive, the effects of which cannot be reversed by any treatment acceptable to the patient, although temporary relief may be possible.
“lethal agent” refers to the drug administered or provided to the patient by the primary physician with which the patient’s life is ended.
			“patient” means a person who is under the care of a physician.
“physician” means a registered medical practitioner.
“primary physician” means the physician approached by the qualifying patient regarding physician assisted suicide. This could, but need not be the qualifying patient’s family doctor.
“psychiatrist” means a registered practicing psychiatrist.
“qualifying patient” means a patient who meets the conditions set down in clause 3 of this Bill.
“secondary physician” means a physician practicing in the National Health Service who is qualified by speciality to make a professional diagnosis and prognosis regarding the qualifying patient’s condition and who is independent of the primary physician.
“sessions” refers to the consultations between the primary and secondary physicians and the qualifying patient. 
“untreatable pain” means corporeal, bodily pain and/or mental anguish, which cannot be adequately alleviated to the patient’s satisfaction by palliative care.
“waiting period” means the period of time that must elapse between the patient’s initial request for assisted suicide and the administration of drugs to cause death; a minimum of 14 days. 





3	The provision of immunity from prosecution to doctors who act in accordance with the provisions of this Bill

(1)	Subject to the provisions of clauses 1(1), 1(2) and Part B of this Bill, any primary physician, acting in good faith, who takes positive steps to end his patient’s life, or attempts to do so, when that patient is a qualifying patient and may be, due to his/her illness, physically incapable for ending his/her own life, will not be guilty of an offence.

(2)	Subject to the provisions of clauses 1(1), 1(2) and Part B of this Bill, any primary physician acting in good faith, who provides a qualifying patient with a lethal agent with which he/she takes his/her own life, will not be guilty of an offence.







4	 	Defining the qualifying patient

	(1) Before the primary physician can assist the qualifying patient’s suicide or perform euthanasia, the conditions set out in the following clause must be met.

(a) The patient must be suffering from untreatable pain as a result of an intractable illness.
(b) The patient may, by virtue of his/her intractable illness or other physical incapacity, be unable to take his/her own life.
(c) The patient must have reached the age of 18 years.	
(d) Subject to the provisions in clauses 5(1), 5(2), 6(2) and 6(3), the patient must be deemed to have capacity to consent to treatment.

5		The primary physician’s response to a request for assistance

(1) Once the patient has requested assisted suicide or euthanasia the primary physician must make a preliminary diagnosis and prognosis. 

(2) Psychiatric referral is not mandatory under this Bill. However if, in his opinion, the patient is suffering from a psychological or psychiatric problem the primary physician must refer him to a qualified psychiatrist.

(3) If, after psychiatric evaluation the patient is either found to be unable to consent to treatment and/or is under the influence of others to seek assistance in dying, the request for PAS or euthanasia under this Bill will be considered void and the patient will be offered counselling and treatment for his/her mental issues.

(4) If the patient is deemed competent, the primary physician’s duties are as follows:

(a) He must thoroughly examine the patient and conclude to the best of his ability that his prognosis and diagnosis are accurate.
(b) He must conclude on the basis of the psychiatrist’s evaluation (if one was consulted in pursuance of clause 5(2)) and his own examination of the patient that he/she is competent to consent to treatment and that he is free of coercion.
 (c) He must conclude on the basis of his diagnosis/prognosis that the patient is in untreatable corporeal pain.
(d) He must, (in collusion with the psychiatrist if one was consulted in pursuance of clause 5(2)) counsel the patient repeatedly about his/her options regarding further treatment, further palliative care and pain control. The minimum number of these sessions is four.
(e) If, after the minimum number of the sessions referred to in clause 5(4)(d)  has passed, the patient repeats his/her request for euthanasia or PAS the primary physician and the psychiatrist (if one was consulted in pursuance of clause 5(2)) must talk him/her through the process of euthanasia/PAS to ensure full comprehension before making the referral to the secondary physician.

(5) No person may give or promise to give the primary or secondary medical practitioner any reward or advantage for either assisting, or refusing to assist a patient to die. Furthermore, any physician who accepts such a reward or advantage has no legal right or capacity to receive or retain it

6		The role of the secondary physician

(1)	Once the provisions in clause 5 are complied with the patient is referred to the secondary physician. 

(2)	Before the first session with the patient the secondary physician must have received the patient’s medical records and the records of the sessions held with the primary physician and the psychiatrist (if one was consulted pursuant to clause 5(2)). From these he must make a preliminary judgement on:

	(a) The patient’s competence to consent to treatment.
	(b) The freedom with which the patient has made his/her request.

(3)	If either point (2)(a) or (2)(b) is in doubt the secondary physician must refer the patient to an independent psychiatrist for a full psychiatric evaluation/treatment.

(4)	If the patient has already been referred to a psychiatrist under clause 5(2), he/she will be re-referred for a consultation to ascertain whether he/she is competent, and whether his/her request for assistance under this Bill has been made free from coercion.

(5) The secondary physician must have at least four sessions with the patient, during which he will:

(a)	ensure that the diagnosis/prognosis of the primary physician is correct through thorough examinations of the patient.
(b)	counsel the patient as to possible palliative care options/further treatment/pain control.
(c)	discuss the patient’s family situation and offer support and guidance if need be.
(d)	conclude that the patient is in untreatable corporeal pain.
(e)	inform the patient of the process of euthanasia/PAS.





(1)	The phrase “sessions” in paragraphs (5)(4)(d), (5)(4)(e), (6)(2) and (6)(5) refers to the individual consultations between the patient and his/her doctors/psychiatrist. These sessions must:

(a)	be held in a time and place suitable for the patient.
(b)	be at least 20 minutes in length each to ensure proper counsel is given.
(c)	be tailored to the patient’s individual needs.

(2)	General themes which must be covered in the sessions include but are not restricted to:

(a)	how the patient’s palliative care is progressing.
(b)	his/her diagnosis/prognosis as it progresses over time.
(c)	the alternatives to PAS.
(d)	his/her family situation.




(1)	When clauses 4, 5 and 6 have been fulfilled the patient must make a declaration in the form set out in Schedule One of this Bill.
	
(2)	The declaration must be signed by:	

(a)	the patient.
(b)	the primary physician to attest the patient’s diagnosis/prognosis.
(c)	the psychiatrist (if one was consulted pursuant to clause 5(2) or 6(3)) to attest the patient’s competence to consent to treatment.
(d)	the secondary physician to attest the diagnosis/prognosis of the primary physician.

(3)	These signatures must be witnessed by two independent witnesses, one of whom must be a solicitor with a current practising certificate.

(4)	The solicitor may only witness the declaration if:

(a)	he is independent of the patient and the patient’s family.
(b)	he has nothing to gain from the patient’s death.
(c)	the patient has provided proof of his/her identity.

(5)	The second witness may only witness the declaration if:

(a)	the patient has proved his/her identity to him/he knows the patient.
(b)	he has nothing to gain, pecuniary or otherwise, from the patient’s death.

(6)	Those people who cannot witness the declaration:






(7)	The declaration will come into force after the requisite waiting period has elapsed and will remain in force unless revoked or after the passage of six months.

(8)	The patient and witnesses shall sign and witness the declaration respectively at the same time and in each other’s presence. 

(9)	  Any person who signs the declaration forfeits any and all financial and other benefits that person would otherwise, directly or indirectly, gain as a result of the patient’s death.






(1) Prior to administering or making a lethal agent available to the patient under this Bill the primary physician must:

(a)	inform the patient of his/her right to revoke the declaration.
(b)	recommend to the patient that he/she notifies his/her next of kin of his/her request for assistance under this Bill.
(c)	verify immediately before assisting the patient’s suicide/performing euthanasia that the declaration is in force and that it has not been revoked.
(d)	ask the patient immediately prior to assisting his/her suicide if he wishes to revoke the declaration.

(2)	The primary physician will either:
(a)	provide the qualifying patient with the lethal agent, with which that patient will end his/her own life in the physician’s presence, or;








(1) This clause recognises the right of medical practitioners to object to giving either assisted suicide or euthanasia. Any family doctor/primary/secondary physician who is approached by a qualifying patient in pursuance of aid under the provisions of this Bill is under no obligation, contractual or otherwise to render such aid if he/she conscientiously objects to doing so.

(2) The primary physician has no obligation to refer the patient to a specific doctor who will assist him/her under this Bill.






(1) The primary and secondary physicians must not assist a patient under this Bill if, in his or her opinion there are palliative care options reasonably available to the patient to alleviate the patient’s pain and suffering to a level that is acceptable to the patient.

(2) If a patient has been offered assistance under this Bill, and his/her palliative care brings about the remission of his/her suffering to a level acceptable to him, the physician must not, in pursuance of the patient’s original request for assistance, assist him or her under the Bill.








(1) No policy of insurance which has been in force for 12 months as at the date of the patient’s death shall be invalidated by reason of a doctor having assisted a qualifying patient to die under the provisions of this Bill.

(2) The issuance of life, health or accident insurance or annuity policy, or the rate charged for any policy, cannot be altered due to a request for assistance in suicide or euthanasia under this Bill.


13		Documentation and medical records

(1) The primary physician shall ensure that the following are documented and filed in the patient’s medical records-

(a) the reports of the psychiatrist, primary and secondary physicians detailing the patient’s capacity to consent to treatment and the freedom with which that consent has been given
(b) any written or oral requests from the patient for assistance under this Bill
(c) the declaration





(1) There shall be established such number of Monitoring Commissions covering countries or regions forming part of Great Britain as the Secretary of State may determine, to review the operation of this Bill, and to hold and monitor records maintained pursuant to this Bill.

(2) A Commission shall consist of an uneven number of members appointed by the Secretary of State, of whom-
	(a) one shall be a legal practitioner
	(b) one shall be a registered medical practitioner
	(c) one shall be a registered psychiatrist
	(d) one shall be an expert in palliative care/hospices
(e) one shall be a lay person having firsthand knowledge or experience caring for a person with an intractable illness

(3) If, in relation to a file sent to a Commission in accordance with clause 13(2), three of its members consider that the qualifying conditions have not been met, they shall refer the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

(4) A Commission to which a file has been sent in accordance with clause 13(2) shall confirm to the primary physician concerned whether the qualifying conditions have been met as soon as reasonably possible after the date of receiving such notification of the patient having been assisted to die, whether or not such assistance led to the patient’s death.

(5) The Secretary of State shall publish an annual statistical report of information collected under this clause.

(6) The Secretary of State may dismiss any of the members of the Commissions both at their own request, and for reasons of unsuitability or incompetence.

(7) All of the members of the Commissions shall receive a holiday allowance, as well as a reimbursement of travel and accommodation expenses, insofar as these expenses are not already reimbursed from State Funds.

(8) The members of the Commissions are obliged to keep confidential any information acquired in the performance of their duties, except where any statutory provision obliges them to disclose that information, or where disclosure is necessary in pursuance of their other duties.






(1) Excluding witnesses as defined in clauses 8(3), 8(4), 8(5) and 8(6) of this Bill, a person commits an offence if he wilfully falsifies or forges a declaration made under clause 8 of this Bill with the intent or effect of causing the patient’s death. A person guilty of an offence under this sub-clause shall be liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life.

(2) A witness commits an offence if he wilfully puts his name to a statement he knows to be false. A person guilty of an offence under this sub-clause shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.

(3) A person commits an offence if he wilfully conceals or destroys a declaration made under clause 8. A person guilty of an offence under this sub-clause shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.

(4) A physician, psychiatrist, or witness commits an offence if he puts his name to a declaration in the knowledge that he will gain financially from the patient’s death. A person guilty of an offence under this sub-clause shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.


16		Power to make regulations

	(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations under this Bill—

(a) to ensure the intent of this Bill is carried out;
(b) determining classes of persons who may or may not witness a declaration made under clause 8;
(c) regulating the custody of records and the collection of information regarding the operation of this Bill; and
(d) making provision about appointments to and the operation of the Commissions.

(2) The power to make regulations under this Bill is exercisable by Statutory Instrument.





17		Short title and extent

(1) This Bill may be cited as the Assistance In Dying Bill 2011.














































I,__________________, am an adult of sound mind who has been resident in Great Britain for at least twelve months as at the date of this declaration.

I have been counselled by a psychiatrist, Dr________________, who has determined that I am legally able to consent to treatment.

I am suffering from___________________________, which my primary physician, Dr_________________________, has determined is an intractable illness and which has been confirmed by the secondary physician, Dr___________________________. This illness is causing me untreatable pain. I have received a course(s) of palliative care on the recommendation of my doctors and these have had little to no impact on my condition.

I have been informed of and counselled extensively regarding my diagnosis, prognosis, alternative treatments and the process of being assisted to die.

Please delete as appropriate:

(1) I request that my primary physician provide me with a lethal agent with the objective of assisting me to die.

(2) I request that my primary physician administers a lethal agent to me with the objective to assisting me to die.

I have decided to inform/not decided to inform my family of my decision.










I declare that I am a solicitor with a current practising certificate and that:

(a)	I am independent of the patient and his/her family
(b)	I have nothing to gain from the patient’s death
(c)	The patient has provided proof of his/her identity to me
(d)	I am certain, on the evidence provided by the primary and secondary physicians, and by the psychiatrist that the patient is of sound mind and that his/her decision is free from extraneous influences
(e)	I am satisfied that the patient understands the effect of the declaration and that it can be revoked at any time

Signed: _________________________________ (Witness 1)

Date:    _________________________________

I declare that I:

(a)	I have nothing to gain from the patient’s death
(b)	The patient has provided proof of his/her identity to me
(c)	I am certain, on the evidence provided by the primary and secondary physicians, and by the psychiatrist that the patient is of sound mind and that his/her decision is free from extraneous influences
(d)	I am satisfied that the patient understands the effect of the declaration and that it can be revoked at any time

Signed: _________________________________ (Witness 2)






1. One of the witnesses must be a solicitor with a current practising certificate who has satisfied himself that the patient understands the effect of the declaration.

2. The patient and witnesses shall sign and witness the declaration respectively at the same time and each in the presence of the others.
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Diagram 1 – Double effect

Intended consequence – amelioration of pain

The intention(al) provision of a bolus of morphine

The state of acting intentionally – without coercion.

Foreseen (though unintended) consequence - death

Diagram 2 – boundaries?













^1	  The possible options for reforming the law considered in chapter 7 of this work are as follows: legalising euthanasia or physician assisted suicide (PAS); creating a set of regulations on assisted dying with strict requirements of consent; creating a special defence for those who have committed euthanasia; providing immunity from prosecution if a physician involved in assisting death follows a set procedure(s); substituting murder and manslaughter with unlawful homicide; forming a new category of offence called ‘killing with compassion’; creating a Permanent Standing Advisory Committee to draw up a code of practice containing guidelines to review developments and form Working Parties; creating a notification system of an intended assisted death to an independent body who would act on the patient’s behalf; the adoption of a ‘non-prosecution policy where there is no evidence of a ‘victim’ and, removing euthanasia from the scope of the criminal law.
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